Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - Tnubu

In the name of Brothers keepers mentality, it should be understandable that Nigeria 

appealed to Uncle Sam to help with security

Professor Jibrin Ibrahim was registering more than disappointment here when

he cried,

“Trump’s United States of America that promised to kill off security threats in the

country, and rescue Christian victims “guns a blazing” are running out

of the country with their tails between their legs.” - but he does not explain why they are “ running out of the country” 

Soon enough the commentators will be commentating on The State of the World’s Human Rights: April 2026  with a special focus on NIGERIA as a country of great concern 

The insecurity situation will have to be considerably improved before the elections that are slated for January 16,  2027 

However,  all is not gloom and doom, in the midst of these birthing problems there are impressive infrastructure projects such as the Lagos Port and road projects to be upbeat about…

On Tuesday, 21 April 2026 at 09:05:11 UTC+2 Okey Iheduru wrote:

"Nigerians have not had it so bad in recent history. The country is unravelling and the government is vacillating between denial and a pompous lack of concern to multiple unfolding crises." --  Professor Jibrin Ibrahim

Ethnic harvest has its consequences. Too late for buyers' remorse!

On Sat, Apr 18, 2026 at 8:20 AM Jibrin Ibrahim <jibrinib...@gmail.com> wrote:

Tinubu is Unravelling the Nation



Jibrin Ibrahim, Deepening Democracy, Daily Trust, 17th April 2026

Nigerians have not had it so bad in recent history. The country is
unravelling and the government is vacillating between denial and a
pompous lack of concern to multiple unfolding crises. Trump’s United
States of America that promised to kill off security threats in the
country, and rescue Christian victims “guns a blazing” are running out
of the country with their tails between their legs. The US State
Department, in a travel advisory, authorised  non-emergency government
employee and their family members to leave its embassy in Abuja due to
the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria. Visa services in the
Embassy have been suspended.

The Associated Press, just published a report that insurgents are now
headed for the Nation’s capital, Abuja with planned attacks on
landmark sites including the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport and
a prison facility in Abuja, as well as a military detention centre in
neighbouring Niger state.  The report said Nigeria’s security forces
are on high alert over the threat. The attack on the airport, says the
report, would be similar to the recent terrorist strike on Niamey
International airport in Niger Republic. Their intention is to release
detained terrorists and inflict significant damage on critical
aviation infrastructure. Many of Nigeria’s governing class have
stopped visiting their home towns and now they are no longer safe even
in Abuja.

In recent weeks, the Islamist militant groups Boko Haram and Islamic
State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have been launching coordinated
overnight attacks on multiple locations in Nigeria's northeastern
Borno state, killing an army ‌general and a Col in recent days and
several other soldiers. Nigeria's Defence Headquarters said insurgents
attacked a key military base in Benisheikh where the general was
killed. The killing of the Commander 29 Brigade, Brigadier-General
Oseni Braimah, who responded with exceptional courage to the attack
has been painful to Nigerians who feel the pain of losing so many
senior officers. Boko Haram and ISWAP who have been fighting and
killing each other for years are now uniting to combat the Nigerian
armed forces and targeting officers to break the command structure of
the armed forces.

Since the war started in 2009, the 17-year Islamist insurgency in
northeast Nigeria has killed thousands ⁠of people and displaced at
least 2 million in repeated attacks. Sadly, for the people in the
zone, the insurgency in Nigeria’s north-east and some parts of the
north-west have remained a theatre of persistent violence, with
insurgents repeatedly targeting both civilians and military
formations.  What started as Boko Haram has since evolved into
multiple factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province
(ISWAP), which is linked to the Islamic State (ISIS). ISWAP
intensified its attacks in 2025 when it launched what it described as
the “camp Holocaust” — a strategic campaign aimed at weakening the
operational capacity of security forces by targeting military
positions. The onslaught has led to the killing of more senior
officers.

Many top-quality officers have been lost over the years. They include
DAHIRU CHIROMA BAKO (2020), a colonel under Operation Lafiya Dole, was
ambushed near Wajiroko in Borno state in September 2020. He later died
from injuries sustained in the attack despite undergoing surgery at a
military hospital. Z. MANU (2020), a lieutenant colonel, was killed in
September 2020 during an operation in Katsina state. He died after
bandits ambushed his team in Unguwar Doka village in Faskari LGA.
DZARMA ZIRKUSU (2021), a brigadier general and commander of the 28
Task Force Brigade in Chibok, was killed in November 2021. He died
alongside other soldiers in an ISWAP ambush in Askira Uba, Borno
state.

COL ALIYU SAIDU PAIKO (2025) was killed by Boko Haram fighters when he
was the commanding officer of the 202 Battalion in Bama LGA, along
with other soldiers. MUSA UBA (2025), a brigadier general, was killed
near Wajiroko in Borno state in 2025 after ISWAP fighters ambushed
troops along the Damboa–Wajiroko road.  UMAR IBRAHIM MAIRIGA (2026)
killed on March 1, 2026, when fighters linked to the Islamic State
West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacked a military formation in Mayenti,
Bama LGA, killing Umar Ibrahim Mairiga, the commanding officer, and
several soldiers. The assault targeted a base near Bama town.

S.I. ILIYASU (2026). On March 6, 2026, insurgents carried out
coordinated attacks on multiple military positions across Borno state,
including Konduga, Mainok, Jakana, and Marte, between 10 pm and 3 pm
the following day. During the offensive, S.I. Iliyasu, a lieutenant
colonel and commanding officer of the 222 Battalion, was killed in an
attack on a major base in the Konduga area. UMAR FAROUQ (2026). On
March 9, 2026, insurgents overran a military base in the Kukawa LGA of
Borno state, killing Umar Farouq, a lieutenant colonel, along with
several soldiers.

What is disturbing is that it is the men and officers of the Nigerian
army that are under siege and not the insurgents. Sadly, our troops
are not getting enough state-of-the-art armaments and equipment to
enable them win the war. Civilians are of course the biggest victims.
According to Amnesty International, at least 1,100 people were
abducted across northern Nigeria between January and April 2026,
warning that the scale and pattern of the attacks reflect a deepening
security crisis and a failure of authorities to protect vulnerable
communities. The organisation said those abducted are often subjected
to extreme violence and inhumane conditions. “Those abducted are
frequently subjected to torture, starvation, amputation, rape, and
forced to witness or commit atrocities.” The group noted that the
abductions, largely driven by ransom demands, have become widespread
across rural communities and camps for internally displaced persons.

While the entire country is unravelling due to the atrocities being
committed by non-state actors who are massacring citizens and security
personnel alike, the focus of the government has been using the
judiciary and the electoral commission to cause confusion within
political parties to block them from contesting next year’s election.
It is unfortunate that there is insufficient focus on addressing the
multiple security, economic and political challenges facing the
country. Continuing with this laissez-aller attitude raises the risk
of system collapse that can do no good to the Nation and the people.
President Tinubu should focus on saving the Nation rather than being
obsessive on presiding over its ruins forever.



Professor Jibrin Ibrahim
Senior Fellow
Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja
Follow me on twitter @jibrinibrahim17

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Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - Tnubu

Also note that in Cameroon Pope Leo XIV indirectly walked back his earlier indirect comments on 45/47.

On Monday, April 20, 2026, 4:31 PM, Cornelius Hamelberg <corneliushamelberg@gmail.com> wrote:

https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=954578187330444&set=a.221879027267034

On Sunday, 19 April 2026 at 13:15:10 UTC+2 Dr. Oohay wrote:

A very compelling critique;  apparently, Naija needs a transformational way of politicking. Politics based presumably essentially on “binary” logic only AIN’T working at all. See politics as basically a game that demands a (political) game theory — aka mereology (which in my lingo I call “mereology”). By the way, does “democracy” exist anywhere? My dear sisthas and brothas of the whole wide/wild world — oh comrades of the (utopian, aka dystopian) world, vMarxism ain’t an answer at all. “Russia” tried it and failed; Cuba has been trying it and keeps failing, etc. Hope AIN’T an answer either. Needed: pragmatic wise way of politicking. I love you all  (most of the time). Hope as a zero concept means having no plan at all and yet expecting to succeed. As one WISE USAmerican noted, having no plan means planning to fail. We need “WISE” plans that resist change just for the sake of change (or “fake” earthly fame).

Oohay

On Saturday, April 18, 2026, 10:20 AM, Jibrin Ibrahim <jibrinib...@gmail.com> wrote:

Tinubu is Unravelling the Nation

Jibrin Ibrahim, Deepening Democracy, Daily Trust, 17th April 2026

Nigerians have not had it so bad in recent history. The country is

unravelling and the government is vacillating between denial and a

pompous lack of concern to multiple unfolding crises. Trump’s United

States of America that promised to kill off security threats in the

country, and rescue Christian victims “guns a blazing” are running out

of the country with their tails between their legs. The US State

Department, in a travel advisory, authorised  non-emergency government

employee and their family members to leave its embassy in Abuja due to

the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria. Visa services in the

Embassy have been suspended.

The Associated Press, just published a report that insurgents are now

headed for the Nation’s capital, Abuja with planned attacks on

landmark sites including the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport and

a prison facility in Abuja, as well as a military detention centre in

neighbouring Niger state.  The report said Nigeria’s security forces

are on high alert over the threat. The attack on the airport, says the

report, would be similar to the recent terrorist strike on Niamey

International airport in Niger Republic. Their intention is to release

detained terrorists and inflict significant damage on critical

aviation infrastructure. Many of Nigeria’s governing class have

stopped visiting their home towns and now they are no longer safe even

in Abuja.

In recent weeks, the Islamist militant groups Boko Haram and Islamic

State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have been launching coordinated

overnight attacks on multiple locations in Nigeria's northeastern

Borno state, killing an army ‌general and a Col in recent days and

several other soldiers. Nigeria's Defence Headquarters said insurgents

attacked a key military base in Benisheikh where the general was

killed. The killing of the Commander 29 Brigade, Brigadier-General

Oseni Braimah, who responded with exceptional courage to the attack

has been painful to Nigerians who feel the pain of losing so many

senior officers. Boko Haram and ISWAP who have been fighting and

killing each other for years are now uniting to combat the Nigerian

armed forces and targeting officers to break the command structure of

the armed forces.

Since the war started in 2009, the 17-year Islamist insurgency in

northeast Nigeria has killed thousands ⁠of people and displaced at

least 2 million in repeated attacks. Sadly, for the people in the

zone, the insurgency in Nigeria’s north-east and some parts of the

north-west have remained a theatre of persistent violence, with

insurgents repeatedly targeting both civilians and military

formations.  What started as Boko Haram has since evolved into

multiple factions, including the Islamic State West Africa Province

(ISWAP), which is linked to the Islamic State (ISIS). ISWAP

intensified its attacks in 2025 when it launched what it described as

the “camp Holocaust” — a strategic campaign aimed at weakening the

operational capacity of security forces by targeting military

positions. The onslaught has led to the killing of more senior

officers.

Many top-quality officers have been lost over the years. They include

DAHIRU CHIROMA BAKO (2020), a colonel under Operation Lafiya Dole, was

ambushed near Wajiroko in Borno state in September 2020. He later died

from injuries sustained in the attack despite undergoing surgery at a

military hospital. Z. MANU (2020), a lieutenant colonel, was killed in

September 2020 during an operation in Katsina state. He died after

bandits ambushed his team in Unguwar Doka village in Faskari LGA.

DZARMA ZIRKUSU (2021), a brigadier general and commander of the 28

Task Force Brigade in Chibok, was killed in November 2021. He died

alongside other soldiers in an ISWAP ambush in Askira Uba, Borno

state.

COL ALIYU SAIDU PAIKO (2025) was killed by Boko Haram fighters when he

was the commanding officer of the 202 Battalion in Bama LGA, along

with other soldiers. MUSA UBA (2025), a brigadier general, was killed

near Wajiroko in Borno state in 2025 after ISWAP fighters ambushed

troops along the Damboa–Wajiroko road.  UMAR IBRAHIM MAIRIGA (2026)

killed on March 1, 2026, when fighters linked to the Islamic State

West Africa Province (ISWAP) attacked a military formation in Mayenti,

Bama LGA, killing Umar Ibrahim Mairiga, the commanding officer, and

several soldiers. The assault targeted a base near Bama town.

S.I. ILIYASU (2026). On March 6, 2026, insurgents carried out

coordinated attacks on multiple military positions across Borno state,

including Konduga, Mainok, Jakana, and Marte, between 10 pm and 3 pm

the following day. During the offensive, S.I. Iliyasu, a lieutenant

colonel and commanding officer of the 222 Battalion, was killed in an

attack on a major base in the Konduga area. UMAR FAROUQ (2026). On

March 9, 2026, insurgents overran a military base in the Kukawa LGA of

Borno state, killing Umar Farouq, a lieutenant colonel, along with

several soldiers.

What is disturbing is that it is the men and officers of the Nigerian

army that are under siege and not the insurgents. Sadly, our troops

are not getting enough state-of-the-art armaments and equipment to

enable them win the war. Civilians are of course the biggest victims.

According to Amnesty International, at least 1,100 people were

abducted across northern Nigeria between January and April 2026,

warning that the scale and pattern of the attacks reflect a deepening

security crisis and a failure of authorities to protect vulnerable

communities. The organisation said those abducted are often subjected

to extreme violence and inhumane conditions. “Those abducted are

frequently subjected to torture, starvation, amputation, rape, and

forced to witness or commit atrocities.” The group noted that the

abductions, largely driven by ransom demands, have become widespread

across rural communities and camps for internally displaced persons.

While the entire country is unravelling due to the atrocities being

committed by non-state actors who are massacring citizens and security

personnel alike, the focus of the government has been using the

judiciary and the electoral commission to cause confusion within

political parties to block them from contesting next year’s election.

It is unfortunate that there is insufficient focus on addressing the

multiple security, economic and political challenges facing the

country. Continuing with this laissez-aller attitude raises the risk

of system collapse that can do no good to the Nation and the people.

President Tinubu should focus on saving the Nation rather than being

obsessive on presiding over its ruins forever.

Professor Jibrin Ibrahim

Senior Fellow

Centre for Democracy and Development, Abuja

Follow me on twitter @jibrinibrahim17

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USA Africa Dialogue Series - Reintegration Without Justice: Nigeria’s Dangerous Security Gamble

Reintegration Without Justice: Nigeria’s Dangerous Security Gamble

As Nigeria reintegrates 744 former insurgents under Operation Safe Corridor, a deeper question emerges: can a state still battling terrorism prioritise reconciliation without first securing justice, trust, and legitimacy?

By John Onyeukwu | Policy and Reform Column, Business a.m. | Mon April 20-Sun April 26, 2026 | pullout attached.

The Federal Government’s recent decision to reintegrate 744 former insurgents into society under the Operation Safe Corridor programme has ignited one of the most intense public backlashes in recent months.

At the centre of this policy moment is the Nigerian military leadership itself. Speaking on April 16, 2026, at the Operation Safe Corridor graduation ceremony held in Gombe State, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Olufemi Oluyede, made the government’s position unequivocal: the programme is “not a reward” but a deliberate strategy to reduce violence, weaken extremist recruitment, and promote long-term stability. The ceremony marked the formal transition of 744 “rehabilitated” former insurgents from military custody back into civilian pathways, under the supervision of relevant state governments.

The scale and composition of this cohort are significant. The 744 individuals are reported to include a mix of low-level fighters, logistics supporters, and individuals conscripted or coerced into insurgent networks, primarily from Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States, with a small number of foreign nationals linked to cross-border insurgent activity in the Lake Chad Basin. Their participation in Operation Safe Corridor followed screening by security agencies to determine eligibility, typically excluding those considered to have committed grave atrocities. Over the course of rehabilitation, participants underwent deradicalisation anchored in religious re-education, psychosocial therapy to address trauma and extremist conditioning, and vocational training designed to support economic reintegration. The underlying assumption is that economic agency, combined with ideological disengagement, reduces the likelihood of recidivism.

From a policy standpoint, the logic is not new. It reflects a shift from purely military responses to a hybrid model that combines force with behavioural transformation. Nigeria is not alone in this approach; similar frameworks have been deployed in conflict zones globally under Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) strategies. The United Nations has long maintained that DDR programmes are essential to “stabilising post-conflict environments, reducing the likelihood of relapse into violence, and facilitating the transition from conflict to peace.” In parallel, the World Bank has consistently warned that reintegration is “the most complex and longest phase of DDR,” requiring sustained economic absorption and community acceptance to succeed. In contexts where these conditions are weak, DDR programmes risk underperformance or reversal.

Yet, despite this global policy logic, the Nigerian public response has been swift, emotional, and overwhelmingly distrustful.

To understand why, we must move beyond surface outrage and confront the deeper policy contradictions at play.

The first and most immediate issue is one of justice, or the perception of its absence. Across the North-East and other affected regions, the scars of insurgency remain fresh. Entire communities have been displaced, families torn apart, and economic systems shattered. Nigeria continues to grapple with one of the largest internal displacement crises in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, while former fighters are being processed, rehabilitated, and prepared for re-entry into society, many victims remain in camps or fragile host communities, without compensation, closure, or meaningful state support. This creates a profound moral imbalance. When a government appears more efficient at reintegrating perpetrators than restoring victims, it risks eroding the ethical foundation of its own policy. Justice, in this context, is not limited to prosecution; it extends to recognition, restitution, and the visible prioritisation of those who suffered. Without this balance, reintegration begins to look less like strategy and more like surrender.

This concern is also constitutional in nature. Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Section 14(2)(b) clearly establishes that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.” Reintegration, if not carefully balanced with victim protection and restitution, raises legitimate questions about whether this constitutional obligation is being discharged holistically.

Equally troubling is the issue of timing. Reintegration programmes are typically most effective in post-conflict environments, when violence has subsided and institutional control is relatively stable. Nigeria, however, remains firmly within an active conflict environment. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, Nigeria continues to rank among the countries most impacted by terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index, reflecting persistent insurgent activity and evolving asymmetric threats. Nigeria experienced a 46% increase in terrorism related deaths (750 in 2025), and a 43 % rise in incidents, driven mainly by Boko Haram and ISWAP. This is not a post-conflict society; it is a conflict-affected one. Reintegration under such conditions introduces a layer of strategic risk that must be actively mitigated through robust monitoring, intelligence coordination, and community-level safeguards.

This leads directly to the deeper structural issue of trust. Reintegration is not simply a technical programme; it is a social contract between the state and its citizens. It requires communities to accept former combatants, institutions to monitor compliance, and government to guarantee security. In Nigeria, however, trust in these systems is already fragile. Citizens question whether security agencies possess the capacity for sustained monitoring, whether local communities have been adequately prepared for reintegration, and whether the broader policy architecture is sufficiently coherent to prevent relapse into violence. In the absence of confidence, fear becomes the default response, and fear, once entrenched, is difficult to reverse through official assurances alone.

Perhaps the most under-examined risk is that of incentives. Public policy shapes behaviour, sometimes in unintended ways. If reintegration is not carefully structured, it may be interpreted as an eventual pathway back into society without sufficient accountability. Nigeria’s counter-terrorism framework, including the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 (as amended), criminalises acts of terrorism and provides for prosecution and sanctions. Where reintegration appears to operate alongside, or in tension with, this legal regime, clarity becomes essential. The state must ensure that deradicalisation does not inadvertently dilute deterrence or create ambiguity around consequences.

In fragile security environments, narratives matter. The perception that the system is lenient toward violent actors can distort future choices in ways that undermine long-term stability. This makes it imperative that reintegration frameworks clearly communicate consequences, thresholds, and distinctions between categories of offenders.

I am persuaded that the government is not entirely wrong. As the Chief of Defence Staff has emphasised, military force alone cannot end insurgency. Addressing the human dimensions of conflict; the ideological, psychological, and socio-economic drivers, is essential for sustainable peace. Operation Safe Corridor reflects this understanding and represents an attempt to move beyond a purely kinetic doctrine. As DDR scholarship consistently emphasises, “reintegration is fundamentally a political process, not merely a technical one,” requiring legitimacy, sequencing, and sustained community acceptance. But necessity does not excuse poor sequencing.

Reintegration cannot precede justice. It cannot outpace trust. And it cannot succeed without community legitimacy.

What is required now is not a reversal of policy, but a recalibration. The state must demonstrate, in visible and measurable terms, which victims are not an afterthought but a central pillar of the response. Community engagement must shift from assumption to deliberate strategy, ensuring that reintegration is locally grounded rather than centrally imposed. Monitoring systems must evolve beyond administrative processes into credible, intelligence-driven frameworks capable of tracking outcomes and managing risk over time.

Beyond these structural adjustments, there is also a communication gap that the government must urgently address. Policies of this magnitude cannot be executed in technocratic silence. Citizens need clarity, transparency, and sustained engagement. They need to understand not just what is being done, but how risks are being mitigated, what safeguards exist, and what accountability mechanisms are in place.

Ultimately, the controversy surrounding the reintegration of 744 former insurgents is not just about those individuals. It is about the Nigerian state and the nature of its relationship with its citizens. It is about whether public policy is perceived as fair, strategic, and anchored in a coherent moral and legal framework.

At its core, the public is asking a simple but profound question: whose side is the state on?

Until that question is answered convincingly, even the most well-intentioned policies will struggle to gain acceptance. Reintegration, done right, can be a pathway to peace. Done poorly, it risks becoming something far more dangerous, a catalyst for deeper instability and a further erosion of public trust at a time when the state can least afford it.

More importantly, legitimacy in governance is not built on intention but on perception reinforced by experience. Citizens measure fairness not by policy design documents, but by outcomes they can see and feel. When victims remain marginalised while perpetrators are visibly processed and reintegrated, the state inadvertently weakens its own moral authority. Over time, this gap between policy intent and public perception can harden into cynicism, making future reforms, no matter how sound, far more difficult to implement.

 

--

John Onyeukwu
http://www.policy.hu/onyeukwu/

 http://about.me/onyeukwu
“Let us move forward to fight poverty, to establish equity, and assure peace for the next generation.”
-- James D. Wolfensohn
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