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Presentation by The 1960 Collective at the BEN TV Security Conference on Nigeria
Theme: Global Terrorism – Resurgence of Militancy and Fundamentalism in Nigeria
(1) We members of The 1960 Collective thank BEN TV for organising an event of this nature in these trying times. It is obvious to all national and international observers of Nigeria that the security situation in the country calls for urgent attention. This is not the first of this type of gathering and we are sure it won't be the last. But we must hope that as we jaw-jaw on the issue, the Federal Government of Nigeria will continue to take note, but more importantly, act to restore law and order, so that good governance and fair development can take hold.
(2) We thank members of the panel for gracing this occasion. We note that it is comprised of knowledgeable people and persons who are in a position to take the outcome of this deliberation to the right quarters, nationally and internationally. Nigerians count on you to live up to their expectation. We join them to urge you not to disappoint our people.
(3) While it is apposite to begin a discussion of this nature by having an overview of the security situation nationally and internationally in the light of the global war against terrorism, it would be a mistake to attach too much international or global influence to the Nigerian situation as represented by the Boko Haram insurgency. We say this, because we are sure likely to hear speaker after speaker link Boko Haram to Al Qaeda in the Maghreb or to the Taleban in Afghanistan or the Al Shabab in Somalia and so on. Indeed, as we sit here in deliberation over the Nigerian security situation, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Dr Goodluck Jonathan is sitting somewhere in Lancaster House on an international conference on security as well with Somalia in focus. There he'll be hobnobbing with fellow Presidents, Heads of State and representatives of other countries and possibly selling them the view that Al Shabab has grip of our nation in the form of Boko Haram and that we need their help. Of course, as he's making the rounds pleading for support, they will be commiserating with him on the loss of more Nigerian citizens from another Kano bombing spree today on the heels of him flying out of Nigeria! But while we will not be arguing with those who make these connections, we would rather suggest that our problem is closer to home. Indeed, despite the Federal Government's best effort to sell this as part of a worldwide terror campaign, not many in the international community are convinced. For instance, after the Kano bombings of Friday, 20 January 2012, the London Financial Times put a decidedly domestic stamp on the issue with its Wednesday, 25 January 2012 edition of the paper. Its front page was emblazoned with the rider "Badluck Jonathan" with the image of protesters hoisting an unflattering picture of the President. Page 11 of the paper had more unflattering analysis of the Nigerian crisis, full page – an analysis that posited the problem as one of failure of leadership. On the same day, an exasperated United Nation Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon simply called on the Nigerian government to "mobilise full possible forces to address these Boko Haram terrorist attacks." It is instructive that the UN Secretary-General has never internationalised the Nigerian security crisis, despite the Boko Haram bombing United Nations offices in Abuja.
(4) There is no doubt that the name "Boko Haram" is today synonymous with the insecurity ruling the country. True, we have had the violent campaign of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, but that has largely been taken care of by the amnesty programme initiated and being implemented by the Federal Government and some of its agencies. Even though a faction of it seems now to have resumed the campaign, not many people think them a threat enough to disturb national security. But on the other hand, Boko Haram has occupied that position of a national bogey for sometime now to the extent that today's discussion will necessarily centre around them or at least use them as a case study in proffering solutions to the problem. Our presentation today will therefore deal primarily with the Boko Haram issue. We will be examining its aims, the root causes of the insurgency and what we propose to be the solutions to be adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria.
Background:
(5) The origin of Boko Haram cannot be divorced from the general history of Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria, even though a post-September 11 2001 world now tends to see such ferments in the general glow of international terrorism. It is part of a development that dates back to the most successful Islamic fundamentalist movement, the Usman Dan Fodio Sokoto Jihad of 1804. The intervention of colonialism only led to its recalibration in the Mahdist movement, whose latter-day incarnations in post-colonial Nigeria have seen the emergence of several strains of this fundamentalist movement based on different schools of Islamic thought, the emergence of radical preacher-leaders, poor socio-economic conditions, the political assertions of the secular state and then today, after the events of September 11 2001, concerted international action against religion-fuelled terrorism and the general reaction in the name of Muslims' self-determination.
(6) Though, latter-day accounts of Boko Haram now tell us that its doctrines are based on the teachings of the Turkish scholar, Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (who lived between the 13th and the 14th centuries), there is really nothing much by way of religious practice to indicate this. Instead, they exhibit an anarcho-Islamic tendency that is a combination of influences from the Maitatsine movement of the 1980s and the pre-2000 'Shi'ite' movement led by El Hadj Zaky, which even though wasn't strictly a Shi'ite movement, received inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran. The first provides them with their anti-authority character and the second gives them their intellectual base. It is this crude ideological combination that Mohammed Yusuf combined as a message to transform the original sect to the Yusufiyya sect (Boko Haram). Before he took over leadership, they were a peaceful Sahabah sect (those who believe in the teachings and accounts of 'the Companions' – that is those who were actually with Prophet Mohammed and whose testimonies of the words and deeds of Mohammed and the events surrounding the Qur'anic revelations are regarded as the authentic Islamic theology and history). This is where they shared Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah belief. They were formed in 1995 and their first leader was the mild-mannered Abubakar Lawan, whose departure for further studies in Medina, Saudi Arabia created the vacuum filled by Mohammed Yusuf who then transformed the group into the rabidly violent movement it became.
(7) Like all Islamic fundamentalist movements before them, they want a Sharia state in the North at least and all over Nigeria generally; but after several confrontations with the state, the most defining being the July 2009 one that saw the security services kill Yusuf in controversial circumstances and engage in extra-judicial killings of suspected Boko Haram members and the arrest and detention of others, there is now the immediate demand of the release of these members in prison and detention as a pre-condition for peace. Latterly, they've added a demand that Christians leave the North. But clearly, a sect that rejects the authority of the secular state will at any point in time present a security challenge to the authorities particularly and the civil populace generally.
Causes and Establishment Support:
(8) Most of the claims about establishment figures in government or high society supporting Boko Haram have not been fully substantiated. Even President Goodluck Jonathan's claims that this is so have not been more than mere claims. Most of the evidence has only been circumstantial. But this is not surprising. Throughout post-Independence history of religious and political violence, we've had Presidents and Heads of State come up on national television to proclaim that they know those behind the violence only to stop short of naming names or effectively doing anything to stop them striking again (most likely because these figures are top members of the establishment and violence is part of their bargaining chips in the complex and dirty political canvass that is Nigeria as they have made it). General Olusegun Obasanjo as President made this type of assertion throughout the communal and religious violence that engulfed Kano, Jos and Kaduna in his time; President Musa Yar'Adua after him did the same. President Jonathan is only following the same script. What all this signify is that the ruling establishment seems to know more than they are letting out about these things; yet it is the ordinary citizens that suffer it all. The security of lives and property has never been a strong priority of the Nigerian ruling establishment. Once they have used the resources and instrument of state to protect themselves and their families, they leave the general populace in the vortex of this violence and dance of death.
(9) To understand this whole establishment collaboration with terrorism, we need to go back to the political climate immediately preceding the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 and the aftermath. In the dying days of the military era, opposition to General Sani Abacha's rule in the north came in the form of radical Islamists led by El Hadj Zaky who combined popular anger against the dictatorship with his radical Islamic teachings to pose a different kind of challenge for the regime in that part of the country, as opposed to the more traditional pro-democracy challenge posed to Abacha in the south and internationally. After a series of violent campaigns culminating in El Hadj Zaky's arrest and detention, the remaining pockets of resistance from his followers were quelled by military action. Upon Abacha's death and the coming of General Abdulsalami Abubakar who midwifed the Fourth Republic, he and the military council in charge felt the release of El Hadj Zaky would be a peace offering pursuant to the establishment of the new democratic dispensation.
(10) However, for the politicians, the challenge was far more complex. Bad and authoritarian governance and the seeming martyrdom of the radical preachers in an atmosphere of poor economic and social conditions have radicalised the northern commoner, especially the Almajiri elements, whose whole existence seems to revolve around waiting for some radical preachers to begin to call for the enforcement of Shari'a to get them all out in the streets, killing and maiming. The politicians couldn't blame it all on the military, because for large chunks of time under the General Ibrahim Babangida regime, a sort of diarchy was in operation that saw civilians sitting as elected civilian Governors and members of a National Assembly. From then on, they had to compete with the radical preachers for the hearts and minds of the northern populace. General Olusegun Obasanjo and his northern sponsors at the time thought they had to find a way around this by reaching some form of accommodation for the ideas of the radical preachers who were indeed winning the popularity contest up north. Even those who did not support their violent ideology seemed to have sympathy with the idea of some kind of Islamization of governance.
(11) The complex horse-trading between radical preachers, their followers and the northern political establishment meant that for a semblance of peace to exist, they either buy them off with state stipends or look the other way when they unleash violence on hapless 'Christians' (an omnibus term for whoever does not support them and who isn't known as an ardent Muslim) to reassert their relevance. Elements of them also became instruments in the hands of politicians as thugs or enforcers. At every level of the establishment, they had sympathisers who reduced the whole problem to a North versus South affair or Christians versus Muslims affair and who saw this as some kind of bargaining chips for power at different levels, because there was enough by way of coagulated misinformation to get the Muslim hoi polloi on the streets against non-northerners, ranging from such claims as the Igbo or Southern traders being the cause of their poor economic and social conditions to claims of desecration of the Koran or insult to the name of Prophet Mohammed and so on and so forth. This is the basis for the usually tepid response of government to the violent impulses generated from the north.
(12) Of course, we are not saying religion-inspired violence began with the unconstitutional compromise made by the leaders of the secular state in 1999, leading to the establishment of Shari'a criminal codes in the north barely a year after a return to democratic rule. The point we are making here is that the compromise was unnecessary, nation-destroying and totally inimical to the future of Nigeria as one state, even if it served immediate political expediency for the politicians at the time. Rather than act like true patriots with vision of a purposeful civilian government, especially with what we all knew about how religion had even been used by the military before then, for instance, with Babangida and his surreptitious conscription of Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the near Islamization of the Federal Cabinet in 1988 and so on and so forth, what was needed then was to stare down the radical preachers and respond with development initiatives to free the Almajiri and the northern hoi polloi from their grip. But because the politicians themselves lacked ideas; because they were bereft of vision, they simply went for the simpler, but deadlier alternative of promising the people Criminal Shari'a when they knew it would be difficult to implement it in a secular state against the Constitution and that whatever the nature of implementation, it was never going to satisfy the fundamentalists who will always ask for more. And this was exactly what happened. It was a case of kicking the stinking can down the road! The radical preachers and their followers, after the initial euphoria of getting the Shari'a, soon began asking for the politically impossible.
(13) The constant clashes with the secular state were what produced the strain of fundamentalism that led to the establishment of the Yusufiyya-Boko Haram within the period of the adoption of Criminal Sharia. The sect cashed in on Muslim youth rebellion against what they considered to be half-measures in the adoption of Shari'a. By 2002, disenchanted undergraduates, university dropouts and the usual crowd of Almajiri always waiting for a Mujaddid or messiah (in this case, in the figure of Mohammed Yusuf, the sect leader) began joining and swelling its ranks. They began to make pretentions to Islamic scholarship by cherry-picking doctrines, including those propagated by Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah which talks of purity of practice and politics along the lines practiced by the Companions in Medina and so forth. Their anti-western education rant is a corruption of Ibn Taymiyyah's views about Christianity and his well-documented responses to Christian theologians of the day at about the time the Crusades were to begin. As stated earlier, it was a brand of anarcho-Islamic teachings and practices that was sustained by demagoguery and hubris. In fact, the sect did not gain the popular membership it hoped precisely because the larger Muslim Umaah around its Railway Quarters headquarters in Maiduguri and environs began to worry about their violent and un-Islamic bent. For instance, it was well known that no one, man or woman, were allowed to wear jeans around their area, as they would forcefully strip people bare in supposed enforcement of this rule.
(14) They blackmailed state officials for support and funds (especially those who had used members as political thugs in the past) and continued in their impunity while covered by these establishment elements. A lot of the young ones involved also have well politically connected parents who protected them from the law as they sowed mayhem all over Maiduguri and environs. If at this point, the state had responded to this menace as a pure law and order issue and deployed intelligence and the rule of law to patiently deal with them, the nation wouldn't have been in this mess, because the information necessary to arrest and prosecute their sponsors within government would have been obtained and they would have gained the support of the people if they are convinced that things are being done lawfully, as the courts would have been the proper forum to expose their duplicitous programme. In fact, this style isn't new, as it was the style successfully applied by the Indonesian security services against a much more formidable Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Instead, President Musa Yar'Adua deployed soldiers and police who engaged in a spree of extra-judicial killing which won the outlaw group sympathy from several quarters. Rather than President Jonathan reviewing that policy, he employed the instrumentality of the Joint Task Force (JTF) that failed pitiably in Ogoniland to handle the matter. Of course, the task force soon became a byword for extortion, corruption and extra-judicial killing, becoming even more unpopular than the Boko Haram they were meant to confront.
Who Should Take Responsibility Now and Solutions
(15) The 1960 Collective indicts every level of national leadership for this criminal failure. The Presidency, the National Assembly and the Judiciary must all take the blame for this huge embarrassment we face, even as we recognise that the bigger blame goes to the Presidency as it is the institution more constitutionally and functionally empowered to act in this matter. The failure of the Presidency is the failure of governments at all levels, because it indicates the failure of consultation and coordination, the failure of vision and the total lack of patriotic instincts on the part of those we have given the mandate to run our national affairs.
(16) We note that the President's Proclamation of a state of emergency in 15 Local Governments in 4 States of the Federation on 31 December, 2011 has not been sent to the National Assembly as constitutionally required, neither has the latter given it the necessary approval via the vote of a two-thirds majority. Indeed, because the National Assembly never sat within ten days of the Proclamation to approve this declaration, the Proclamation failed and ceased to have effect in accordance with the provisions of Section 305(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). What we therefore have now by way of the operation of a state of emergency in these areas is an illegality that must not continue because of its blatant breach of the Constitution. If the President wants to continue with this declaration and make it lawful, he has to now properly follow the provisions of Section 305 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). In matters of the rule of law in a democracy, there can be no shortcuts. But The 1960 Collective believes that there is no point in declaring a state of emergency in only certain parts of the Federation when the security challenge is now nationwide. We would rather now propose more holistic solutions that build confidence in the populace and carry everybody along, because, in truth, Boko Haram is only a symptom of a larger problem.
(17) (5) The 1960 Collective knows that at the basic level, what we have is the failure of the institutions of law and order. For years, these institutions have been thoroughly stripped of credibility by thieving controllers and their agents with their bosses in Aso Rock nodding approvingly. National security has since been reduced to protection of the President and his friends while funds meant for institutional development, procurement of equipment, training of vital operatives and modernization of the police have been siphoned. Tafa Balogun wasn't the only thieving police boss, but he was dropped off the wagon, because his bosses didn't need him anymore. Corruption, that old curse, is at the root of this failure of security.
(18) (6) We also know that the problem of insecurity persists because the national question has remained unaddressed for too long. The growth of ethnic militias and militant irredentism in the form of the Odua People's Congress, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, Boko Haram and so on sprouted on the fertile grounds of structural defects, marginalization and perceived institutionalised injustices. Rather than have a genuine attempt at a Sovereign National Conference (SNC), the Nigerian establishment post-Second Republic has been playing games. Indeed, we have heard the President and a former military President, General Ibrahim Babangida rail against the Sovereign National Conference a few days ago in a joint assault against those calling for it. Yet, the horned chickens have come home to roost and Boko Haram is just one of them. There is no doubt that those who do not want us to explore plausible solutions to the nation's multiple problems (through credible dialogue where all sections of the populace will be represented to determine the future of our nation) have something to gain by leaving it in its present prostrate state. The 1960 Collective will want to put it on record here and now that whatever these persons gain by way of opposition to the long-overdue Sovereign National Conference (SNC) remains the nation's loss.
(19) However, while The 1960 Collective believes that long-term solutions to the problem of security cannot be found outside the resolution of the national question, we are also realistic enough to understand that we are not close to it at this point. Even if we are likely to sit down ultimately, some semblance of order needs to be restored for now. We accept the reality that past governments have failed to invest in security over the years, just as the Jonathan government is equally failing to do, which explains why we are failing in maintaining routine law and order. But there are also other self-imposed impediments. For instance, bureaucracy, duplication, lack of coordination and poor recruitment are all self-imposed problems and when the President in a national address informs the world that the security forces have no anti-terrorism unit, this is also self-defeating. What that does is energise the terrorists, because they know your limitations and these aren't what you can correct overnight as you need time to build this unit, choose officers for training and deployment before you begin to get result. By that time, the terrorists would have stolen a march on the nation. Indeed, our Immigration and Customs services are as handicapped as the other security agencies precisely because of the same problems we've enumerated above and added to the lack of effective coordination and effective information and intelligence gathering system, the nation is not only at the mercy of such groups as Boko Haram indefinitely, it is also a sitting duck against external threats. Something has to be done.
(20) In the first instance, we propose for the President to declare a national emergency on the state of national security. He does not have to officially declare a national state of emergency, because he constitutionally has no such powers, but let him make Nigerians feel that he understands the gravity of the problem. Let him address Nigerians, identify what the problems are, analyse the possible solutions and tell Nigerians what he is going to do about the situation and what they as Nigerians should do to help. The President must engage in the battle of winning hearts and minds over this, because he needs the people to return peace and security to the nation and he needs to mobilize them to achieve this purpose.
(21) We propose that as part of this new drive for solutions, the President calls a mini national conference on security as the first step to handle the problem holistically. This conference should have delegates from amongst the top and middle level personnel working in the security forces and services all over the country; people in command positions in these places nationwide. It must also include members of the civil society groups, top judges and members of the National Judicial Council and representatives of the private and public sectors, the National Assembly and Federal Executive. This conference must, amongst other things, consider the structure of the police and decide the kind of police force Nigerians need to protect them. It is obvious that the police force is too centralized and unwieldy and this is a huge factor in its slow operation and immobility. Should we have state police which is more in tune with our established Federal structure? If so, how do we fund it sustainably and how can we insulate it from politics and imbue it with the requisite independence to perform its task? A police force that is created by the people and whose members live amongst them instead of in secluded barracks, a police force they pay for and maintain and that they can control in the form of independent civilian oversight bodies will do the work they are paid to do. Once this conference concludes its work, Government's task thereafter would be to immediately begin to implement its recommendations with a view to addressing the present, medium and long-term problems of national security.
(22) In order to engender better cooperation from members of the public and communities in the present battle against Boko Haram, we suggest that the government do three things immediately. The first is to reconstitute the operational leadership of the Joint Task Force. This is because it is obvious that the present JTF leadership has lost the confidence of the people and government needs the people on its side going forward. Secondly, government should invest heavily in public awareness and information dissemination, including provision of secured forums where civil leaders and security operatives can share information and build trust. There should also be provision of discreet and anonymous channels for members of the public to pass information to the security forces and it is important that these channels engage all available media avenues. One of such channels could be the provision of toll-free phones where members of the public can leave information for the security and investigative authorities confidentially. The third thing is to make more proactive use of traditional institutions, traditional rulers and community elders throughout the areas the group operates. They should not only report suspicious activities in their areas, they should also be encouraged to guarantee the safety and non-prosecution of fringe members of the sect who not only denounce the sect and its violent ways, but who, more importantly, cooperate with the security services by way of giving useful information about the organization's activities, their leaders and their own role in it up to that point. The higher classed traditional rulers should be given the discretion to do this at first instance. This would give them better leverage in ensuring security of communities. However, to ensure that such a programme isn't abused, independent overseers and assessors made up of credible members of civil society should be appointed by the President in consultation with the governments of the states in the region. This body should be the one to consider and make final approval of any recommendation by the traditional rulers. This is not amnesty, but a confidence-building measure to make the enforcement of law and order easier by getting the people at all levels involved.
(23) Finally, we believe that for there to be national security and with all due respect to the President, the institutional deficiency in the appointment of persons charged with security in the nation has to be addressed. Of course, we know that the President appoints his National Security Adviser, the Defence chiefs and the Inspector-General of Police. President Jonathan has changed persons occupying all these positions since he took office and in the case of the Inspector-General of Police, he's done so twice. He's done this claiming that these changes were attempts to address the prevailing insecurity in the nation. But rather than things getting better, they are getting worse! The only explanation of course can be found in the fact that professionalism has been thrown to the dogs and the President has let himself be influenced by the politics, rather than the propriety of appointments.
(24) Take the cases of the immediate past and present Inspectors-General of Police, both of whom are President Jonathan's appointees. Mr Hafiz Ringim came in as Inspector-General of Police in September 2010 as part of a wholesale change in the highest echelons of security services. But he was an Assistant Inspector-General of Police who had about nine officers ahead of him in the hierarchy. He had roundly failed as the AIG in charge of Zone 9 (comprising Enugu, Abia, Imo and Anambra States) where kidnapping was rife and where he'd scandalously proposed an amnesty programme for kidnappers as answer to the problem! All officers ahead of Mr Ringim in the hierarchy were retired to make way for him and the only thing that recommended him for the position was that he was a personal friend to the President, having been the State Police Commissioner in Bayelsa when the former was the Governor of the State. Mr Ringim was allowed to remain in office until a few days before his official retirement despite his abject failure and then was replaced by Mr Mohammed Abubakar, the present Acting Inspector-General of Police. Again, Mohammed Abubakar was an Assistant Inspector-General of Police appointed as Acting Inspector-General of Police ahead of at least six Deputy Inspectors-General. In the case of Ringim, the nation lost all those men to early retirements simply because the President wanted to reward an officer who was his friend and the State Police Commissioner when he was Governor of Bayelsa State. Today, we do not know why Mohammed Abubakar is favoured, but we do know that he is not a fit and proper person to hold public office and certainly not the office of the Acting Inspector General of Police, being someone indicted by the 2002 Justice Niki Tobi-led Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs.
(25) Those who have read the gory detail of the Commission's findings against Mohammed Abubakar would agree that it is disturbing. It stated in Chapter 4 of the White Paper: "Of all the individuals, groups and organizations who were mentioned in the various memoranda as having played one role or the other with regard to the crisis, none received more scathing comments than Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police at the time of the crisis. He served in that capacity from 16/7/2000 to 16/11/2001. His name was mentioned in not less than fifty percent of the memoranda submitted to the Commission with varying degrees of condemnation of his role before and during the crisis. Such memoranda include Exhibits L, 16, 48, 52, 257, 470, 507, 521 and 524 among many others. The oral evidence of witnesses before the Commission is equally replete with allegations that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar was responsible in one way or the other for causing the crisis or failing to curtail its severity or extent. The only dissenting voice is that of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Dominic Yadubiya, the Area Commander who signed and presented Exhibit 79, the Memorandum of the office of the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command. While not condemning Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, Yadubiya did not praise him either".
(26) More evidence before the Commission, including Mohammed Abubakar's own oral evidence, indicted him for what was essentially genocide as he was found to have actively taken steps to facilitate the killings by Muslims of others, being Muslim himself. The Commission had no hesitation to recommend as follows: "Religious fanatics should not be posted to head state police commands. The commission recommends that for his ignoble role during the September 2001 crisis which resulted in the loss of lives, the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force and in the event of his refusal to do so, he should be dismissed from the service." And that was not his first brush with notoriety. As General Sani Abacha's Police chief at the Lagos Airport, he was variously fingered in the 14 November 1996 deaths of Dr Shola Omoshola, the then Head of Security at the Lagos Airport and his cousin, Nelson Kazeem. While we recognize that no hard evidence has been tendered, except circumstantial, to support the widely held view that he was complicit in the murder of the two gentlemen, considered along with other factors, it is our considered view that it ought to be enough to stop President Jonathan from appointing him to such an important security office. The President should have weighed the matter carefully and reached the only conclusion possible here for the interest of the nation. The only decision that would have given the Nigerian people confidence and return trust to the Police and boost morale within the force at a time they are confronting this deadly insurgency from religious fanatics would have been not to appoint Mohammed Abubakar. The danger here is that we are all viewing another appointment based on cronyism, totally impervious to the signs and reality officially recorded about this appointee.
(27) It is for the above reasons, that The 1960 Collective stated unequivocally in a statement issued at the time of the appointment that if this appointment stands, if the President refuses to do what is fair and just, if he refuses to remove such a tainted and polarizing figure from the headship of the Nigerian Police Force and replace him with a competent officer that can command the trust of his men and the nation, we will begin a campaign internationally to arrest Mr Mohammed Abubakar anywhere outside the country for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, based strictly on the findings of the Niki Tobi Judicial Inquiry. The 1960 Collective believes the Nigerian people deserve better than to have such a man lead the dedicated and patriotic men of the Nigeria Police Force. We are again using the opportunity of this forum to call on President Jonathan to immediately nullify this appointment before it becomes a bigger embarrassment at home and internationally.
Conclusion
(28) In conclusion, we urge the President and the National Assembly to immediately begin working on a comprehensive plan to return peace and security to the nation. They must do all within their power, personally and officially, to begin to inspire Nigerians to address the security situation as one community. They can only do this by action and no better place to start than by the President removing Mr Mohammed Abubakar from the position of Acting Inspector-General of Police to show that we have respect for our laws and institution and that we will never reward fundamentalism and genocide with higher office. The National Assembly should then begin to act as the body constitutionally charged with making laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation, rather than keep a distance from it all as though it is an exclusive problem for the Presidency and the Nigerian people alone.
(29) Our nation needs strong and honest leadership now! Strong leadership begins when the President understands the power of personal example. Courage and statesmanship is required now! If the President is desirous of returning peace and stability to Nigeria to make the environment conducive for investment and progress, he needs to stop tiptoeing around the security problem. Decisiveness and clear-headedness are what is required and we are convinced the President has it in him to exhibit both. He must do so to save our country from the scourge of the cancer of fundamentalism and lawlessness. We call on the President and the National Assembly to begin the process of arresting this drift before darkness falls. If they don't, they stand a good chance of going down in history as the leadership that sat over the disintegration of Nigeria with the consequential losses in human lives and material resources. They can be rest assured that Nigerians today and generations yet unborn will never forgive them for such monumental betrayal of trust.
Signed:
Mimie Oshodin
Kennedy Emetulu
Emeka Enechi
(For and on behalf of The 1960 Collective)
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ADDENDUM:
Some Alleged Supporters of Boko Haram in the Establishment:
A Boko Haram spokesperson by the name Ali Konduga (alias Saidu Umar or Al Zawahiri) is reported in the news as saying most northern governors pay the group some monthly stipend "to leave their states alone". This is quite possibly true, based on our analysis above. In fact, when one considers the role surreptitiously played by some northern governors in all this, it seems more plausible. Below is a list of persons mentioned in public space as being supporters of Boko Haram or violent Islamic fundamentalism. As explained earlier, these are still speculations.
(1) Ali Modu Sherriff, (former Governor of Borno State and presently, Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria): Ali Modu Sheriff was the former Governor of Borno State, which is one of the states where the Boko Haram group was supposed to have originated from and from where it began to grow into the national menace it has become now from the time he was serving as Governor. There are those who accuse Sheriff of elevating Boko Haram politically by appointing a known member, Buji Foi, into his cabinet (he himself said this member asked him to join the sect) and raised the group as a private army to serve his political end and fight the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in the state when he was running for Governor. Sheriff, who belongs to the All Nigeria Peoples' Party (ANPP) was though popular; yet, like most politicians not in the ruling party nationally, he was very fearful of the latter's rigging machine. He projected the ANPP as the party that will protect Kanuri interest against the general Hausa-Fulani influence in the PDP and in the region. At the height of the Boko Haram menace, a chieftain of his party, Lt General Jeremiah Useni (Ret), sitting beside the President in Aso Rock, recounted how he was in Borno State as a guest of Sheriff and how Sheriff had informed him of his wish to use political thugs to turn the election. Useni's interpretation of that conversation (though he was to deny this later) was that the Governor was using Boko Haram for political purposes much in the same way as Peter Odili used the group that was to metamorphose into Niger-Delta militants in the South-South. There are those who see his link with Boko Haram in the type of protection the sect enjoyed before they began to attack the police and the security services and the opulence and influence enjoyed by Mohammed Yusuf, their leader. Several accounts talked of Friday visits by eminent personalities to Yusuf in his Railway Quarters residence in Maiduguri. Though not many could put names to these visitors, because they are said to come there in cars with tinted screens and under disguise; but people do recognize their stature from the cars they bring around. His political thugs were commonly known locally as ECOMOG, which is because of the prevalence of foreigners of other West African countries in the Sahel in their rank. ECOMOG was the name of the West African peacekeeping force in Liberia during the crisis there. There's also the fact that Mohammed Yusuf and Buji Foi were killed extra-judicially after they had asked to be taken to the see the Governor upon arrest. Not a few think this was deliberately done to prevent the duo from spilling the beans on the nature of support they have within the establishment. Sheriff was supposedly questioned by the State Security Services in July 2011, yet nothing came of it. But two weeks after he'd unilaterally chosen a cousin, Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio who was the State Commissioner for Finance, to succeed him as Governor in January 2011, Boko Haram killed the cousin, along with six others in Maiduguri to send him a message that he's betraying them. He goes in and come out of the Presidential Villa as he pleases.
(2) Buji Foi (late, former Commissioner for Religious Affairs and Water Resources, Borno State): Buji Foi was a known member and financier of the sect who reportedly left government to concentrate on funding the group and become more actively involved in its activities. He was captured after a gun battle at his home in Maiduguri on 31 July, 2011 and requested to be taken to see the Governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, who at the time was reportedly not on seat. He was thereafter killed extra-judicially.
(3) Isa Yuguda (Governor of Bauchi State): The crisis that led to the full-scale security action against the Boko Haram sect started in Bauchi where several members were reportedly killed by the security forces. The governor, who is a son in-law to President Yar'Adua was said to have acted very triumphant in the aftermath. Yet, he is said to be a sponsor of the sect from his days as an ANPP governorship candidate under which platform he won the 2007 gubernatorial elections in Bauchi when he organized them as part of his "Yan Sara Suka" mob before he switched to the PDP. He is said to pay a monthly stipend of N10 million to the sect for protection and that he provided training grounds for them within the state. Essentially, he is accused of using them the same way Ali Modu Sheriff used them in Borno; but his loyalty became an issue when he became son in-law to President Yar'Adua in late 2008 with his marriage to Yar'Adua's daughter, Nafisat and then later joined the People's Democratic Party. When he therefore began to publicly show himself as backing President Yar'Adua's tough stance against the sect, they threatened him. He was one of the governors that made a grovelling apology to the sect "for injustices caused them". In September 2011, on a courtesy call on the Oyo State Governor, Abiola Ajimobi, Yuguda declared Boko Haram a pressure group concerned only with social injustice. On Friday, 30 September 2011, at the Presidential Villa, in Abuja he made a spirited defence of Boko Haram along the same lines, claiming they aren't against the Nigerian society, but only fighting for social goods. It is noted that after the initial arrests in 2010, he gave instructions for everyone of over 28 persons arrested in connection with the mayhem to be released. He is said to be eyeing the presidency in 2015 with Governor Rotimi Amaechi as his running mate.
(4) General Olusegun Obasanjo (Ret): Eyebrows were raised when in September 2011, the former President, General Olusegun Obasanjo supposedly went on a peace mission to dialogue with members of the Boko Haram sect in Maiduguri. Shehu Sani, a known civil society activist who has also been campaigning for dialogue with the group was the intermediary. Obasanjo met with some members of the sect at the home of Babakura Fuggu, an in-law to Mohammed Yusuf. But the day after, Fuggu was killed by Boko Haram, according to them, because he made demands of money from Obasanjo and received the sum of N500, 000, which according to the group cheapened their struggle. They said they had Obasanjo in their gun sight, but spared him, because he's been good to them, recalling that he allowed Shari'a. All this leaves several questions unanswered. Who delegated Obasanjo to go on this mission? Why did he give them money and what exactly is the reason for the killing of Fuggu? Did he know something that could have compromised the former President? Why has Obasanjo not spoken publicly about his mission? Why has he not come out to condemn the group throughout its campaign of violence?
(5) Hafiz Ringim (former Inspector General of Police): Ringim was reportedly a target of the group for declaring that he was going to wipe them out. But once they threatened him, he soft-pedals and began to speak less forcefully. There were revelations of several security reports getting to him about the activities of the sect and their intended targets that he simply did not act on. The suicide bomber that bombed the Police Headquarters in Abuja followed his convoy into the heavily secured police premises and detonated the bomb before he went upstairs into his office. He put a discredited officer and a known fundamentalist, Zakari Biu (who had earlier been sacked from the force for more than ten years before being recalled back into the Police) in charge of the alleged mastermind of the Christmas Day bombing, who less than 24 hours later disappeared from police custody supposedly on the way to search his place. Embarrassed, President Jonathan (who appointed him in 2010 ahead of nine senior officers to the top police job, because of their friendship from his days as Governor of Bayelsa when Ringim was the State Commissioner of Police) actually gave him a 24-hour ultimatum to produce the suspect. His sack is linked with that episode.
(6) Mohammed Abubakar (Acting Inspector General of Police): He is the newly appointed Police chief, replacing Ringim. But his record as a fundamentalist and sympathizer with violent Islamists and agents of mayhem is documented in a 2002 White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into the Civil Disturbances in Jos and its Environs. He was at the time the State Police Commissioner and he was indicted for actively aiding Muslims to kill Christians and others and doing everything to ensure that help did not get to those who needed it. Even his own oral evidence at the tribunal indicted him. Essentially, he was indicted for genocide and crimes against humanity. The Commission strongly recommended he be removed from the Police and actually described him as a fundamentalist. But he remained in the force and ten years after is appointed by President Jonathan to head the force at a time it is fighting fundamentalists. The 1960 Collective has indicated that they will call for his arrest and prosecution for crimes against humanity anytime he sets foot outside Nigeria.
(7) Kashim Shettima (Governor of Borno State): He took over from Ali Modu Sheriff as the governor on the same ANPP platform. He was the Commissioner for Health in the Sheriff administration. When asked what his agenda is in the State, he stated categorically that it was to enter into dialogue with Boko Haram. He said his government was to "pursue a cause that will at the end ensure amnesty to the entire members of the sect". He said "members of the Boko Haram are our brothers who are largely resident in Maiduguri metropolis and probably felt offended by one thing or the other. So, the Boko Haram problem is politically-motivated and as such requires political solutions. That is the best option for us to ensure total restoration of peace, to engage them in a dialogue so that they can return home and unite with their loved ones". He also gave N100 million naira to the families and relations of Mohammed Yusuf as some out of court settlement and as a means to seek peace. There's reason to believe that part of the reason Babakura Fuggu was killed was because he did not give full account of money channelled through him from politicians like Shettima and Obasanjo. Rumours of Shettima's connection with Boko Haram were further boosted when it was revealed that the alleged mastermind of the Abuja Christmas Day bombing, Kabiru Sokoto was arrested at the Borno Governor's Lodge in Abuja in company of an Air Force officer. Though, Shettima's spokespersons say this was as a result of a security breach and that the governor knew nothing about it.
(8) Zakari Biu (former Commissioner of Police): He was a notorious police officer who headed the General Sani Abacha Presidential Task Force on Terrorism, which was one of his apparatuses for arrest, torture and murder of pro-democracy activists. Biu is well-known in pro-democracy circles and upon assumption of office in 1999 President Obasanjo quietly retired him from the force. However, Biu returned to the police ten years later, courtesy of his friends in high places, He was quickly posted as an Instructor at the Police Academy in Wudil, Kano State and last year, Ringim, his old course-mate recommended him to be promoted to the rank of Commissioner of Police and immediately posted him to Abuja as the Police Commissioner in charge of the Wuse Zone 7 Command. When Kabiru Umar (Kabiru Sokoto) was arrested, Ringim ordered that Biu should take charge of him. Biu and Kabiru Umar hail from the same hometown of Biu in Borno State, reputed to be the home state of Boko Haram. In less than 24 hours of Sokoto being put under the care of Biu, he disappeared from police custody, supposedly in handcuffs (but he's now been rearrested). He supposedly escaped when Biu and some of his men led him to an Abuja suburb known as Abaji to search his home. In what appears to be an attempt to appear firm on this issue, Biu was said to have been dismissed from the Police yesterday by the Police Service Commission (PSC).
(9) Ali Ndume (Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, representing Borno South Senatorial District): Between 2003 and April 2011, Ndume represented the Chibok/Damboa/Gwoza Federal Constituency in Borno State in the House of Representatives on the platform of ANPP. He was a vociferous critic of the PDP; but by 2010, he defected to the PDP alleging injustice in ANPP and contested for the Senate under the PDP platform. President Jonathan appointed Ndume as one of the eight members of the Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari-led Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North-East. At the time the Committee was submitting its interim report in August last year, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Pius Anyim specially singled out Senator Ndume for praise. According to Anyim, who was representing the President, this was "for his positive role during the committee's work". Senator Ndume who holds a Masters degree in Accounting and Computing from Toledo University, USA is the only prominent person being presently prosecuted for links with the Boko Haram sect. He was arrested in November 2011 following statements allegedly made to investigators by a captured Boko Haram operative Ali Konduga (also known as Usman Al-Zawahiri). The latter is said to have alleged that Ali Ndume funded the group and gave the telephone numbers of government officials, including judges and political office holders for the purpose of the group sending them threatening text messages. But the case against Ndume is floundering because of what is clearly a deliberate lack of diligent prosecution by state lawyers. At the last hearing on Thursday, 2 February at the Federal High Court, Abuja, Justice Gabriel Kolawole threatened to throw out the case due to the absence of prosecuting counsel and other time-wasting antics by the prosecution.
(10) Rabiu Kwankwaso (Governor, Kano State): Elected under the platform of the PDP as governor, he has done very little to deal with issues of security and fundamentalism in his state, despite the fact that Kano is one of the topmost bases of the Boko Haram group in the north. He caused a stir in August 2011 when he called for the release of all Boko Haram militants and suspects held in prison and detention, because "there is no justification" for holding them. It is also alleged that he is one of the governors paying a monthly stipend of N10 million to the sect and that he's provided them with secure training bases. An unnamed Boko Haram operative claimed that the Kano attacks were a response to some of the governor's failed promises to the group.
(11) Ibrahim Shekarau (Former Governor of Kano State and the Presidential Flagbearer of the ANPP during the April 2010 Elections): He is reputed to be the one that signed the original agreement with the Boko Haram group in 2004 to provide them with an initial monthly stipend of N5 million, which was then increased to N10 million in 2009. He was also said to have used the Hisbah (the Sharia police) as a conduit organization for funding the fundamentalists. He was invited by the State Security Service after the first Kano bombing and interviewed for three hours. But he has not been charged.
(12) Saidu Pindar (late, former Nigerian Ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe and PDP running mate to Muhammadu Goni in the Governorship Elections of April): Pindar, who died in an auto crash along Kaduna-Zaria Road on 31 August 2011, was the one that recruited the Boko Haram fundamentalist, Ali Konduga as a political thug in the elections and named him Al-Zawahiri after the Al Qaeda leader. He was reputed to be one of Boko Haram's biggest financiers who worked closely with the operatives. He also hails from Biu, like Zakari Biu and Kabiru Sokoto.
(13) Mohammed Awwal Ibrahim (former Governor of Niger State, now Emir of Suleja): He was the first civilian governor of the state in the Second Republic (1979-1983) and was removed, like all other civilian governors then, by the Muhammadu Buhari military coup. In 1984, he was convicted of corruption and abuse of office by a tribunal set up by the Buhari government and in 1986 the Babangida government released a white paper in which he was banned from holding any public position for life. He was installed as the Emir of Suleja in 1993, a decision that led to massive riots in the emirate. He was deposed by General Sani Abacha in 1994, but was reinstalled in January 2000 again sparking off massive riots and violent protests. In 2010, Governor Babangida Aliyu of Niger State appointed Awwal Ibrahim as the Chairman of the Committee on Reformation of Almajicir (the institution of itinerant students of the Quran living on alms). On 4 January 2012, the Niger State Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, Mr. Abdullahi Bawa Wuse said the Niger State Government was unhappy with the Emir for failing to sympathise with the victims of the Christmas Day bombing which happened in his domain when everybody all over the country was doing so. The Commissioner said on 1 January, 2012, the Government issued a query to the monarch to explain within 24 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for behaviour unbecoming "of a person of high standing in society". He said the Emir responded within 24 hours and the government is looking into it.
(14) Adamu Baba Yunusa (Ona of Abaji): He is the traditional ruler of Abaji, one of those communities close to Abuja said to provide operational bases for the Boko Haram militants. The police story is that Zakari Biu and his men were taking Kabiru Sokoto to the palace of the traditional ruler (for reasons unknown) when they were set upon by a gang of youth who freed Sokoto near or around the palace.
The above list is not exhaustive. For instance, there have been strong mentions of such persons as Ibrahim Babangida and Muhammadu Buhari (two former Heads of States), Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (the Governor of Central Bank), Rabe Darma (the Executive Secretary of the Petroleum Technology Development Fund), Ahmadu Chanchangi (a wealthy businessman from Taraba State), Suleiman Hunkuyi (a former Kaduna State Commissioner of Finance) Dr Muhammad Ali Pate (the Minister of State for Health), Ret Lt General Aliyu Gusau (former National Security Adviser), Bello Damagun (a director of Media Trust, publishers of the Trust newspapers who was arrested about seven years ago by the State Security Service along with Mu'awuya Babayo and Mohammed Nazifi Inuwa on allegations of illegally funding some students to Mauritania for Islamic studies) and so on. But it still comes down to the fact that the best we can say about them being mentioned is that it's speculative.
For us, the effectiveness of Boko Haram in its campaign suggests deep official connivance and the nature of politics in the country also suggests that it is the type of movement that politicians can hijack and make to do their bidding and of course, the ease with which people in power can manipulate the system makes it quite possible for a large number of influence wielders to be involved with them to serve personal ends. It is therefore not inconceivable that official support for them can cut across party lines.
There is of course the strong imputation one can make from the near silence from core northern leaders over the Boko Haram issue. Not many of them have come out to condemn them, but a lot of them have tried to rationalise what they are doing and call for amnesty for them, without a thought about the implication of what they are doing to the Nigerian nation or the pain and suffering they are causing others. With the exception of the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa'ad Abubakar, former Kaduna State governor, Balarabe Musa and Niger State governor, Babangida Aliyu, we find it hard to name any northern leader that has condemned the activities of Boko Haram or offered real suggestion as to how to deal with their menace. In a society where following their leaders is an established culture, this says a lot.
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Link to the White Paper on Justice Niki Tobi's Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report:
(Note: There has been a concerted effort by persons unknown to remove the full Report and White Paper from the web. Links to it are now not functional)
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