Sabella Ogbobode Abidde
The killing, maiming and the destruction of lives and property in many
parts of Northern Nigeria began the moment it became apparent that Dr.
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, the incumbent and candidate of the Peoples
Democratic Party, had won the 2011 presidential election against his
chief rival, Maj.-Gen. Muhammadu Buhari (retd.) of the Congress for
Progressive Change. Two weeks after the killing began, there is still
bedlam, insecurity, and palpable anxiety in the air. Incidentally, two
weeks after the first life was lost, the Nigerian government has yet
to tell the public how many lives were lost, how many were injured and
how many public and private possessions were destroyed. But of course,
this is characteristic of Nigerian governments: the dereliction, the
indifference and the sheer incompetence.
Since 1976, at least, there have been about three accounts of
communal, ethnic and/or religious crises almost every year. Because
the government, non-governmental organizations, and the media and
research institutions do not have reliable data, it is highly likely
that about a quarter million Nigerians have lost their lives in
manners that are directly and indirectly related to these crises. In
addition, it is possible that both private and public concerns have
lost properties that can conservatively be estimated at five billion
dollars. And then, there are the losses that can not be quantified:
the loss of time and wages; the physical and mental injuries; and the
social dislocations that are associated with such strife.
What's more, there are costs to the nation-state: Every time we suffer
any of these self-immolations, it diminishes our collective humanity;
contributes to the fragmentation of the state; helps to deepen and
widen primordial suspicions; and also helps to flame mutual hatred.
The violent aftermath of the April 16 presidential election may not be
a direct offshoot of religious and/or ethnic differences; still, it
seems to have a tinge of both. Many observers of the Nigerian
political landscape have attempted to explain why we continue to
suffer these and related conflicts. Well, as important as their
questions are, it is also necessary to ask why in spite of the huge
amount of resources at its disposal, the intelligence community failed
at one of its most basic functions: Intelligence gathering.
For a while, the primary intelligence agency in the country was the
National Security Organization (NSO). In 1986, however, General
Ibrahim Babangida, the then head of state, issued Decree 19 which
effectively dissolved the NSO and in its place created three separate
intelligence organizations: The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA),
which is the military intelligence unit; the National Intelligence
Agency (NIA), which is today responsible for foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence; and the better known State Security Service
(SSS). Better known because this is the outfit most Nigerians are
familiar with especially since its turf is domestic.
No matter the nature and structure of the intelligence community, its
primary purpose is to assist governments in the policy and decision
making process. In other words, the intelligence agencies exist to do
one thing and one thing only: Assist the government in the furtherance
of its domestic and foreign policy objectives – whatever those
objectives might be; and whether or not they fall within the bounds of
law and human decency. With this in mind, one cannot say – or at least
the evidence are not there – to suggest that the Nigerian intelligence
community has been of use, or is of value, to the country. Why, for
instance, have these agencies not been able to imbed some of its
members into the inner circles of those responsible for fanning
religious and ethnic conflicts in some parts of the country?
Year after year we have violent conflicts without government's inkling
that these pogroms are going to take place. The ongoing situation in
Plateau, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi and elsewhere comes to mind. First, how
difficult could it be for intelligence agents to infiltrate rogue
organizations and non-state actors? How difficult could it be to
employ electronic devices? And for that matter, how hard could it be
to "turn and overturn" flame-throwers? Earlier, I posited that the SSS
is better known because it operates at home. But more than that, the
agency acquired its reputation for its superb, or so it seemed,
ability at harassing and intimidating journalists, travelers,
political opponents and critics.
Aside from the intelligence agencies, several other government
parastatals and ministries also let the country down, and these
include the Nigerian Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the
Office of the National Security Adviser. And even the presidency. In
addition, every state in the nation has security budget and security
agencies. How could they have missed the glaring indicators? A
vigilant Federal Government would have known, or at least, anticipated
the post-election carnage. In this regard, several factors should have
alerted the government to the looming crisis: (a) the recent killings
in Jos; (b) the Boko Haram attacks in Borno, Yobe and Bauchi; (c) the
heated political space; (d) the unguarded and volatile utterances by a
few politicians from the North; (e) the do-or-die nature of the
Nigerian polity; and (f) the continuous squabbles for the "presidency
to return to the north."
Each of the aforelisted factors, taken alone, may not be sufficient
grounds for raising the alert level; but in their totality, they point
to a combustible situation. The Nigerian government, along with half-a-
dozen or so federating states failed the people. This government may
not be directly responsible for the loss of lives and the destruction
of property, it indirectly contributed to the calamity that befell us
as a people. And so, what we have here is a failure of intelligence
and a failure of leadership at various levels. Because of this
systemic failure, hundreds of innocent Nigerians lost their lives. Not
only must there be financial compensation to the families of all those
who lost their lives, the injured must also be compensated. Those who
lost their homes must also be remunerated.
One may concede the fact that intelligence agencies are not
omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient; and that they can not always
get all the bad guys all the times, or anticipate every move and
disrupt all insidious plans. Not even the Federal Bureau of
Intelligence and/or the Central Intelligence Agency are capable of
such feat. South Africa's National Intelligence Agency also has its
shortcomings and moments of lapses. And even the Israeli MOSSAD is
sometimes made mincemeat by persons and groups in and outside of the
Middle East. However, none of these agencies and their partners around
the world would tolerate ninety per cent failure rate as is the case
in Nigeria in the last three or more decades.
While it is true that virtually all the problems and challenges we
have predate the Goodluck Jonathan Administration, his government
should have done more. Much more! But instead, a significant portion
of its time, energy and resources was devoted to winning elections.
This has to change. And so, in addition to compensating the victims'
families and all those who were injured and/or had their possessions
lost or damaged, the Nigerian Government should embark on several
nation-building efforts which must include rewriting the nation's
national security agenda; retraining and reorienting security and
intelligence agents; conveying a sovereign national conference.
Amongst other things, government should also address age-old
suspicions, imbalances and misunderstandings; introduce policies that
will help strengthen our democratic institutions; and finally, arrest
and prosecute those who encourage ethnic, religious and communal
conflicts. All these we can do. And must do!
• Sabella Abidde is on Facebook and can also be reached at
Sabidde@yahoo.com
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