It would inspire the opposition in Syria and perhaps even Iran,
whereas his survival would embolden other brutal regimes across the
Middle East.
By PAUL WOLFOWITZ
The U.S. has a large stake in the outcome in Libya. Not because of its
oil production but because of the dangerous nature of the Gadhafi
regime—made far more dangerous by the current conflict—and because of
the effect that Libya can have on the rest of the Arab world at a
critical time in history.
Libya may not rise to the level of a "vital interest," as Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates and others have assured us, but preventing it
from becoming a haven for terrorists if Gadhafi survives comes very
close. And while Libya is not as important as Egypt, as Vice President
Joe Biden has told us, what happens in Libya affects Egypt and much of
the Arab world. The Libyan fighting has burdened Egypt's weak economy
with tens of thousands of additional unemployed that it can ill-
afford. The same is true for Tunisia.
Gadhafi's fall would provide inspiration for the opposition in Syria
and perhaps even Iran, whereas his survival would embolden the regimes
in power there to cling on. The sooner Gadhafi goes, the greater the
impact will be.
In Libya itself, the U.S. might gain a much-needed friend in the Arab
world. A British diplomat in Benghazi, the unofficial temporary
capital of free Libya, has said that it is the first time during his
many years in the Arab world that he has seen American flags displayed
in appreciation. Even in Tripoli, still under Gadhafi's control,
people go to the rooftops to whistle in celebration during NATO
bombing raids. After a visit to Benghazi last month, Assistant
Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman wrote: "Imagine walking in the main
square of a teeming Arab city and having people wave the American
flag, clamor for photographs with a visiting American official, and
celebrate the United States as both savior and model."
Appreciation for the United States in the Arab world is something to
be welcomed at any time, but particularly now when demands for freedom
are sweeping across the Middle East. Yet here in the United States,
there seems to be little appreciation for this or for the brave
Libyans who are fighting for their freedom with such courage.
Earlier this month, 168 members of the House of Representatives—
including 87 Republicans—voted for the antiwar Kucinich amendment that
demanded an end to all U.S. military operations in support of NATO in
Libya. That resolution might have gained a majority of House members
had Speaker John Boehner not offered a different resolution that was a
milder rebuke of the administration's Libya policy. All told, 330
members of Congress showed their unhappiness by voting for one or both
of the resolutions.
0430libyagad01Moammar Gadhafi in Tripoli earlier this month.That
should have been a wake-up call for President Obama, telling him that
he needs to make a better case to Congress and the public for the
American stake in Libya. Instead, the administration has inflamed the
congressional situation further by submitting a response to the
Boehner Resolution asserting that the War Powers Act of 1973 does not
apply to Libya because the U.S. is not engaged in "hostilities" there.
This assertion—which overruled the advice of the senior lawyers at the
Justice and Defense Departments—was like waving a red flag in front of
Congress. If its purpose had been to provoke outrage, it could not
have been better designed to do so. Democrats may restrain their anger
somewhat, in deference to the president. But Republicans feel no such
compunctions and may even sense an opportunity for partisan advantage.
If so, they should be careful what they wish for.
If congressional opponents of U.S. action in Libya actually succeed in
withdrawing U.S. support for the NATO military operation, they risk
being blamed for the survival of a murderous dictator and a deep sense
of betrayal on the part of those struggling for freedom in Libya, plus
the millions who sympathize with them throughout the Arab world.
Perhaps some members of Congress think they are making a purely
symbolic statement of their unhappiness, as the administration will
ignore Congress or the Senate will block any action that has teeth
(such as defunding the operation). If so, they are setting themselves
up—when the Libyan opposition does eventually triumph—for the
president to claim a foreign policy success that they tried to
prevent.
In either case, those opponents will bear some responsibility for
prolonging the conflict and the suffering of the Libyan people. The
American public may be unhappy with our military engagement in Libya,
but some of that unhappiness stems from its indecisiveness. A recent
Fox News poll recorded opposition to U.S. military involvement in
Libya at 58% to 30%. But in the same poll, 53% of respondents thought
that the U.S. and NATO should make it a priority to immediately remove
Gadhafi from power (31% said otherwise).
Instead of weakening the president and our allies—and lending de facto
support to a murderous dictator whom they abhor—members of Congress
should be criticizing the administration for its failure to support
the military effort with nonmilitary actions that could secure a
positive outcome and gain broader support from the American people.
While demanding that the president come to Congress for approval of
the ongoing military operation, Congress should also point out that—
despite the administration's professed belief in "smart power"—it has
thus far failed to take many nonmilitary actions that could hasten an
end to this bloody stalemate.
The conflict in Libya is as much psychological as it is military. The
key to Gadhafi's removal is convincing those still fighting for him
that they are fighting for a lost cause.
• One of the most powerful ways to send that message would be for the
U.S. to de-recognize the Gadhafi regime and to recognize the
Transitional National Council (TNC) as the provisional government of
Libya. If that seems a step too far because we're unsure of who the
TNC actually represents—although France, Italy and more than a dozen
other countries have already recognized it—then we should at least
establish an embassy-size mission in Benghazi headed by someone with
the rank of ambassador (perhaps even Gene Cretz, who was until
recently our ambassador in Tripoli). That would send a powerful
message and would enable much more effective interaction with the TNC
concerning the opposition's needs, its future plans for Libya, and the
support it may need from the international community once Gadhafi
goes.
• Another use of smart power would be to get the wealthy Arab countries
— including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, who have already
recognized the government in Benghazi—to fund the costs of the U.S.
operation in Libya. Those costs, projected at roughly a billion
dollars for the year, are small compared to other items in the U.S.
budget, but they are also small compared to the roughly $1 trillion
gross domestic product of the six Arab Gulf countries. Getting their
financial support would provide a sense of fairness that would help
recover public support here in the U.S. It would also send a powerful
message in Libya.
• For some reason, Gadhafi continues to be able to use Egyptian-owned
Nilesat communication satellites to broadcast his propaganda, incite
violence, and support his military. We should consider jamming Libyan
State Television, but a much better alternative would be to persuade
the Egyptians to stop carrying the channel.
• The best alternative to greater NATO military activity is to
strengthen the forces of the opposition. Yet the Obama administration
seems determined to repeat the mistake of Bosnia, where the U.S.
imposed an arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims while their Serb
enemies had no shortage of weapons. It makes little sense to argue
that we don't know what might become of our weapons down the line.
Once Gadhafi is defeated, the opposition will have billions of dollars
with which to purchase virtually anything it wants on the
international arms market. In the meantime, it's not preferable to
make them dependent on weapons from other Arab countries.
At a minimum, the administration should support the creation of a NATO
training command to enable the opposition to make better use of the
weapons it has. Such a facility would also give us insight into who
makes up the opposition and allow us to help build the nucleus for
effective security in a post-Gadhafi Libya. To avoid the
administration's self-imposed prohibition on "boots on the ground,"
such a training facility could be based nearby in Italy.
• There is much more that could be done with nonlethal support as
well. Announcing the delivery of halal military meals when the
opposition was pleading for arms had the quality of a cruel joke. The
opposition could clearly use better communications tools, better body
armor, and better mine-clearing equipment. The latter would also serve
an important humanitarian purpose.
• So too would provision of hospital beds for the severely wounded—
both civilian and military—onboard NATO ships in the Mediterranean.
During the humanitarian support mission for Haitian earthquake
victims, the U.S. Navy provided as many as 1,400 hospital beds and was
treating as many as 543 patients at once. A significant fraction of
that assistance came from the hospital ship USNS Comfort, which is
currently on a goodwill cruise in South America and might be
temporarily diverted to the Mediterranean to meet this urgent need.
While the administration continues to hope that NATO will get lucky
and Gadhafi will be gone soon, it seems to have done little to
encourage the opposition to prepare for the day after. It doesn't help
that there are very few Americans on the ground in Benghazi. But by
engaging with opposition leaders now, we can help them develop
realistic plans to implement the excellent eight-point "Vision for a
Democratic Libya" that they announced in March.
So far, the Libyan opposition seem to have behaved quite responsibly,
but there are still many questions about who they are and what will
they do if they win. However, unless we want Gadhafi to win—which no
one advocates—we will have to deal with a victorious opposition at
some point. Hastening their victory will improve the chances for
success afterwards, since the longer the blood-letting continues, the
more scores there will be to settle and the more capable future Libyan
leaders will be killed.
Instead of opposing U.S. support for NATO's military operations,
Congress should be criticizing the administration for its failure to
support that effort with nonmilitary actions that could bring the
conflict to a more rapid and successful conclusion. The mood in
Congress in part reflects a public that is understandably weary of
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But Libya is not Afghanistan or Iraq. No
one is suggesting sending in foreign ground troops, and the Libyans
have made clear that they don't want them. What they do want are the
means to win their own fight for themselves. The sooner that happens
the better.
Mr. Wolfowitz, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute, was the deputy secretary of defense from 2001 to 2005.
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