Zeleza may be right or wrong about Iran's strategic realpolitik trumping their concerns about theological and other political differences within the global family of al-Islam, I'm thinking of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Shia, in particular, his long-time accusation that
"Iran is responsible for the spreading of Shiism across Afghanistan " -
his later reconciliation and the role he may be likely to play in the Taliban led administration. I seem to remember when he ran his own prison in Afghanistan, as the self-appointed mini-supreme leader in his state within the state.
More importantly, in tune with the politics of the friend of my enemy is also my enemy, I wonder what an Iran-Afghanistan rapprochement could mean for Beloved Israel ( the only democracy in that noisy neighbour ) and of course with due consideration – and respect for the Palestinians dreams of self-government in the near future
Here's a near-accurate translation of key extracts from DN's (always succinct ) foreign correspondent Michael Winiarski's article from two days ago, "Smekmånaden med talibanerna kan bli kort" ( Iran's honeymoon with the Taliban could be short-lived") updated and published 21-08-24 :
"The Shia Muslim ayatollahs in Iran welcome the Taliban's rapid takeover, despite the fact that the new rulers in Kabul are extreme Sunni Muslims. From supporting the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Iranian leaders have changed footing and approached their former sworn enemy.
(This is a commentary text. The author is responsible for analysis and positions in the text.)
Iran is the country in the region that has perhaps the most complicated relationship with Afghanistan. Prior to 2001, the Shiite clerical regime - like the United States and Russia - supported the armed opposition to the Taliban regime, known as the Northern Alliance, a group of former Mujahideen warriors and warlords.
In the eyes of pure Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims are really "worse than dogs". Iranian hatred of Afghan Sunni extremists culminated in 1998, when the Taliban murdered eleven Iranian diplomats in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Tehran did not oppose the US invasion in the autumn of 2001, but instead helped the United States with intelligence reports on the whereabouts of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
And after the Taliban were ousted from power, Iran helped form a new government in Kabul.
In 1998, the Taliban murdered eleven Iranian diplomats in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. It diluted tensions between Iran and Afghanistan. The picture shows Iranian soldiers participating in an exercise near the border with Afghanistan in November 1998.
But in time, the Iranian leaders changed their footing and began cautious approaches to their formerly sworn enemy. Iran gradually strengthened its contacts with the Islamic Emirate, Afghanistan, the Taliban's fundamentalist-ruled state of God.
While maintaining diplomatic relations with Ashraf Ghani's Western-backed regime in Kabul, Iran called for dialogue with the Taliban. In Tehran there was a good knowledge of the society, culture and politics of the neighbouring country; the largest language Dari is a variant of Persian. In addition, large parts of today's Afghanistan are historically part of the Persian Empire.
Therefore, the Iranian leaders were well informed that the Taliban were taking over ever-larger parts of the Afghan countryside. And they knew something that President Joe Biden did not want to admit - that the Taliban would take over the whole country at lightning speed as soon as the US military had packed up.
This week Iran's new president Ebrahim Raisi spoke only positively about the regime change in Kabul: "The US military defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan is an opportunity to restore life, security and lasting peace in the country."
However, there are cracks in the Iranian facade; the most conservative Shiite priests have openly expressed their hostility towards the Taliban. Grand Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani, has been warned that "it would be a grave mistake to trust a group whose history of evil, murder and slaughter is clear to the whole world."
For Iran, the US farewell to Afghanistan provides an opportunity to continue to strengthen its position in the region. In Tehran, the retreat is interpreted as part of the US withdrawal from Central Asia / Middle East. Joe Biden has promised to withdraw all combat troops in Iraq - the United States' second-longest war after the Afghan one - by the end of the year. There are also many indications that the last American soldiers in Syria will soon be taken home. In these two countries, Iran already has a large military and political influence, and it can now be expected to become even greater.
For Iran, the US farewell to Afghanistan provides an opportunity to continue to strengthen its position in the region. In Tehran, the retreat is interpreted as part of the US withdrawal from Central Asia / Middle East.
Iran's courtship of the Taliban can be seen as an example of how results-oriented political, economic and strategic needs can trump religion or sectarianism. In practical terms, the established relations with the Taliban have enabled Iran, like Russia, to maintain its embassy in Kabul.
This is for the same reason that Iran has long supported Palestinian Hamas, which is a branch of the fundamentalist Sunni movement Muslim Brotherhood.
Of course, Iran has an interest in a stable neighbour, on the other hand, the largely unattended 900-kilometre border between countries.
There are a number of difficulties emanating from Afghanistan, and the future relations between the Ayatollahs and the Taliban will depend on the extent to which the new leadership in Kabul can control them.
(Tens of thousands of Afghans are fleeing the Taliban. Pictured: Afghans travelling to the province of Sistan and Baluchistan in southeastern Iran.)Terrorism. On the other side of the border, there are Sunni Muslim terrorist groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan, which is the Afghan Pakistani offshoot of IS. In the peace agreement reached between the Donald Trump administration and the Taliban in February 2020, the Taliban pledged to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a platform for international terrorism (as in the context of the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001). This concern is shared by the Iranian leadership, which demands that the Taliban prevent jihadists such as IS and al-Qaeda from becoming a threat to Iran.
Minorities. The constant wars in Afghanistan have a sometimes overlooked component: the ethnic divide between Pashtuns (the majority people who are the Taliban's base) and minorities such as Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Iran pays special attention to the Hazaras, who are largely Iranian Shia Muslim allies. The Hazaras are a historically persecuted group in Afghanistan, not least by the Taliban. A large part of the thousands of unaccompanied Afghan children and young people who have sought asylum in Sweden are Hazaras who came via Iran. So far, there have been conflicting signals about how the Taliban intend to treat Hazaras and Shia Muslims: Last week, Taliban commanders in Mazar-i Sharif allowed the Shiites to hold an Ashura procession on Shia Muslims' most important holiday.
But at the same time, the Taliban blew up a statue of Abdul Ali Mazari in the city of Bamiyan. Mazari was a leader of the Hazaras killed by the Taliban in 1995.
It is not unlikely that Shia Muslims and Hazaras in Afghanistan will continue to be persecuted, despite the Taliban's assurances of "amnesty" for all opponents. In addition, Tehran fears that there are geopolitical risks, such as increased influence from arch-rival Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan. In that case, Iran's honeymoon with the Taliban is unlikely to last long.
Facts. Sunni and Shia
The division between Sunni and Shia Muslims is almost as old as Islam. When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632, a phalanx — those who became Sunnis — considered the most competent person to be the new religious head. The other phalanx, the Shiites, considered the rightful heir to be Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali.
Since then, the rift has only deepened between Sunnis, the largest branch of Islam, and Shiites.
The most powerful in Sunni Islam is the Saudi royal family, which applies the fundamentalist variant of Wahhabism.
The Iranian ayatollahs present themselves as the correct interpreters of the Shia Muslim variant.
Both sides have exploited the religious divide for political purposes. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards have armed and funded Shia militias in Iraq and the terrorist movement Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. While Saudi Arabia has supported the Sunni Muslim Taliban in Afghanistan and the terrorist network al-Qaeda.
turns out paul zeleza was right, according to this piece i just saw in Le Monde the iranian govt has backed away from its former criticisms, softened its tone, met with taliban leaders. they are seeing in the retreat of the americans an occasion for them to find rapprochement with afghanistan. i wonder how relations with pakistan will follow.ken
kenneth harrow
professor emeritus
dept of english
michigan state university
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