Ethnic Minorities and Political Turbulence in Kaduna State
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1Ethnic minority tensions and conflicts in southern Kaduna have probably engendered far more serious violence than any other forms of communal instability in recent Nigerian history. Because these conflicts and tensions have deep roots in northern Nigerian history, it is useful to examine this historical background before proceeding to discuss the complex facts and facets of ethnic minority political turbulence in Kaduna State today.
Historical Background
2What is presently known as Kaduna State emcompasses the area of the old Zaria (Zazzau) emirate-cum-province. In his historical-cum-anthropological study of Government in Zazzau, 1800—1950, M.G. Smith identified two broad cultural segments in this emirate province. The first of these segments is what Smith referred to as the Muhammadan Hausa-Fulani group. The group constitutes about 60 per cent of the emirate population, occupies mainly the northern part of the province and dominates the structure of traditional governance as expressed in the emirate system (Smith, 1960:2).
3The second ethnocultural bloc of the Zazzau kingdom comprises a "pagan population" of some thirty tribes. These are located in the southern and western half of the territory. However, throughout this pagan-dominated half of the territory are to be found the Hausa "in enclaves, walled towns or open villages which are the foci of economic, political and administrative life in their respective areas" (Smith, 1960:2). As shall be demonstrated in the course of this chapter, this pattern of settlement has contributed enormously to the crystallization of the contours of socioeconomic conflict between the Hausa population and the pagan communities.
4More importantly, however, complex forms of clientage and vassalage have developed between the dominant Hausa-Fulani bloc and the pagan population of Zazzau. The pagan tribes were traditionally the legitimate target for slave-raiding, the exaction of tribute and other forms of domination by the Hausa-Fulani. The political and military vulnerability of the pagan groups to Hausa-Fulani hegemony arose from their relatively inferior technology, smaller settlements and decentralized modes of political organization, all of which rendered them relatively defenceless in the face of Hausa-Fulani expansionism and imperialism.
5However, the pagan communities differ in their degree of penetration by, or subordination to, the Fulani emirate system. Indeed, some of these communities had successfully resisted conquest and incorporation by the Fulani power-group. Thus, the Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa populations of southern Zaria have enjoyed some degree of independence from the emirate system. Although involved in diverse forms of historical, political and administrative relationships with the Zaria emirate, these three groups have been able to retain their integrity and autonomy as independent chiefdoms since the colonial era. Consequently, the core emirate population accords the pagan populations of Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa a higher status than pagan groups that are incorporated and subordinated within the emirate society itself (Smith, 1960:242).
6The incorporated pagan populations are closer geographically to the Hausa settlements and enclaves than the independent pagan groups. Consequently, these incorporated populations are more vulnerable to cultural, economic and political domination by the Hausa-Fulani power group. While the independent pagan populations are ruled by their own chiefs, the incorporated pagan communities are administered by emirate-appointed district heads. Such district heads have often been nominated from the Hausa-Fulani group, although pressures from the pagan communities have sometimes led to the appointment of elements from the indigenous tribesmen to this position.
7This unequal historical political relationship between the Hausa-Fulani group and the pagan community has been compounded by religious differences. Islam is the religion of an overwhelming majority of the Hausa-Fulani. The religion also provides the doctrinal or ideological foundation for the emirate system On the other hand, different forms of animistic worship have traditionally predominated amongst the pagan populations. Moreover, looked down upon as infidels by the emirate population, and often arbitrarily and oppressively subjected to the Muslim judicial and legal system, these pagan populations have become particularly receptive to Christian conversion and education. Thus, historically, the leadership of these minority populations has been dominated by mission-educated elites, many of whom have also been employed in occupations related to the Church, mainly as pastors or vernacular teachers of religion (Yahaya, 1980:28). Today, these ethnic minority elites occupy a frontline position in the Christain Association of Nigeria (CAN), which has persistently and violently attacked the hegemony of Muslim Hausa-Fulani elites in the North and in the whole of Nigeria.
8The political, cultural and religious cleavages between majority and minority communities in the Zaria emirate have been reinforced by economic imbalance between the two groups. Although blessed with heavier rainfall and denser woodland than northern Zaria, the southern districts of Zaria are generally relatively more underdeveloped than the northern section of the emirate. Moreover, even within the southern Zaria area itself, socioeconomic opportunities and infrastructure improvements have tended to be concentrated in areas or enclaves inhabited by Hausa settlers (Smith, 1960:2; Yahaya, 1980:74).
9Official sources have often attributed the relative economic backwardness of southern Zaria to the sparse population of these areas, and their lack of viable internal sources of revenue (Yahaya, 1980:75). To the southern Zaria intelligentsia, however, the underdevelopment of their communities is the result of deliberate and persistent neglect by the emirate officials who, until the 1976 local government reforms, also dominated the system of local or native administration.
10The aforementioned differences between majority and minority communities in Zaria over traditional political control, culture, religion and resource distribution have predictably often escalated into violent agitations and confrontations. C.S. Whitaker (1970), for instance, reports that at different times during the 1946-66 period, riots were staged by the "Kataf and other related peoples in southern Zaria province" over certain oppressive features of the emirate system, particularly the headship of Fulani ruling families over predominantly non-Fulani districts.
11More specifically, A.D. Yahaya (1980:28) notes that in 1942, political protests developed among the Kaje ethnic group of the Zangon Katab district over perceived discrimination by the Native Authority administration against the southern Zaria population. Similar protests took place in 1948 among the Kataf of the same Zangon Katab district. As Yahaya (1980:28) explains:
These protests, which in certain cases were reinforced by violence, were the beginnings of what was to become a continuous demand for political recognition and participation (by Southern Zaria groups).
12Such protests often escalated during periods of major political developments or tensions, such as the demise of the Emir or of a Fulani district head in southern Zaria.
13The protests were geared towards the realization of specific southern Zaria demands which included, increased autonomy and control over local matters; the indigenization of all district head appointments in southern Zaria; the establishment of independent chiefdoms for all the southern Zaria tribes; an end to the proliferation of village heads as a strategy of divide-and-rule by emirate officials; an end to deliberate acts of discrimination and maladministration by the Native Authority administration against the southern Zaria population; the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal for non-Muslim groups to complement the existing Sharia Court of Appeal; and, more recently, the subdividion of Kaduna into one or two new states in order to mitigate or eliminate the minority status of the southern Zaria population.
14Official responses to these demands and protests have varied from outright repudiation and denunciation of the claims of the southern Zaria communities to genuine efforts to mollify these communities. Thus, although Native Authority officials often dismissed agitations by the southern Zaria population as the work of a "few vocal malcontents and missionaries" (Yahaya, 1980:73), the regional or state governments have sought to implement appropriate redressive policies. These policies have included: the prohibition of discriminatory acts by Native Authority officials against the southern Zaria population; the promotion of political decentralization through the establishment of village and district councils; the establishment of an Outer Court in order to facilitate the participation of southern Zaria groups in emirate affairs; the employment of southern Zaria indigenes as emirate and Native Authority functionaries; the establishment of new Native Authority departments and welfare projects in southern Zaria; and the transfer of the independent districts of Moroa, Kagoro and Kwoi from the Zaria Province to Jema'a Division (Yahaya, 1980:73-75).
15Although the aforementioned policies were hardly effective in defusing ethnic minority conflict, they nevertheless ensured that this conflict did not unduly polarize Kaduna State or the country at large. Indeed, the local government reforms of 1976, and the inauguration of the egalitarian-oriented Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) Government in Kaduna State in 1979, would appear to have substantially ameliorated the fears and grievances of the southern Zaria population.
16However, the re-introduction of military rule in 1984, and the frenzied religious mobilization in the North that followed the controversy over Nigeria's purported enlistment in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, appeared to have opened up a new phase of ethnoreligious conflict in Kaduna State. This era of conflict has witnessed three major outbursts of ethnoreligious violence in southern Kaduna and Kaduna State in general, viz; the Kafanchan disturbances of March 1987; the first Zangon Katab disturbances of February 1992; and the second Zangon Katab disturbances of May 1992. Each of these flashes of ethnoreligious violence will now be discussed in turn.
The Kafanchan Crisis of March 1987
17The Kafanchan disturbances of March 1987 started as theological disagreements between Christian and Muslim students of the Kafanchan Teachers College, Kafanchan, in the Jema'a Emirate of southern Zaria (Ibrahim, 1989). These disagreements rapidly degenerated into a fracas which spilled into Kafanchan town and ignited age-old tensions between the politically dominant Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers located in the town centre on the one hand, and the numerically larger and predominantly Christian and/or animist non-Hausa-Fulani natives inhabiting the town's suburbs, on the other. According to one source, "the indigenes of Kafanchan resented the Hausa rulership because it deprived them of their wealth and power, virtually making them strangers in their own land" (Sunday New Nigerian, 15 March 1987:1). Indeed, the intensity of this ethnic minority opposition to the emirate rulership was demonstrated by the angry rebuff and physical attacks visited by the indigenous Kafanchan elements on the Emir of Jema'a, Alhaji Isa Muhammadu, when he tried to intervene in the Kafanchan College of Education imbroglio (Sunday New Nigeria, 15 March 1987:1).
18However, the fiercest phase of the Kafanchan crisis was played out in such areas as Kaduna city, Katsina and Funtua, where Muslim mobs attacked Christian and/or southern Nigerian migrant communities and their properties (mainly churches and hotels) in retaliation for the alleged killing of muslims and burning of mosques in Kafanchan town.
19According to official estimates, the Kafanchan crisis claimed nineteen lives, and resulted in the destruction of 169 hotels, 152 churches, five mosques and 95 vehicles (New Nigerian, 17 April 1987:9).
20Apart from the relatively heavy toll on lives and properties, three other features of the Kafanchan crisis may be noted. First, the sheer magnitude of the crisis induced the intervention not only of the state government but also of the federal authorities. The latter used the army to contain the riots, and subsequently established a judicial tribunal to try rioters apprehended by law enforcement and security agents.
21Second, the Kafanchan crisis marked the assimilation of the ethnic minority ferment in southern Zaria into a federation-wide, inter-regional and inter-religious struggle involving northerners and southerners, and christians and muslims. In short, the tensions between majority and minority communities in Kaduna State had acquired a national character, with telling implications for the safety of southerners living in the North, and for the relationships between christians and muslims throughout the federation.
22Finally, the Kafanchan crisis presaged a new wave of ethnoreligious turbulence and violence in northern Nigeria as epitomized in subsequent riotings in Bauchi, Adamawa and Taraba States, as well as in the southern Zaria local government area of Zangon Katab. It is to the convulsions in Zangon Katab during February and May 1992 that we now turn our attention.
The Zangon Katab Riots of February 1992
23An outbreak of ethnoreligious rioting that was far more serious than the Kafanchan crisis took place during February 1992 in Zango, a town in the Zangon Katab Local Government Area of Kaduna State. Complex historical, political, cultural and economic factors were at play in this outbreak of communal rioting. But the basic details may be briefly described as follows.
24The Zangon Katab Local Government Council, under the chairmanship of a Kataf, Juri Babang Ay ok, had in January 1992 announced the impending relocation of the Zango weekly market from the Hausa-dominated town centre to a new site on the outskirts of Zango town. The ostensible and/or real reasons for this move included the congestion in the old market centre, with little or no space in the market to accommodate new traders; the poor hygienic conditions of the old market; the unsuitable location of the market in the midst of residential houses belonging to the Hausa; and the need to reduce Hausa commercial domination and expand opportunities for emergent Kataf traders in Zango (Citizen, 17 February 1992:23-24; Mahmood, 1993:36-39).
25The Hausa community in Zango predictably resisted the relocation of the market. The community claimed that the newly proposed site was a part of the muslim annual Eid praying ground. It also argued that the relocation bid was a vindictive design to hurt its economic position. Consequently, the community sought and obtained a court injunction, with accompanying police protection, restraining the relocation (Mahmood, 1993:36).
26The conflicting Kataf and Hausa positions and actions over the market relocation issue escalated into violent confrontations on 6 February 1992, the weekly (Thursday) market date on which the use of the new market site was expected to commence. These clashes, according to official estimates, left 95 persons (mostly Hausa) dead, 252 others injured and 133 houses and 26 farmlands destroyed.
27In retrospect, it would seem that the market relocation issue had merely provided a convenient opportunity for the outpourings of Kataf resentment of Hausa-Fulani domination of cultural, political and economic life in Zangon Katab. Specifically, the Kataf resented their continued incorporation within the Zaria emirate, the alleged appropriation of land around Zango by the emir of Zaria and the Hausa farmers, the derogatory references to the Kataf as "arna" or pagans by the Hausa population, as well as other forms of unequal sociocultural exchange between the two communities (Mahmood, 1993:36-37). These grievances and differences polarized Zango town at elite and mass levels, so that relationships between influential Kataf elites and the Hausa community leaders became sorely strained. The real extent of this polarization did not become apparent, however, until May 1992 when an even more devastating outbreak of communal rioting convulsed Zango and several other places in Kaduna State.
The Zangon Katab Riots of May 1992
28The Kaduna State Government-appointed Justice Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry into the February 1992 clashes in Zango town had barely concluded its public sittings when a new wave of riotings broke out in the town during May 1992. The riotings eventually engulfed other key cities of Kaduna State such as Kaduna, Zaria and Ikara. The immediate and remote causes of this renewed outbreak of violence in Zangon Katab included:
- A written threat by Kataf village heads and community leaders indicating their intention to repossess Kataf land allegedly appropriated, and handed over to the Hausa, by the Emir of Zaria in 1920.
- The subsequent uprooting of crops on farmlands belonging to the Hausa by Kataf youths as a part of the aforementioned agenda of land restitution by the Kataf.
- Retaliatory attacks on Kataf and/or Kataf farmlands by the Hausa.
- A letter written by the extremist Izalaru Islamic Group to the Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, seeking his assistance in waging a jihad to defend the rights of the Muslim Hausa population in Zangon Katab.
- The failure of the police to arrest and prosecute those implicated in the February 1992 riots, and to search for, and confiscate, weapons used during these earlier disturbances.
- The alleged manipulation of the proceedings of the Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry into the February 1992 disturbances. These proceedings were, indeed, eventually boycotted by the Kataf (Mahmood, 1993:36-39; Citizen, 25 May 1992:10-19).
29Two main factors were responsible for the escalation of the Zangon Katab riotings into retaliatory campaigns by muslim mobs against christian and/or southern Kaduna and southern Nigerian groups in Kaduna city, Zaria, Ikara and other areas of Kaduna State. These are:
- Reports and rumours of the annihilation and dispossession of Hausa muslims by 'infidels' in Zangon Katab.
- The emotions evoked among Kaduna muslims by the sight of dead or severely injured bodies of the Zangon Hausa as they were conveyed into Kaduna city from Zango (Mahmood, 1993:37).
30In sum, 471 persons were officially confirmed killed in the May disturbances, with 250 and 188 of these deaths occurring in Kaduna city and Zangon Katab respectively. According to police sources, 518 persons were injured, and 229 houses and 218 vehicles were destroyed in the same riots (New Nigerian, 20 July 1992). These official figures may, however, represent an understatement of the scale of casualties and destruction during the May 1992 riots. Indeed, the presentations of the Zangon Hausa community to the relevant Government investigatory panel included names of some 1,528 members of the community who reportedly died in the disturbances (The News, 7 June 1993:20).
Government Responses to Ethnoreligious Conflicts in Southern Kaduna
31Official responses to recent violent outbursts of ethnoreligious discontent in southern Kaduna have been mainly regulatory in nature. In the wake of the Kafanchan crisis of March 1987, for instance, the Kaduna State Government set up a six-member committee, under Mrs. Hansine Donli, to identify the immediate and remote causes of the crisis, assess the extent of damage engendered by the riotings, identify the key culprits and make appropriate recommendations to the Government (New Nigerian, 14 March 1987:1) However, except for a press conference addressed by Donli at the end of the public sittings of the committee in April 1987, little is known both of the report of the committee and the Government's White Paper on it.
32The Federal Government, for its part, established a five-member tribunal, under Justice A.G. Karibi-Whyte, to try, in "summary fashion", all those arrested for participating in the riotings (New Nigerian, 17 March 1987:3). Although all suspects were allowed legal representation of their choice, appeals against the sentences of the tribunal were disallowed. Rather, such sentences were made subject to ratification by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. The proceedings and judgments of the tribunal eventually became the object of heated opposition from several Islamic groups, which felt that the tribunal had overlooked the atrocities committed against muslims in Kafanchan during March 1987, while imposing harsh sentences on muslim youths implicated in the subsequent "reactive" disturbances in Kaduna, Funtua, and Katsina.
33Government responses to the February and May 1992 disturbances in Zangon Katab have followed the pattern of the official reactions to the initial Kafanchan crisis. The Kaduna State Government, for instance, appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the Zangon Katab disturbances. Headed by Justice Rahila H. Cudjoe, the commission had the following terms of reference:
- Inquire into, investigate and identify the immediate and remote causes of the Zangon Katab disturbances.
- Assess the extent of damage caused by the disturbances.
- Ascertain and identify the roles played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence.
- Determine the extent of loss of lives and property.
- Examine any other matters incidental to the aforementioned terms of reference;
- Recommend appropriate penalties for culprits as well as measures to forestal future disturbances (Citizen, 15 June 1992:14).
34The Cudjoe Commission submitted its report to the Kaduna State Governor, Alhaji Dabo Mohammed Lere, in June 1992. Its findings, like those of the earlier Donli Commission, have, however, not been officially released. Nevertheless, the Kaduna-based Citizen magazine has published important revelations about the activities of the commission. According to the magazine, the recommendations of the commission included the following proposals or measures:
- The President of the Federal Republic should take appropriate disciplinary actions against the chairman of the Zangon Katab Local Government, Juri Babang Ayok. Ayok was indeed removed as chairman on 21 May, and charged for murder before a federal tribunal which, however, acquitted him.
- Appropriate disciplinary action should be taken against other persons implicated in the riots, including members of the police force, and the Kataf and Hausa communities. In particular, the activities of Kataf ex-servicemen within and outside Zangon Katab should be investigated with a view to ascertaining their roles in encouraging, funding and equipping Kataf rioters.
- The police should conduct a comprehensive security search in Zangon Katab in order to curtail and control the possession and use of firearms and other dangerous weapons in the area.
- The controversial market should be moved to a neutral site and provided with basic infrastructures or facilities, while a new weekly market day, other than Thursday, should be adopted.
- A committee should be set up to verify claims for compensation by individuals and groups displaced during the disturbances.
- The Zangon Hausa community, in particular, should be resettled and rehabilitated (The Federal Government eventually released the sum of ₦25 million for the reconstruction of houses destroyed in Zango town). Further, a police barracks as well as a detachment of the National Guard should be stationed in the rehabilitated Zango town.
- A more suitable location should be provided as an Eid praying ground for the Hausa community of Zango town.
- Derogatory references to the Kataf as "Arna" or "Kafirai" (unbeliever or pagan) should be discouraged.
- The Kaduna State House of Assembly should look into the issue of the establishment of a Customary Court of Appeal in the State (Citizen, 15 June 1992:13).
35Finally, on the crucial issue of demands for chiefdoms by the Kataf and other southern Kaduna groups, the Cudjoe Commission called on the Kaduna State Government to accede to these demands in "deserving" cases, provided that "it is adjudged that such a grant would guarantee peace and stability in the state" (The News, 7 June 1993:20). It, however, condemned vehemently:
.... the approach adopted by the Katafs and their resort to violence in order to press home their demands for a chiefdom. As a deterrent to others, the Katafs shall be the last to be considered for the grant of a chiefdom among the southern Kaduna groups (The News, June 1993:20)
36Notwithstanding the commission's proposals for the compensation and rehabilitation of riot victims and the establishment of chiefdoms, however, its recommendations suggest a general preference for a regulatory, rather than a redistributive or a reorganizational, approach to ethnic minority problems in southern Kaduna. This is also the approach that the Federal Government has tended to pursue.
37Thus, in the wake of the May disturbances, two presidentially appointed seven-member tribunals were set up by the Federal Government to try the suspected rioters in accordance with the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree No. 2 of 1987 (now Civil Disturbances Act Cap 53 of the Laws of the Federation 1990). The two tribunals were headed by Justices Benedict Okadigbo and Emmanuel Adegbite respectively.
38Both tribunals were subsequently to sentence 14 persons to death, and many other individuals to various terms of imprisonment, for their alleged roles in the May disturbances. Among those sentenced to death were some leading Kataf tribesmen, including retired General Zamani Lekwot, a former military Governor of Rivers State.
39Yet, the proceedings and judgments of the tribunals provoked cutting strictures, fervent demonstrations and frenzied litigations from various human rights' bodies, members of the Bar, the Press and southern Kaduna groups, and other interested observers. Some of the reasons for this opposition include:
- A statement, allegedly made by President Ibrahim Babangida, after visiting Zango town, that the tribunals he appointed would presume suspects "guilty until proved innocent" (African Guardian, 25 January 1993:19)
- The hasty promulgation of Decree 55 of December 1992 which purportedly ousted the competence of regular courts of superior record to make orders against actions of the tribunals which violate constitutional provisions on fundamental human rights.
- The improper or illegal constitution of the Okadigbo and Adegbite Tribunals, each of which had seven members, in violation of the provisions of the Civil Disturbances Decree which prescribe a tribunal of five members.
- The ethnoreligious imbalance in the composition of the Okadigbo Tribunal. The tribunal had four muslim members, including three Hausa-Fulani. It was, therefore, perceived by the Kataf as susceptible to being influenced by the extreme emotional bitterness among muslim and /or Hausa-Fulani elements over the fate of the Hausa in Zango. It should be noted, however, that a similar religious imbalance was evident in the composition of the Adegbite Tribunal, which had five christian and two muslim members.
- The extremely hostile attitude of Justice Okadigbo to the Kataf defence counsel and witnesses.
- The discontinuation of legal representation for the Kataf tribesmen following the decision of their lawyers, led by Chief G.O.K. Ajayi, to withdraw from the Okadigbo Tribunal in protest against the anomalies enumerated above.
40Predictably, the death verdicts of the tribunals provoked a legal and political impasse. The National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) — the successor to the AFRC — was not able to ratify the tribunals' decisions because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Moreover, these decisions became the subject of various legal actions in the Supreme Court which restrained the Government from carrying out the death sentences on Lekwot and others. Eventually, the Government was constrained to commute the death sentences to short prison terms.
41In view of the controversial and counterproductive character of its regulatory policies on the southern Kaduna crisis, it is useful to consider Government's attitude to alternative policy options for containing the crisis. The most important and compelling of these options remains the policy of reorganization, involving the establishment of new chiefdoms, states or even local government areas in the southern Kaduna region.
42Indeed, as from October 1992, the issue of chiefdoms for the Kataf and other southern Kaduna communities featured very prominently in the deliberations of the defunct Kaduna State House of Assembly. Members of the House from southern Kaduna, in particular, worked vigorously to put the issue on the agenda of public policy in the state. Thus, defying the intrigues and opposition of conservative elements and the emirate establishment, the House of Assembly on 19 October 1992 established a seven-man committee, under Alhaji Isa Aliyu Shika, to investigate the issue (Newswatch, 7 December 1992:28). The committee received a total of 71 memoranda by individuals, organizations and communities from all sections of the state. Thirty-seven of these memoranda involved demands for chiefdoms from such southern Kaduna communities as the Bajju (Kaje), Kataf (Atyap), Kadara, Chawai, Kurama, Gbagyi, Kono and Kagarko of Zaria Emirate, as well as the Ninzam, Ayu, Numana, Caninkon and Kagoma of Jema'a Emirate (Newswath, 7 December 1992:28; New Nigerian, 29 December 1992:16).. Twenty-nine of the memoranda were of a general nature, while the remaining five involved demands for more districts.
43In the report it submitted during December 1992, however, the Shika Committee simply concluded that the constitutional competence to create new chiefdoms or districts lies with the executive rather than the legislature. Sadly, the Committee could not decide on whether to advise the House to forward the memoranda on new chiefdoms and districts to the State Governor for appropriate action, or to institute a constitutional amendment that would enable the House legislate on the establishment of new units of traditional authority. More importantly, the Committee could not advise on the merits or demerits of the various memoranda presented to it. Such an advice could have served as an important input into any future executive action on the issue of new chiefdoms. In essence, perhaps owing to the opposition of the conservative political establishment and traditional ruling class in Kaduna to the idea of new chiefdoms, the Shika Committee was content to reduce its own work to a mere rigmarole.
44The executive, for its part, adopted the position that the creation of new chiefdoms was politically and financially inexpedient. In the words of the National Republican Convention (NRC) Governor, Dabo Lere:
The main problem is the number of tribes that are involved.... Everybody wants a chiefdom, and we have so many tribes. This is physically impossible. And in these days of lean finances, if you make a chief, the chief is entitled to a lot of regalia, you have to build a palace for him, you have to buy him not only one car but cars that will befit him... and so on. And these things cost money. Instead of spending that money creating hospitals or... roads, you spend the money creating so many chiefs (African Concord, 8 February 1993:19).
45Given the attempt by Governor Lere to portray the demand for new chiefdoms as economically diversionary, it is instructive to note that the southern Kaduna groups see such chiefdoms as a means of accelerating development in their areas. Indeed, the southern Kaduna communities often attribute their relative backwardness to the insentivity of the emirate authorities to the developmental needs of these communities. This insensitivity is said to be underscored by the unwillingness of the emirate to make any serious efforts to attract development to the southern Kaduna region. In essence, Governor Lere's apparent postulation of a dichotomy between political autonomy and economic development would appear unconvincing to the southern Kaduna people.
46Pressures and proposals for a reorganizational solution to the southern Kaduna problem have not been limited to demands for the establishment of new chiefdoms. The Government has also had to contend with pressures and proposals for the creation of new states and/or local governments in the southern Kaduna region.
47The subdivision of Kaduna State into Kaduna and Katsina States by the Babangida Administration in September 1987 was widely approved by the southern Kaduna groups since this reorganization gave them a relatively more enhanced position within the new and smaller Kaduna State. However, the euphoria in southern Kaduna over the excision of Katsina from Kaduna soon evaporated as the southern Kaduna elites became increasingly disenchanted with what they described as "a grand design to scheme us out of the affairs of Kaduna State" (National Concord, 13 June 1988:16-18). In particular, the southern Kaduna elites inveighed against their inadequate representation in the critical decision-making sectors of the Kaduna State Civil Service, and the systematic manipulation of political appointments and civil service postings and promotions to favour indigenes of mainstream Zaria. In the words of the southern Kaduna elements:
The totality of evidence, both direct and indirect,... points to the fact that some senior public officers in the state civil service who hold key positions in the state government, particularly from Zaria Local Government Area, have formed the habit of manipulating Government machinery in order to achieve a total enslavement of the people from the other local government areas of the state (National Concord, 13 June 1988:16).
48Following the May 1992 disturbances, allegations of the victimization of southern Kaduna civil servants in general, and the Kataf ethnic class in the bureaucracy in particular, became even more strident (Kukah, 1992:1).
49It was in this context of deepening inter-ethnic distrust and bitterness that proposals began to emerge for the further subdivision of Kaduna State into Zazzau and Jema'a or Gurara (Southern Zaria) States, along the lines of the Hausa/Fulani — non-Hausa minorities' divide (Jibrin, 1993:5). As trenchantly articulated by a group of southern Kaduna indigenes in Plateau State in May 1993, such a subdivision could help to mitigate, if not eliminate, the following "social facts" of the southern Kaduna situation (The Guardian, 30 May 1993:A17):
- The wide gap in socioeconomic development and political representation between the northern and southern parts of Kaduna State.
- The systematic attempts to reduce the peoples of southern Kaduna to "second class citizens, slaves, drawers of water and hewers of wood."
- The political and cultural subjugation of the southern Kaduna people under the emirate system, and the failure to create chiefdoms for these peoples.
- The perpetration of various forms of religious discrimination and persecution against southern Kaduna groups.
- The concentration of a disproportionate number of educational institutions in northern Kaduna at the expense of the southern parts of the state.
50However, although the case for a southern Zaria state had also featured prominently in the report of the 1986-87 Political Bureau, and the Federal Government has become increasingly lavish in its state reorganization policies, the prospects for the subdivision of Kaduna appear to be poor for at least three reasons.
51In the first place, considerable differences exist among the affected communities over the demarcation and configuration of the proposed Zazzau and Jema'a (Gurara) States. For instance, competing claims have been made to the important city of Kaduna by both the Hausa-Fulani and the non-Hausa-Fulani blocs. Such divisiveness, it would be recalled, has been the Achilles' heel of demands for new states in other parts of the country, including the Rivers State. Secondly, the state creation strategy cannot resolve, and may in fact compound, the position of the Hausa settler communities of southern Zaria who may become isolated, alienated and marginalized in the proposed Jema'a or Gurara State. A final and related problem is that with the departure of the Hausa-Fulani power group, the establishment of Jema'a State may simply open up a new phase of competition and conflict among the diverse communities of southern Zaria. Nevertheless, the relatively complex and dispersed ethnic structure of the Jema'a State will probably produce less polarizing and destabilizing outcomes than the centralized ethnic structure in the present Kaduna State (cf. Horowitz, 1985:39).
52Finally, Government has faced intensive pressures from minority communities in the southern Kaduna region for the creation of additional local government areas in the region (The Guardian, 3 August 1992 and 30 May 1993). These pressures were never satisfied by the extensive reorganizations of the local government structure undertaken by the Babangida Administration during May 1987 and August — September 1991. Both of these reorganizational exercises increased the number of localities in the country from 301 to 589. Consequently, like other groups in Nigeria, the southern Kaduna communities have continued to agitate for additional local government areas as a means of bringing "government and development" closer to their region, and of giving more effective expression to the cultural complexity of this part of Kaduna State. Despite the Federal Military Government's continuing commitment to the creation of additional local government areas in the country, however, the deluge of competing demands for new localities from several parts of the federation, the increasing official sensitivity to the counterproductive effects of too many local government areas, and the entrenchment of the local government territorial structure in the Federal constitution, all make the prospects for the creation of additional areas in southern Kaduna somewhat uncertain.
Brief Presentation of Links to Perspectives on Southern Kaduna CrisisExplainer: factors that foster conflict in Nigeria's Kaduna state
MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES ON CRISES AND CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA
[ Many other scholarly articles on the subject at that source]
On Wed, 29 Jul 2020 at 16:39, Oluwatoyin Vincent Adepoju <toyin.adepoju@gmail.com> wrote:Olayinka,Why not share with us your own analysis of the various narratives?It's our duty to develop some insight rather than sit on the fence or outsource analysis to other people or simply accept one view as "fuller" perhaps bcs it pleases our political persuasions.When you put in the effort to present your analysis, Adepoju will do same in response.I have presented on this post, views of others and my own analysis.Ashafa has presented others' views without any analysis of his own.Okechukwu is happy to make general pronouncements only.You are happy to applaud a document you have not analysed in comparison with competing documents, which we can keep posting back and forthOya, give us your analysis.Don't wait for Kadiri, chief defender of right wing Fulani.We are waiting, sir.Meanwhile, I will go to Ashafa's source which seems to be from social media and read the source and comments carefully.I want to be well informed on the various shades of opinion.The sad truth is that Muslims in the North and those who identify with that demographic do everything to either ignore or downplay the activities of Fulani militants and their backers.This observation is based on my experience of Nothern politics since the 2011 Boko Haram esclations, in which the Muslim majority there were earlier coerced into thinking the terrorists were Muslim warriors allied to their interests until the scope of the terrorists' destruction of the social and instituonal fabric became clearer to everyone, except for people like Muhammadu Buhari, who opposed the 2013 State of Emergency that drove Boko Haram from their entrenchment in urban centres to the outskirts of Borno, at which point, ant-govt politics caught up with the war.I see a similar development with the post Buhari 2015 ascension escalation of Fulani herdsmen/Fulani militia terrorism.It seems the horror has spread beyond the traditional killing grounds of the Fulani militia and Fulani herdsmen terrorists in the Middle Belt, leading other sections of the North to cry out, even as killings attributed to Fulani supremacists persist in Southern Kaduna in circumstances that suggest complicity of the govt and the army.This is my working framework for now, which I am open to revising as I learn more.ThanksToyinOn Mon, Jul 27, 2020, 22:03 OLAYINKA AGBETUYI <yagbetuyi@hotmail.com> wrote:Toyin Adepoju.
What do you have to say to this fuller account of Southern Kaduna violence representing the narrative from the Muslim perspective since 1981?
Still Fulani herdsmen to blame for all the Muslim casualties?
OAA
Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.
-------- Original message --------From: Ashafa Abdullahi <abashafa@gmail.com>Date: 27/07/2020 15:09 (GMT+00:00)To: usaafricadialogue <usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com>Subject: Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - Reports Indicate Southern Kaduna isBeing Decimated as Nigeria Keeps Silent : Ethnic Cleansing in Full Swingthrough Terrorism by Right Wing Fulani:
New post on Intervention
The Standpoint of Southern Kaduna Muslim Ummah Development Association (SOKAMUDA) on Re-curring Communal Disturbances in Southern Kaduna, Especially Recently
by adminSomehow, the dynamics seem to have worked out in such a manner that the two most manifest parties to the spiral of violence in Southern Kaduna are speaking up. Last week, the Atyap community published its standpoint on a planned reworking of previous reports on the Zangon Kataf violence in 1992. Now, the Southern Kaduna Muslim Ummah Development Association (SOKAMUDA) is also speaking on re-curring communal disturbances in Southern Kaduna through an equally massive document. Interestingly, it is also insisting on calling the spate of violence as genocide against its members. All these must be considered important in one sense: the self-understanding of the parties vis-à-vis the spate of violence since 1981 and how that enriches the inter-discursive space in relation to what a wider community of brokers, from the local to the national and the global, can do.
Preamble
The Southern Kaduna Muslim Ummah Development Association (SOKAMUDA) is an umbrella community based and self - determination association of the Muslim communities (comprising Hausa, Fulani and indigenous Muslims) in the eleven local governments that emerged out of the old Jema'a, Kachia and Saminaka (JEKASA) Local Government Areas. On behalf of the Board of Trustees (BOT), the Executive Committee (EXCO) and the entire Congress of SOKAMUDA, we wish to commiserate with the Kaduna State Government and the families of all Muslims who lost their loved ones in those areas in the conflicts. We pray to Allahu (SWT) to repose the dead and comfort their families. We want to seize this opportunity to register our unflinching support to the Kaduna State Government in this onerous task of identifying, arresting and prosecuting all the perpetrators of the heinous crimes as well as their accomplices, conspirators and sponsors. In addition, we wish to assure His Excellency that we are prepared to cooperate with the Government in trying to find succor for the victims in this trying moments and that we will not relent until justice is dully achieved. Having said that, we wish to write and offer our advise with regards to the recurring crises especially the recent communal crises that erupted in parts of Atyap Chiefdom in Zangon Kataf Local Government, Kajuru Local Government and parts of Kauru Local Government respectively.
We are aware that His Excellency has already been intimated on the Issue by a number of write ups and press releases by many Fulbe and Hausa community based associations. In such write ups, facts and figures were presented on those affected by the disturbances. The quantum of loss of lives and properties was enormous. Similarly, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was equally very high.
We want to place on record that SOKAMUDA supports the write ups by the various associations seeking Government protection of their properties and lives that have been facing threats of genocide by installments from some of their neighbours from 1981 to date. SOKAMUDA equally welcomes the initiative of the present Kaduna State Government since coming to power in 2015, to seek lasting solutions to the recurrent attacks on Southern Kaduna State communities and to end other sundry forms of conflicts in the area.
We therefore recommend that this letter of advice be carefully, objectively and comprehensively studied so as to understand the sustained and gross breaches of our people's fundamental human rights over time and to find sustainable solution thereto.
The Security situation in most parts of Southern Kaduna particularly, the local government areas referred to in this letter is worrisome for quite some time. It is therefore not unexpected for a responsible and concerned government to take the necessary steps as going on currently to find lasting solutions to the persistent loss of lives and properties that negates the aspirational Development of the peace loving people because peace is a prime requirement for the achievement of sustainable development and quality living standards and overall socio-economic development of the polity and its citizens.
The determined efforts of the present regime that is both patriotic, non partisan and determined to move the State away from the status quo that is characterised by underdevelopment, injustice and internecine conflicts to a new and better Kaduna State that would be characterized by Security, Stability and Prosperity, which we all cherish is commendable.
Analysis of Conflicts in Southern Kaduna from 1981 Kasuwan Magani Crises to the Kajuru Local Government Violence of 2018, the Most Recent Conflict in Zangon-Kataf Local Government in 2020 and Other Conflicts in Parts of Southern Kaduna
(1).Before we present the analysis of such conflicts, we wish to highlight some critical points that are very relevant on those persistent disturbances. They are as follows:
(i). The Muslim Communities have never left their settlements to attack any Christian Settlements in all these enumerated conflicts.
(ii).The Muslims Communities being the minorities in Southern Kaduna have been at the receiving end of all these crises in terms of number of lives lost, the quantum of properties destroyed and the number of people internally forcefully displaced .
(iii) In most of these crises, there were only very few prosecution and convictions of the culprits due to the undue politicisation of the matter instead of treating them as the crime that they were.
(iv) The Victims of these incessant crimes including women, children and other vulnerable persons who were lucky to survive were often left without compensation, rehabilitation and de-traumatisation to enable them resume normal life resulting in the persistent weakening of their capacity to survive.
(v) One of the effects of these conflicts is the forceful displacement of victims from their places of abode with its attendant consequences.
(vi). Many of those killed in the crisis were men; some of them sustained injuries that led to their permanent incapacitation. Many others lost their breadwinners, spouses and children. About 75% of those displaced were women and their Children''.
(vii). There were violations against children, as many lost their parents. Thousands were displaced. Schools were closed down or used as refugee camps. Many children displaced by the crisis were forced to change environment, relocating to other parts of the country. They disrupted their social networks. Thousands were unable to continue with their education because they lost their parents and had no available or surviving sponsors. In this way, they suffered a denial of their rights to basic education and a diminution of their future prospects and standards of living.
(viii). Surprisingly, the Hausa-Fulani and other Muslim communities who were the major victims of the conflicts were always blamed for the crises. How can a minority group repeatedly attack bigger groups when they know that, in the end, they would always be the losers?
(2). SOKAMUDA would wish to again present to Government a timeline of Communal Conflicts in Southern Kaduna in the last 39 years to further help in educating and understanding of such conflicts . Since 1981, so much unprovoked violence has been visited on Muslims in different locations across the entire Southern Kaduna landscape, some of them are:
(i). Kasuwan Magani Crises in the Then Kachia LGA in 1981:
Kasuwan Magani in the then Kachia LGA 1981: Here, people of Adara tribe decided to uproot Hausa traders to take over Kasuwan Magani market, by claiming that the land exclusively belonged to them (Adara People). Calling Muslims settlers and in the process killing and destroying 100 homes belonging to the Muslims in the settlement;
(ii) Yarkasuwa Crises in the Then Lere District (now Kauru LGA) in 1986:
It was a conflict that arose following a contest over the District Headship of Lere when some members of the Kurama tribe were opposed to the candidature of another Kurama person who was a Muslim, whom they said dared not contest the District Headship of Lere town in preference to a Kurama Christian. In that premeditated violence that was organized, the unfortunate killing of over 100 people and destruction of about N10m (ten million Naira) properties of Muslims took place;
(iii) Kafanchan Crises of 1987:
This occurred when a certain Rev. "Bako" who was supposedly a Christian convert from Islam, turned the Campus of the then old Kaduna State's Advanced Teachers College (now College of Education) at Kafanchan against the spirit of plurality into what he dubbed "Jesus Campus" while also provoking Muslim students by quoting in, and misinterpreting the Qur'an out of context in order to denigrate religion of Islam. This led to a protest, that was turned into a violent attack on Muslim Students on the Campus of College, which immediately spread into Kafanchan town, Zaria, and subsequently Kaduna and Katsina among other towns. In the incidence, over 300 people perished and property worth about N500m (five hundred million Naira) were destroyed with majority of the casualties being Muslims of Southern Kaduna;
(iv). Zangon Kataf Crises of 1992 :
This infamous violence against Muslims occurred when Kataf ethnic militia attacked the residents of Zangon Kataf and innocent travelers passing through Zango town. This was under the pretext of the Hausa traders' resistance to the relocation of a market. In the violence, the whole portion of the town occupied by Muslims was burnt and demolished. Again, about 1,200 Muslims were killed in cold blood in broad day light. When the Justice Karibi Whyte Judicial Tribunal found the leaders of militia who organised the pogrom guilty and sentenced them to death and long prison terms, the Federal Government only found it expedient to pardon them. This singular action failed to serve any deterrence and emboldened other people with extremists tendencies to lead and organise similar pogrom among Muslim communities in all parts of Southern Kaduna.
(v). Jema Emirship Staff of Office Riots of 1999
Here, some Christian ethnic tribes decided to stop the installation of a new Emir of Jama'a, a throne that was established in the 19th century and has been in existence since 1810. The reason for their action was that they do not want an Emirate in the Southern Senatorial Zone. The militia went on heinous rampage killing over 30 Muslims, burning properties and destroying anything owned by Muslims in many parts of Kafanchan township and the surrounding settlements of Muslims;
(vi). The Sharia Riots of 2000 :
This violence was visited on Muslims when Christians especially those from Southern Kaduna protested violently against a decision of the Kaduna State Government to implement a moderate version of Shari'ah. This myopic and ill-conceived protest led to attacks on Muslims resulting in the death of hundreds of them. The crisis affected many towns in the Southern Senatorial Zone with the worst case recorded in Kachia where over 70% of the entire township was looted and burnt and hundreds of men, women and children were massacred in cold blood.
(vii). The Violence at Kidache Area in Chawai Chiefdom in 2010 :
In this, cattle herders were attacked and many of them killed after they fled the killings that trailed them from Plateau State. The killings were carried out by Chawai Christian militia.
(viii). The 2011 Post-Election Violence, (PEV):
This broke out following the April 2011 Presidential election in many parts of Northern Nigeria. While the protests were mainly against politicians perceived to have rigged elections in many cities and towns like Kano, Mubi, Sokoto and Zaria, it was converted into ethno-religious violence in Kaduna State. Thus, Muslims were attacked in the Christian dominated parts of Kaduna Township including the adjoining rural areas. In the Southern Senatorial Zone, Christian youths saw this as an opportunity to descend on defenseless Southern Kaduna Muslims. Vulnerable communities of Muslims in Zonkwa, Mitsirga, Kafanchan, Kwoi, Madakiya, Gidan Maga, and Kagoro among many others were attacked in broad daylight. Within two days, more than 1,500 lives were lost, thousands of houses burnt and unquantifiable properties lost. Several settlements of Muslims were completely destroyed and Muslims chased out en-masse from these settlements to the present day. This created a flock of internally displaced persons running to over 200,000 people. The Government of Kaduna State under the past PDP administration completely ignored the plight of these victims.
The April 2011 Post Election Violence which took the typology of ethno-religious cleansing (genocide) in some parts of Southern Kaduna had led to the death of over one thousand five hundred Muslims, the forceful displacement of over fifteen thousand families from 38 villages with the complete destruction of their dwellings, places of worship, farmlands, livestock and other means of livelihoods.
The Post-Election Violence was the worst and bloodiest conflict in the history of ethno-religious crises not only in Southern Kaduna but the nation at large. As at now, over 98% of the victims are yet to return to their places of abode in spite of their expressed willingness to do so but made impossible by the aggressive tendencies of many of the Christian communities they lived with.
(ix). The Destruction of Kafanchan Praying Ground in 2013
For no just cause, war mongering and well-armed Christian youths severally pulled down the walls of Kafanchan central Eid praying ground which has been in existence for over 100 years. Neither the Jema'a Local Government Council nor the Kaduna State Government made any arrest and/or prosecute the perpetrators despite the fact that many of these atrocities were carried out in broad daylight and under the watchful eyes of security personnel.
(x). The Killing of a Motorcycle Operator in Kafanchan in 2013:
A Muslim motorcycle operator was attacked and killed by rampaging Christian youths in the aftermath of the post-election violence in the outskirts of Kafanchan. The killers took his handset and used it to place a call to his uncle informing him in a victorious tone to come and remove the 'carcass' of his relation so that it does not decompose and pollute their environment. This sparked reactions leading to further crisis that left many harmless and hapless people dead.
(xi) Demolition of the Fence of Kachia Eid Praying Ground in 2014
The fence of the Muslims Eid praying ground in Kachia has been under constant attack by 'unknown persons'. Despite several appeals by the Muslims, the appeals were not addressed properly.
On 10th April, 2014, however, when a large portion of the fence under construction was demolished by 'unknown persons' this singular action caused suspicion among Muslim youths who stormed the area in protest of such destruction. Following that development, Muslim and Christian youths engaged each other in a bloody confrontation leading to killings of Muslims and destruction of their property within Kachia town.
(xii) The Ninte (Godogodo) Saga in 2016
Ninte is a settlement in Godogodo chiefdom, Jema'a LGA. On 25/05/16, some herdsmen were grazing with cattle in the area when a farmer accused them of destroying his crops. This resulted in disagreement. The pastoralists' leader (Ardo) of the area intervened and he initiated a peace move. He went to the District Head office to assure the community of their desire to pay compensation to the aggrieved farmer. Unfortunately, he was attacked and killed by an irate youth in the presence of the District Head and other community members. Immediately afterwards, the youths from the farming communities proceeded on rampage, burning all Fulani cattle rearers' settlements in and around Godogodo and in the process attacked and killed every herdsmen on-sight.
These acts of injustice and hopelessness forced the herdsmen to respond in self-defense.
As a consequence of call to arms by SOKAPU and Senator Danjuma La'ah, there were coordinated attacks on the settlement of Muslims in Gidan-Waya, Tafan and Pasakori. At the same time illegal roadblocks were mounted by irate youths along many roads that traversed Southern Kaduna; leading to the periodic killing of Muslims on transit.
(xiii) The Kafanchan Demonstration Episode in 2016
Another round of aggression on Muslims was disguised in the form of peaceful demonstration at Kafanchan on 19th December 2016, in spite of the order banning all forms of procession in Kaduna State by the Government. The Muslim community of Kafanchan Township found itself confronted with insults, harassment and intimidation in the name of the procession. Sadly, the choice of the location for the demonstration was the Muslim streets and with the level of provocative statements, skirmishes started. As security agencies took action to prevent violence, the procession turned violent, revealing the true objective of the organisers: to unleash mayhem and provide platform for the killing of Muslims in Kafanchan. With security agencies preventing attack on the Muslims, the aggression was transferred to Government institutions, Mosques and business investments. Soon, the Local Government Council Chairman office, the treasurer and accountant offices were burnt; the Local Government Mosque, Federal Technical College Mosque and the Kaduna State College of Education temporary site Mosque at Kafanchan were all burnt.
Business properties for Muslims like the Kudnax Filling Station opposite College of Nursing, Kafanchan, A.A. Abbas Filling Station, Alh Kabiru Tanko Stores and Alh. Danjuma Umar business centre were also burnt. All properties for Christians were not touched.
Afterwards, many roads were barricaded and innocent Muslim travelers were intercepted and killed or their vehicles looted and burnt.
(xiv) The Goska Incident in 2016
The final aggression was an attack by Goska community on a Fulani settlement (Kadan) at the outskirt of Dangoma on 23/12/16 where some Fulani herdsmen were killed, houses burnt and nearly a hundred cows killed. The assault continued until 24/1216 when the herdsmen responded and drove them back to Goska Village where the altercation continued leading to the killing of some of the community members and burning of some houses.
In the early morning of 26/12/16, the Goska community regrouped and burnt three Fulani hamlets (rugan Kohoje, Gereje and Kwaje) close to Dangoma. They then proceeded to Dangoma and surrounded the community, killed six persons and made several attempt to attack Dangoma community before the arrival of military personnel. In spite of all this, no arrest was made while the media only reported that herdsmen had attacked Goska community without reference to the earlier attack on the Fulani, the burning of their houses and the killing of animals.
(xv) The Ambush and Attacks of His Highness the Emir of Jama'a at Samaru Kataf:
The attempt on the life of His Highness, the Emir of Jama'a following an ambush and attack on his convoy at Samarun Kataf by the Katafawa was a clear evidence of their hidden agenda that was perpetrated in 1995 to eliminate the Emir and the Emirate from Southern Kaduna. To buttress this fact, neither the Christian leaders, the Southern Kaduna people elected representatives, the Southern Kaduna Elders' Forum nor the Southern Kaduna People's Union, (SOKAPU) acknowledged, condemned the attack and commiserated with the Emir. Sadly enough, SOKAPU rushed to the media and denied such happening (attack). It is therefore, our candid submission that SOKAPU is either the mastermind or executioner of the dastardly act or all of the above otherwise why should they rushed to the press and denied that nothing of such took place. There is more to it than met the eye.
(xvi) The Kajuru Local Government Disturbances 2018 to Date
We are all aware that Kajuru Local Government in particular and some border communities in Kachia and Chikun Local Governments have been witnessing incessant violent communal crises since 2018 to date. These crises continue till date amidst contending narratives by the parties involved in such conflicts.
SOKAMUDA would not want to comment on this conflict at this stage as the State Government has established a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the conflict. Our hope and prayer is that the outcome of the Commission of Inquiry will not only establish the facts but will also help Government to advance peace and Justice. We also advise the State Government to take steps to stabilize the situation.
(xvii) The Zangon Kataf Local Government Disturbances 2020
We are all aware that since the 1992 Zangon Kataf unfortunate crisis, the Katafs (Atyap) have unjustly taken over the farmlands of the indigenous Hausas of Zango Urban. Despite the 1996 brokered peace by the then Military Administrator of Kaduna State, Colonel Lawal Ja'afaru Isa, among the various factions, the farmlands till date have not been returned to their Hausa owners. For over three decades now, as an annual occurrence whenever they made attempts to use their farmlands in rainy seasons, they were attacked. Hate was the immediate cause of the recent crises which spread to parts of Kauru Local Government.
SOKAMUDA would wish the government and the public to disregard the mischief and lies being spread by some groups and associations especially the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU), Atyap Community Development Association (ACDA) as to the immediate cause of the recent unrest by resorting to blaming the victim.
As earlier mentioned, the cause of the crisis was a land dispute between the native Kataf (Atyap) farmers and the indigenous Hausa farmers of Zango town. However, the Fulbe communities in the Kataf (Atyap) Chiefdom in Zangon Kataf Local Government and surrounding villages in parts of Kauru Local Government who had nothing to do with the farmland or any other issue for that matter suffered simultaneous attacks by Kataf youths. The attacks were for about four days from 11th June, 2020. The wicked attacks and maiming resulted in the killing of helpless and defenseless Fulani women, children and the elderly in the homes, sleep, roads and in their productive economic business of cattle herding. Similarly, the Fulbe communities have been suffering similar orchestrated attacks by Adara youths in Kajuru Local Government and other parts of Southern Kaduna for no just cause. The loss in human lives ran into hundreds while loss in property ran into millions of Naira with thousands in IDPs as submitted by various Fulbe associations.
As usual, SOKAPU, their collaborators and other mischievous, nervous individuals and groups always quickly issue false information to mislead the public so as to get underserved attention. The public is advised to disregard such misinformation and falsehood by those people.
SOKAMUDA unequivocally wish to appreciate the efforts and prompt response of the Government and security personnel towards ensuring the return of normalcy and the rule of law in the area. We in SOKAMUDA hereby advise that further steps should be taken to ensure that the dead bodies that could not be seen have been fully recovered for burial accordingly and all missing persons and cattle still scattered in the villages are recovered and handed over to their families and owners. Other appropriate general recommendations are made at the end of this letter.
admin | July 26, 2020 at 8:56 am | Tags: ACDA, Col. Lawal Ja'afaru Isa, Fulbe, SOKAPU | URL: https://wp.me/p7K3do-5uR
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On Mon, 27 Jul 2020, 06:42 'Okechukwu Ukaga' via USA Africa Dialogue Series, <usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Toyin,My honest answer to your first question is that I truly don't know who is responsible for the inversion and I am not even a position to hazard a guess. To you second question, I also don't know why the responses of government leadership to this horror have been clearly less than adequate. But from all indications, it is safe to guess that a combination of incompetence, separation from reality, nepotism, corruption, sycophancy among those in position to advice leadership, aversion to constructive criticism and lack of wisdom is at play.Regards,Okechukwu
On Jul 26, 2020 10:06 AM, "Oluwatoyin Vincent Adepoju" <toyin.adepoju@gmail.com> wrote:
Ukechukwu,
Who do you think is responsible for the invasion?
What do you think is the reason/s for the responses of the govt leadership to this horror?
Toyin
On Sun, Jul 26, 2020, 16:09 'Okechukwu Ukaga' via USA Africa Dialogue Series <usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com> wrote:
Toyin,While I wouldn't use your language such as "terrorism by Right Wing Fulani", I think it is the obvious that Nigeria (not just Southern Kaduna but the entire country) is clearly being invaded and decimated while the leadership is unwilling or unable to effectively stop the calamity. And the people, especially the elite and intellectuals are "drinking koolaid" and making excuses for government failure to secure lives and properties. Very short sighted! I am afraid we are approaching point of no return. And if not stopped very soon, this conflagration will consume all including those who made the raging fire possible. Here is of of the many stories I came across recently and wept:
3'I was gang-raped by herdsmen, offered blood to drink as water ― Kidnapped victim
ON JULY 14, 20205:38 AMIN METRO
By Evelyn Usman
Twenty-five-year-old Victoria Okocha gave a chilling account of how she was abducted by suspected herdsmen in Isa-Ogwashi-Uku area of Delta state, gang-raped and forced to drink another victim's blood as water, while in her captors' den.
Okocha left her home town in Ubulu-Uku, Aniocha South Local Government of the state last Friday, heading for Asaba, the state's capital, when they sighted a fallen tree across the road at Isa-Ogwashi.
Apparently thinking the fallen tree was as a result of the heavy downpour the previous day, the driver, according to her, kept moving toward the direction, until they discovered too late that it was used to barricade the way.
She said: " By the time the driver attempted to reverse, it was too late as a man armed with a cutlass, hit his side window in an attempt to drag him out of the vehicle. Passengers hurriedly jumped out and ran into the bush in different directions. But I was unlucky because I had cramps and fell. Another one got hold of me and dragged me into the bush, while the driver who was inflicted with matchet cuts managed to escape.
"They took me far into the bush and demanded N20 million ransom. When I told them my family could not afford that amount because we are poor, they threatened to cut my breasts and plucked out my eyeballs from their sockets if they did not get the amount.
More in HomeThey were five in number and spoke in Fulani dialect. Only one of them could speak English. I was blindfolded and had my hands tied. Five of them took turns to rape me that night.
ALSO READ: Lawmaker advocates life, death sentence for killer herdsmen, bandits
When they contacted one of my relatives, Afamefune, he begged that they reduce the amount and they agreed to reduce it to N5 million. I stayed with them for two days before my people could raise some money which was dropped at a designated place.
They also collected N2000 out of the N3000 cash I had in my bag.
Offered blood to drink
"In my weak state, I begged them to give me some water to drink and they offered me blood. The blood was that of a lady they kidnapped and murdered while I was there. They also drank out of the blood.
"Leader of the gang, who could speak English, told me that their intention was also to kill me because my family did not give them a reasonable amount. But he intervened by sending other members away and told me to run away, showing me the direction to take.
"I was able to locate the road, where I saw a vehicle that was heading towards the direction of my village", she said.
Meanwhile, the Police in Delta State, according to her family, had been informed of the incident. But efforts to reach the Command's Public Relations Officer, DSP Onome Onovwakpoyeya, failed as she could not be reached on her mobile telephone.
But sources at the command said that the command had been working round the clock to address the worrisome trend which kidnapping had assumed in the state, disclosing that some arrests had been made.
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On Jul 25, 2020 2:43 PM, "Oluwatoyin Vincent Adepoju" <toyin.adepoju@gmail.com> wrote:
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The killer herdsmen are operating freely in Southern Kaduna, systematically attacking village after village in several local government areas unchallenged. There is either no security deployment or the deployment is woefully inadequate or ineffective as a deterrent.
And yet Governor Nasir El-Rufai, the inciter-in-chief who has waged a war of extermination and humiliation against the Southern Kaduna people since he took office to punish them for daring to reject him at the poll, for belonging to the wrong ethnicity, and for worshipping God the wrong way, has imposed a 24 hour curfew.
What good is a 24-hour curfew when the killers are roaming the bush freely, where the curfew cannot be enforced, to choose their next target village for today or tomorrow's murderous rampage?
Does the curfew, absent robust, effective, and aggressive security patrols and a neutralization of the killer herdsmen, not simply turn Southern Kaduna people into sitting ducks waiting to be mowed down by the killers?
Does the 24-hour curfew in the absence of a military counter to the killer herdsmen not prevent the Southern Kaduna people from patrolling their villages or adopting other means of self-defense against these killer invaders?
You arrest and cage the leaders of an area and then you confine them to their homes 24 hours a day while their killers are roaming freely in the bushes around their communities, reloading, rearming, restocking, and scoping out new targets.
You have blood on your hands.
Oh I forgot, according to people who should speak out against the Governor's bigotry, criminal abdication, and supremacist politics, which have emboldened the killers and hobbled their victims, El-Rufai "is not perfect," and "has his faults," but he is "intelligent," so all is well.
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