Professor,
This truly took me by surprise. Thank you very much for sharing my 'itakuroso' on Facebook with 'Denjarous' Denja Abdulahi of the Nigerian Writers Association—indeed, a former President of the Association. To be honest, I would not ordinarily have brought such a piece into this space. Our people here are, as you know, wonderfully bookish, and I sometimes fear making a fool of myself in the midst of so many erudite voices.
Still, I appreciate the gesture deeply. Whatever reactions or backlash may emerge within this revered group, I have already made up my mind: if the heat becomes too hot, I will simply step aside in silence. Thankfully, the examination period is upon us, and I can bury myself in grading until the dust settles and no one remembers that Facebook post.
Thank you again, Professor, for the honour and the unexpected encouragement.
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Bukola A. Oyeniyi
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Missouri State University
College of Humanities and Public Affairs
History Department
Room 440, Strong Hall,
901 S. National Avenue
Springfield, MO 65897
Email: oyeniyib@gmail.com
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On Mon, Dec 8, 2025 at 4:01 PM Cornelius Hamelberg <corneliushamelberg@gmail.com> wrote:
The Nigerian Army, Coup in Benin, and Terrorism in NigeriaSince the news broke yesterday that the Nigerian Army played a decisive role in rapidly suppressing the attempted coup in the Republic of Benin, many Nigerians have urged the military to deploy the same speed and expertise against Boko Haram and similar insurgent threats at home. While this sentiment is understandable—even patriotic—it rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of warfare. The comparison assumes equivalence where none exists.Those making such arguments are juxtaposing categories that may look alike on the surface but are, in reality, profoundly different. Apples and oranges are both fruits, yet they demand different ecologies, cultivation techniques, and uses. In a similar vein, soldiers, medical doctors, and university lecturers may all be state-trained professionals, but they are trained for distinct missions, shaped by different epistemologies and operational logics. The fact that an army excels in one domain does not automatically translate into proficiency in another. The fact that Professor Toyin Falola stands as a towering figure in African history does not, by that achievement alone, qualify him as a successful professor of Analytical Chemistry. Success in one intellectual domain does not confer automatic mastery in another governed by entirely different methods, logics, and traditions.Conventional warfare and terrorist or insurgent violence do not simply occupy different points on a continuum; they belong to entirely different ontologies of conflict. Conventional soldiers are trained to confront identifiable, spatially fixed enemies—opponents who operate within recognizable theaters of war, whose forces can be mapped, tracked, and engaged using established doctrines. Insurgents, by contrast, dissolve into their social environments. They inhabit the interstices of everyday life, leveraging mobility, ambiguity, and intimacy with civilian populations. Schools, markets, farms, and homes become terrains of their conflict. Civilians become their shields, hosts, bargaining chips, and sources of information—willingly or unwillingly.This is why public commentaries dominated by "bomb them out" rhetoric reveal a profound misreading, if not ignorance, of the structural complexity of asymmetric warfare. Even the world's most resource-rich militaries—those of the United States included—have repeatedly failed to "bomb out" insurgencies. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and parts of the Sahel stand as stark reminders that insurgency is not amenable to brute force. Colombia's decades-long battles with FARC represent one of the very few cases where specialized counterinsurgency units eventually achieved meaningful traction—and even there, success required radical institutional reform, intelligence-driven operations, and a willingness to innovate over decades.To defeat non-conventional threats such as Boko Haram or ISWAP, a military cannot simply transpose the doctrines of conventional warfare. It requires an entirely different architecture of response: purpose-built training oriented toward intelligence-led operations; robust human intelligence networks capable of entering insurgent social spaces; advanced surveillance and precision technologies suited to ambiguous environments; and interagency collaborations that extend beyond traditional military procurement. Insurgency is defeated not by firepower, but by information, adaptation, patience, and an intimate understanding of local dynamics.For this reason, the Nigerian military's rapid and effective deployment in Benin Republic should not be misread as proof of an equivalent capacity to swiftly neutralize insurgent threats at home. A coup attempt is a conventional contest for state power. It unfolds in predictable spaces—presidential palaces, barracks, communication centers—with uniformed, identifiable actors. The rules of engagement are clear, command hierarchies are straightforward, and the adversary operates within the same military grammar. Nigeria's performance in Benin Republic demonstrates competence within this specific, bounded domain.Terrorist and insurgent warfare follow an entirely different script. Insurgents do not seize barracks or broadcast stations; they embed themselves in communities, manipulate local grievances, and rely on clandestine networks. Their operations unfold in nonlinear, dispersed, unpredictable ways. A military trained primarily for conventional battlefields cannot simply "apply the same speed" to actors who present no visible front, offer no stable target, and derive strength from blending seamlessly into civilian life.Even the tools of these conflicts differ sharply. Coup suppression relies on armored vehicles, infantry units, and the projection of overwhelming force. Counterinsurgency requires intelligence assets, precision-guided technologies, psychological operations, and community-embedded strategies. The most decisive weapon in insurgency is not the gun but human intelligence—something the Nigerian military has historically lacked at scale.To conflate Nigeria's success in Benin Republic with an assumed capacity to crush Boko Haram is to collapse two distinct epistemologies of violence into one. It is as misguided as assuming that a world-class brain surgeon is automatically qualified to become a seasoned ophthalmologist or a counterterrorism operative. The logics, risks, and required expertise are entirely different.Nigeria's challenges in the counterinsurgency realm do not indicate incompetence; they reveal a mismatch between training and task, doctrine and reality, equipment and environment. Until the country builds forces specifically tailored for asymmetric warfare—grounded in intelligence, community engagement, adaptive tactics, and advanced technologies—its strengths in conventional operations will remain a poor predictor of its effectiveness against insurgent and terrorist violence.(c) Bukola Adeyemi OyeniyiDecember 8, 2025--
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Listserv moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com
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