How Egypt's military pulled the plug on Morsi's regime
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For all the more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger protestations, this coup d'état was about as retro as they come. Troops surrounded state broadcasting headquarters early on, and once the army commander had finished his televised announcement of the government's demise, the plugs were pulled on the ruling party, silencing its TV stations.
But the choreography of this coup – ousting Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's first democratically elected and only Islamist president, after one year in power – was unusual.
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the army chief of staff, mobilised extra divisions of no mean significance. As he replaced Mr Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood with a transitional government, he was flanked by the Sheikh of al-Azhar university, the leading Sunni Muslim authority, the Pope of Egypt's sizeable Coptic Christian minority, Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel peace laureate and leader of Egypt's liberals, and youthful activists who brought down the army-backed dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the high spring of the new Arab Awakening.
As the vast crowds in Tahrir Square erupted in joy every bit as spectacular as the way they greeted the toppling of Mr Mubarak, it is fair to ask who mobilised whom.
Mr ElBaradei, speaking after Gen al-Sisi, greeted the coup as a reset for the Egyptian revolution and the Arab spring. Yet it is obviously an unhappy state of affairs when those who profess to be liberals need army bayonets to press their case. When the Assads took power in Syria in 1970 as a "corrective movement" after a long period of revolving door coups and mayhem, or indeed when the legendary "Free Officers" of Gamal Abdel Nasser toppled the louche Egyptian monarchy in 1952, they were also greeted as saviours. The rest of the story Syrians and Egyptians know all too well.
The Islamists did not hijack the Egyptian revolution. They were just far better organised than their liberal and leftist rivals in scooping up votes in the five electoral exercises that have followed the fall of the Mubarak regime. The reasons for this have long been obvious.
The Assads and the Mubaraks, the Gaddafis and the Saddam Husseins, all of them at different points bolstered by the west, laid waste to the entire spectrum of organised politics in their countries – with the exception of the mosque, around which Islamist dissidence regrouped. Of course secular politicians are at a disadvantage. But polls show they have a big constituency. Under dictatorship they took it for granted. In a democracy they have to organise it.
The Egyptian transition has been messy and instructive – and not just for Egypt.
The spectacular failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – the country of its birth 85 years ago, the most populous Arab country which still presumes to regional influence – heralds a setback for mainstream political Islam across the broader Middle East.
Arab despotism was good at manufacturing Islamists. But that did not mean the Islamists would be any good at governing.
Mr Morsi, for example, while democratically elected, failed to behave like a democrat. His abortive constitutional coup last autumn – attempting to place his government above the judiciary – and his growing intolerance of criticism and attempts to pack Egypt's institutions with his followers, alienated all but hardcore Islamists.
Unable to meet the needs of ordinary Egyptians for jobs and security, electricity and services, he was accountable to the Brotherhood but not citizens of the republic.
Even foreign governments and international institutions were dealing with Khairat al-Shater, deputy supreme guide of the Brotherhood, which in its paranoid secretiveness ran a parallel government.
Is the fall of Mr Morsi and the Brotherhood a setback for democracy? Of course it is. But it cannot be taken in isolation.
The spectacle presented by the first elected parliament after the fall of Mubarak – an Islamist-dominated assembly arguing about prayer times and obsessing about curtailing women's rights – was a setback for democracy. Attempts to manipulate the judiciary by all sides – the generals, the Mubarak "deep state", the liberals and the Brotherhood – were a setback for democracy. By no means least, the manifest inability of secular, urban and modern Egyptians to organise their political representation was – and remains – a setback for democracy.
- The Morsi and the Islamic brotherhood regime despite being a democratically elected government is probably the most short-lived regime in recent Middle East in history. At the same time it was a long time coming.
As as cited, it spent most of its efforts in passing Islamic/Sharia laws, disenfranchising minorities, women, the youth, Christians, and liberal Moslems instead of building a crumbling economy. It goes to prove that democracy (great as it is and as envied as it is), is NOT the omnipotent answer in every country.
Interestingly, Morsi himself has been a big advocate for regime change in other countries only to be "regime-changed" himself.
Now the brotherhood that fought for long to ascend to power in Egypt and has been always been inspiration for Arab fundamentalists - with hopes of regime changing other Arab regimes finds itself back fighting for survival. It is no doubt they are going to resort to the same violence they used before of setting off bombs and terrorism - which will further reveal their true colors. - Egypt faces an immense challenge. We may now see a proper liberal constitution being written enshrining equality, freedom of assembly, expression and religion: principles severely trampled upon under Morsi. But the return of Islamists and their doctrines to a democratic government of Egypt seems inevitable. With it the desire to turn Egypt into an Islamic nation in violation of those principles.
For parliamentary elections, the Islamic parties are far better organized: the Brotherhood's loss can become the Salafist's gain. The Brotherhood will then have to enter a coalition most likely with the Salafis who didn't abandon them for Tahrir. It seems very possible that such a coalition will secure a majority of the vote.
The secular, urban and modern Egyptians don't have the political discipline to properly organize themselves. They continue to look for the army to ultimately represent their interests and this keeps their organizations infantile. Each round however the Islamists will have to reevaluate their organization and strivings again and will be strengthened.
I don't see how Egypt can mature into say a Turkish-style democracy anytime soon. The Turkish AK party despite the recent events around Taksim is a far more inclusive affair and the Turks are much more aligned in their national strivings than the Egyptians. Many Turks even those who don't want to join the EU see the EU's principles as necessary ingredients for Turkish growth. What Egypt needs is a period of calm during which the Brotherhood can go to Turkey and learn from the AK after which one must hope an Erdogan-like person can assume the presidency and reform the party into an Islamic-democratic group more like the AK.
The demographic and economic timebomb under all of this is ticking away though. Youth unemployment is some 30% and growing. Population density is effectively at 2000 individuals per square kilometer and growing. Food imports account for half of what Egyptians eat and despite a great harvest in 2012 is also set to grow. The current account is in deficit with the balance dropping, putting energy and food imports at risk.
The next government will need to start addressing those challenges right away, implementing unpopular measures that may see discontented voters flock to Tahrir square once more. Many Islamists will feel the Brotherhood never had the chance to prove its mettle, and the pain that the economy will continue to generate will feed their agenda.
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Okey Iheduru, PhD
Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies
National Defence College
Herbert Macaulay Way (North)
P.M.B. 323, Central Business District
Abuja, N I G E R I A
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