LONDON FOR KOLKER, PARIS FOR FENDRICK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SF
SUBJ: ESSA MOOSA TALKS ABOUT MANDELA AND OTHER TOPICS
¶1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
--------
SUMMARY
--------
¶2. ATTORNEY ESSA MOOSA WHO SPOKE WITH HIM LAST WEEK,
SAYS MANDELA FULLY EXPECTS THAT ON FEBRUARY 2 DE KLERK
WILL ANNOUNCE THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS, THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY,
THE RETURN OF POLITICAL EXILES TO SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 CAPE T 00097 01 OF 03 182017Z
RELEASE OF SEVERAL POLITICAL PRISONERS INCLUDING MANDELA
HIMSELF. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS WOULD COME
SWIFTLY AFTER DE KLERK'S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF
PARLIAMENT.
-
¶3. THE SAG IS CONCERNED OVER ANC RELATIONS WITH THE SACP
AND OVER THE WORKING DEFINITION OF "ONE MAN ONE VOTE,"
AMONG OTHER "WHITE FEARS" ISSUES. MANDELA HAS PASSED
DE KLERK'S "PROPOSALS" ON THESE TOPICS TO THE ANC.
THE ORGANIZATION'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT IS WILLING TO
NEGOTIATE EVEN WHILE APARTHEID LAWS REMAIN IN PLACE MAY
BE PART OF THE ANC'S REPLY TO THE SAG.
¶4. TENSIONS IN THE COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY
REDUCED BY THE SAG'S TACTIC OF OPENING DIALOGUE AND A
COMMITMENT SHARED BY THE MDM TO REDUCE CONFRONTATIONS.
WHILE MAINLY OF BENEFIT TO THE SAG, THIS PERIOD OF CALM
COULD ALSO FAVOR THE ANC'S NEW STRATEGY OF PRAGMATISM.
¶5. RAISING THE PENDING VISIT OF JESSE JACKSON, MOOSA
EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IT WOULD BE BAD FOR THE STRUGGLE
IF JACKSON ADVOCATED LIFTING SANCTIONS UPON HIS RETURN TO
THE US. END SUMMARY.
-
¶6. IN A HALF HOUR CONVERSATION WITH POLECONOFF. ESSA
MOOSA. THE WESTERN CAPE UDF'S LAWYER AND ONE OF THE
ATTORNEYS WHO MET WITH MANDELA LAST WEEK, MADE THE F0LLOW-
ING REMARKS:
--------------------------------------------- -------------
MANDELA RELEASE WILL BE ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 2 IN PARLIAMENT
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶7. MANDELA MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 CAPE T 00097 01 OF 03 182017Z
PRESIDENT FW DE KLERK TO MAKE SEVERAL MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENTS
IN HIS FEBRUARY 2 SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT.
DE KLERK WILL ANNOUNCE:
-- THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC, PAC AND OTHER POLITICAL
- ORGANIZATIONS;
-- THE END OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY;
-- THE RETURN OF POLITICAL EXILES TO SOUTH AFRICA;
-- THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS,
- INCLUDING NELSON MANDELA.
-
¶8. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS WILL NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ALL
THE ITEMS LISTED WILL TAKE EFFECT AS OF THE TIME OF THE
SPEECH. BUT FIRM PLANS AND A COMMITMENT TO CARRY THEM OUT
SWIFTLY WILL BE PART OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
-------------------------------
WHERE WILL MANDELA BE RELEASED?
-------------------------------
¶9. MOOSA SIDESTEPPED A QUESTION ABOUT WHERE MANDELA'S
HOME BASE WOULD BE UPON HIS RELEASE. HE ONLY REMARKED
THAT MANDELA CAN TELL THE SAG WHERE HE WANTS TO BE
RELEASED AND WHERE HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE WOULD THUS
TAKE PLACE. SENTIMENTALLY, SAID MOOSA, PAARL (WHERE
MANDELA IS NOW IN PRISON) SEEMED TO APPEAL TO MANDELA.
(COMMENT: BUT POLITICALLY AND PRACTICALLY THIS MAKES
LITTLE SENSE. JOHANNESBURG SEEMS BY FAR THE MOST
SUITABLE VENUE. END COMMENT.)
-
--------------------------------------------
CONFIDENTIAL
R 171512Z JAN 90
FM AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5366
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL DURBAN
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 CAPE TOWN 00097
LONDON FOR KOLKER, PARIS FOR FENDRICK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SF
SUBJECT: ESSA MOOSA TALKS ABOUT MANDELA AND OTHER TOPICS
--------------------------------------------
DE KLERK-ANC COMMUNICATION THROUGH MANDELA
--------------------------------------------
¶10. WHEN HE MET SEVERAL WEEKS AGO WITH MANDELA, DE KLERK
PROVIDED A SET OF PROPOSALS AND ASKED FOR THE ANC'S
RESPONSE. MANDELA HAS NOT DISCUSSED THOSE PROPOSALS
IN ANY DETAIL WITH PEOPLE HERE (AT LEAST HE DID NOT DO SO
WITH THE LAWYERS' GROUP OF WHICH MOOSA WAS A MEMBER) BUT
HE DID TRANSMIT THEM TO ALFRED NZO AND THABO MBEKI.
MOOSA BELIEVES (PIECING TOGETHER STRAY REMARKS WHERE AND
THERE) THAT THE PROPOSALS RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO THE NEED
TO ALLAY WHITE FEARS. SPECIFICALLY, HE THINKS ONE ISSUE
WAS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ANC TO THE SACP (SOUTH AFRICAN
COMMUNIST PARTY) AND ANOTHER WAS THE DEFINITION OF ONE MAN
ONE VOTE.
¶11. ASIDE FROM BEING AN EFFORT TO SEIZE THE MORAL HIGH
GROUND BY PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATING FLEXIBILITY, THE ANC'S
RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE
EVEN WHILE APARTHEID LAWS LIKE THE GROUP AREAS ACT REMAIN
IN PLACE MAY BE PART OF THE ORGANIZATION'S REPLY TO DE
KLERK.
¶12. MOOSA UNDERSTANDS MANDELA TO HAVE WORKED OUT A
GAME PLAN FOR "NEXT STEPS" IN A NEGOTIATION WITH DE KLERK
SO AS TO ENSURE THAT HE IS NOT RELEASED FROM PRISON
INTO A VACUUM.
¶13. MANDELA HAS TOLD VARIOUS VISITORS THAT HE HAS A GOOD
OPINION OF DE KLERK AS A SINCERE INDIVIDUAL EVEN THOUGH
HE REGARDS HIM AS STILL THE LEADER OF THE NATIONAL PARTY
AND NOT MORE THAN THAT.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
COMMITMENT ON SAG AND MDM SIDE TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶14. MOOSA AGREED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IS MUCH LESS TENSE
THAN EVEN SIX MONTHS AGO. FOR EXAMPLE, LAST YEAR THE
RETURN TO SCHOOL RESULTED IN THE USUAL ACCUSATIONS AND
PHYSICAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND TRAINING (DET), AIDED BY THE POLICE,
AND STUDENTS SUPPORTED BY PARENTS, TEACHERS AND THE MDM.
THIS YEAR THERE IS AN EVEN WORSE CRISIS DUE TO LACK OF
SPACE IN BLACK SCHOOLS AND THE FAILURE OF OVER 100,000
STUDENTS TO PASS THEIR "MATRIC EXAMS." YET THERE IS A NEW
SPIRIT OF DIALOGUE AT THE DET AND ACTIVISTS ARE
THEREFORE ABLE TO CHANNEL STUDENT FRUSTRATIONS IN A CON-
STRUCTIVE MANNER.
¶15. THE SAG'S NEW "TACTIC" OF ALLOWING DISSENT AND
ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE INSTEAD OF STONEWALLING "IS WORKING
FOR THEM," MOOSA SAID. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT IT
COULD ALSO, IF DEALT WITH POSITIVELY, WORK FOR THE MDM
AND ANC. THOUGH AN ABSENCE OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION IS
"DEMOBILIZING FOR THE MASSES," FEWER RAW NERVES AMONG
ACTIVISTS COULD MAKE THEM MORE AMENABLE TO THE ANC'S
INCREASINGLY PRAGMATIC STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE SAG.
THAT STRATEGY, MOOSA SAID, IS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY MANY
ACTIVISTS, ESPECIALLY YOUTH, WHO FEAR A SELL-OUT OF THEIR
CAUSE. THERE REMAINS A LOT TO DO TO EXPLAIN THE VIRTUES
OF FLEXIBILITY TO THEM.
--------------------------------
PAC AND BC -- A THORN IN THE SIDE
--------------------------------
¶16. MOOSA DESCRIBED THE CONFERENCE ON A DEMOCRATIC
FUTURE AS "NOT A POSITIVE EXPERIENCE IN COOPERATION."
HE OPINED THAT THE PAC AND BC COULD TURN OUT TO BE A
REAL PROBLEM. HE EXPECTS THEM TO REMAIN ALOOF, SNIPING
AT THE ANC'S POSITIONS FROM THE SIDELINES AND STIRRING
UP YOUNG PEOPLE IN PARTICULAR.
----------------------
JESSE JACKSON VISIT
----------------------
¶17. MOOSA INQUIRED ABOUT THE DATES FOR JESSE JACKSON'S
VISIT AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT JACKSON HAD MET WITH
THE PRESS AT SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR KOORNHOF'S
RESIDENCE. MOOSA FEARED THAT THE SAG WAS GOING TOO GOOD
A JOB OF CULTIVATING JACKSON AND THAT HE MIGHT RETURN
TO THE US AND ANNOUNCE THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE LIFTED.
MOOSA APPEARED TO HAVE GREATER CONFIDENCE IN KOORNHOF'S
PERSUASIVE ABILITY THAN IN THAT OF THE SACC LEADERSHIP
WHICH IS HOSTING THE JACKSON VISIT.
BAQUET
________________________________________
From: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com [usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Ibrahim Abdullah [ibdullah@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:17 PM
To: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - US Intelligence in West Africa
See what those who claimed to practice democracy do????
===================
> US embassy cables: Washington launches intelligence trawl in West Sahara
> states
> * guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 18.13 GMT
> * larger | smaller
>
> Thursday, 16 April 2009, 14:17
> S E C R E T STATE 037566
> NOFORN
> EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2034
> TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, CD, CV, GA, ML, MR, NG, SG, UV
> SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: WEST AFRICA
> SAHEL REGION
> REF: A. 08 STATE 124337 B. 04 STATE 179667
> Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).
> Summary
> 1. The state department is hungry for information on Burkina
> Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. It
> wants to know about insurgencies, drug trafficking and standards of
> governance as well as detail about telecoms systems. Key passage highlighted
> in yellow.
>
> 2. Read related article
> 1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT
> Collection Directive (NHCD) on the West Africa Sahel region (paragraph
> 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic
> information relating to the West Africa Sahel region (paragraph 2).
> A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref B and reflects
> the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs
> focused on the West Africa Sahel region (Ref A). The review produced a
> comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and
> collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies
> as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the
> West Africa Sahel region. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool
> to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation
> of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
> B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities
> Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February
> 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the
> use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue
> below) in NHCDs.
> C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of
> the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National
> HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
> assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant
> reporting through their own or State Department channels.
> 2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
> A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for
> much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal
> biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's
> collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for
> dissemination to the IC.
> B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following
> information as possible when they have information relating to persons
> linked to the West Africa Sahel region: office and organizational titles;
> names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of
> telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information,
> such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if
> available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet
> e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers;
> frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant
> biographical information.
> 3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
> This directive covers eight countries of Sahelian West Africa: Burkina Faso,
> Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. The
> coastal countries to the south (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone,
> Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin) are covered separately in
> the West Africa Littoral directive.
> I. Regional Issues
> A. Security 1) International Terrorism (TERR) 2) Response To Terrorism
> (TERR) 3) Military (FMCC) 4) Support for U.S. Military Contingency Planning
> (HREL) 5) Insurgent and Separatist Groups (SRCC) 6) Relations With The
> United States (FPOL) 7) Drug Trafficking (DRUG) 8) Peacekeeping (SRCC) 9)
> GRPO can provide text of this issue.
> B. Governance 1) Leadership (LEAD) 2) Government Stability and Support For
> Democracy (DEPS) 3) Human Rights (HRWC) 4) Political Opposition (DEPS)
> C. Socio-Economic Issues 1) Agriculture and Food Security (FOOD) 2) Foreign
> Aid and Relations (FPOL) 3) Criminal Activities (CRIM) 4) Health and
> Infectious Diseases (HLTH) 5) Population and Refugee Issues (DEMG) 6)
> Economic Institutions and Initiatives (ECFS) 7) Environmental Issues (ENVR)
> D. Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR)
> II. Country-Specific Issues
> A. Chad: Sudan/Darfur Issues (SRCC-2)
> 4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
> I. Regional Issues
> A. Security
> 1) International Terrorism (TERR). -- Details, presence, and activities
> related to al-Qa'ida in the land of the Islamic Maghreb and other
> terrorist-related individuals and organizations. -- Plans and intentions for
> operations against U.S. or allied personnel or interests. -- Links to
> weapons of mass destruction or related materials. -- Presence and activities
> of fighters returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. -- Information on
> organizations, leadership, personnel, tradecraft, intelligence and
> counterintelligence capabilities, financing, front companies, recruitment,
> and training. -- Weapons and methodologies, particularly for improvised
> explosive devices. -- Details about local support networks, particularly for
> transshipments. -- Details about couriers operating in, or originating
> outside of, the region. -- Presence and activities of non-North African
> fighters in the region. -- Indications that international terrorist groups
> are seeking to take advantage of political, ethnic, tribal, or religious
> conflict. -- Health, biographic, biometric, and assessment information on
> leaders.
> NIPF Priority for TERR Chad: 1, Mali: 1, Mauritania: 1, Niger: 1
> NIPF Priority for Non-State Actors for TERR Al-Qa'ida and Sunni Affiliates:
> 1, Hizballah (Lebanese): 1, Jama'at Tablighi: 3
> HUMINT Priority for TERR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Senegal: 5H
> 2) Response To Terrorism (TERR). -- Capability, willingness and intent of
> countries to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts and policies,
> and to conduct counterterrorist operations. -- Details about CT legislation,
> organizations, capabilities, equipment, operations, tactics, and
> limitations. -- Data regarding the impact of U.S. and multilateral economic
> sanctions -- Policies, attitudes, and actions regarding U.S. and other
> western CT training. -- Military and security forces' attitudes towards CT
> training and operations. -- Interaction and interoperability of security and
> military forces with foreign CT forces. -- Public attitudes towards CT
> policies and activities. -- Plans to deploy biometric systems to enhance
> domestic counterterrorism efforts.
> NIPF Priority for TERR Chad: 1, Mali: 1, Mauritania: 1, Niger: 1
> NIPF Priority for Non-State Actors for TERR Al-Qa'ida and Sunni Affiliates:
> 1, Hizballah (Lebanese): 1, Jama'at Tablighi: 3
> HUMINT Priority for TERR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Senegal: 5H
> 3) Military (FMCC) -- Plans, intentions, status and details of the national
> defense policy and strategy. -- Military relations with other countries,
> including training exercises. -- Capabilities, disposition, vulnerabilities,
> and readiness of forces. -- Details about military personnel, units,
> equipment, and tactics. -- Plans and efforts regarding military reform,
> procurement, and modernization. -- Government cooperation regarding U.S.
> POW/MIAs and detained U.S. citizens. -- Evidence of coup plotting in
> military ranks. -- Evidence of criminal activity in military ranks and
> impact. -- Extent and effects of ethnic, religious, and political factions
> within the military. -- Public attitudes towards the military and other
> security forces. -- Details of covert arms acquisitions and arms sales.
> NIPF Priority for FMCC Chad: 3, Mali: 4, Mauritania: 4, Niger: 4, Senegal: 4
> HUMINT Priority for FMCC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H
> 4) Support for U.S. Military Contingency Planning (HREL). -- Plans,
> intentions, and capability of host governments to support evacuation or
> humanitarian assistance by U.S. forces, including host nations' ability and
> willingness to protect U.S. citizens and/or facilities. -- Internal
> developments that could prompt U.S. contingency planning for Non-combatant
> Evacuation Operations (NEO) or humanitarian assistance. -- Host government's
> emergency management capabilities and points-of-contact. -- Details about
> infrastructure, medical facilities, and communication networks. --
> Geocoordinates and description of third-country diplomatic, humanitarian
> aid, and non-governmental organization (NGO) facilities. -- Evacuation
> routes, including official/unofficial checkpoints, chokepoints, and
> potential impediments.
> NIPF Priority for HREL Chad: 3, Niger: 5
> HUMINT Priority for HREL Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> 5) Insurgent and Separatist Groups (SRCC). -- Plans, intentions, and
> capabilities of separatist, insurgent or radical opposition groups or
> organizations to influence or destabilize host country government. --
> Clandestine efforts to subvert peace accords and reconciliation efforts. --
> Plans and intentions relating to U.S. citizens and military personnel in the
> region. -- Leadership, organization, recruitment and training, tactics,
> sources of financing, and Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and
> Intelligence capabilities. -- Goals and attitudes toward peace accords and
> reconciliation efforts. -- Links to foreign governments and non-state actors
> in foreign countries. -- Public support for groups. -- Links to
> international terrorist groups. -- Health, biographic, biometric, and
> assessment information on leaders.
> NIPF Priority for SRCC Chad: 2
> HUMINT Priority for SRCC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 4H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 4H, Senegal: 5H
> 6) Relations with the United States (FPOL). -- Plans and intentions of
> government and government leaders concerning relations with the United
> States, including plans and efforts to support or oppose U.S. policies and
> efforts in international fora. -- Decision-making, policies, plans,
> negotiating strategies, and efforts, particularly regarding Burkina Faso. --
> Impact of relations with China on relations with the United States. --
> Public opinion about U.S. actions in Africa, particularly regarding the U.S.
> Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation foreign
> aid program. -- Response to U.S. policies regarding the Sahel region, the
> Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the global war on terror. --
> Impact of trade relations with India and Brazil on relations with the United
> States.
> HUMINT Priority for FPOL Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
> 7) Drug Trafficking (DRUG). -- Government plans and intentions regarding
> drug production and trafficking. -- Use of transportation networks for drug
> production, trafficking, or storage. -- Details about types of drugs
> trafficked and associated transportation networks and seizures. -- Details
> about front companies, financial institutions, and money flow. -- Links to
> international terrorist groups. -- Links to drug producers outside of
> region, particularly Latin American cocaine cartels. -- Links to regional or
> international drug distribution networks. -- Law enforcement and judiciary
> capabilities to combat drug trafficking and production. -- Drug traffickers'
> efforts to corrupt or undermine law enforcement and government. -- Presence,
> use, or transshipment of precursor chemicals and associated equipment for
> drug production. -- Information about terrorist or insurgent groups' income
> derived from the drug trade, including drug types and quantities. --
> Information on impact of drug trafficking and use, particularly on public
> health and crime, and supporting internal statistics.
> NIPF Priority for DRUG Senegal: 5
> HUMINT Priority for DRUG Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 4H, Chad: 5H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H
> 8) Peacekeeping (SRCC). -- Governments' plans and intentions to participate
> in or support peacekeeping operations and funding allocated/spent. --
> Military and security forces' willingness and capability to train with other
> nations and participate in peacekeeping operations, and details of
> peacekeeping experience. -- Military and security forces' capabilities and
> willingness to accept international military assistance and joint training.
> -- Perception of troops' performance during peacekeeping operations.
> NIPF Priority for SRCC Chad: 2
> HUMINT Priority for SRCC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 4H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> 9) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
> B. Governance
> 1) Leadership (LEAD). -- Key issues of concern to national and opposition
> leadership, particularly dynamics and decision-making processes of key
> civilian and military officials and of ruling political parties, including
> coup plotting. -- Attitude toward political opposition. -- Personal
> financial resources, financial institutions used, and personal
> relationships. -- Biographic data, including opinions about the United
> States.
> HUMINT Priority for LEAD Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 3H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
> 2) Government Stability and Support For Democracy (DEPS). -- Internal or
> external threats to government stability, democracy, or rule of law,
> including government efforts to address these threats. -- Government control
> over national territory and borders, including areas where government
> authority is weak or absent. -- Commitment to representative government and
> democratic reforms, particularly during election cycle. -- Laws, policies,
> and prospects for political succession and elections. -- Details on
> corruption and anti-corruption measures. -- Drivers of, and responses to,
> political instability or economic deterioration. -- Details on
> administrative, judicial, and legislative organs and related
> decision-making. -- Signs of ethnic, religious, or generational polarization
> and impact on decision-making. -- Political and social infrastructure
> development in remote regions.
> NIPF Priority for DEPS Chad: 4, Mauritania: 5, Senegal: 5
> HUMINT Priority for DEPS Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 5H, Niger: 5H
> 3) Human Rights (HRWC). -- Details of human rights abuses by intelligence
> and security services, military, paramilitary, police, or other officials,
> or by insurgent, separatist, or other groups. -- Details of government
> efforts and capability to prevent or respond to abuses. -- Government
> reaction to foreign and domestic criticism of alleged human rights abuses.
> -- Details of alleged disenfranchisement or enslavement of individuals or
> groups, including government complicity or inaction. -- Government
> relationship with international peacekeeping and aid organizations.
> NIPF Priority for HRWC Chad: 2, Mauritania: 5, Niger: 5
> HUMINT Priority for HRWC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 4H,
> Mali: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> 4) Political Opposition (DEPS). -- Plans, intentions, and role of opposition
> parties in political system, including intention to use extra-legal means to
> depose government. -- Activities, plans, intentions, and sources of funding
> and support. -- Leadership, organization, agendas, membership, and level of
> influence. -- Plans and intentions related to the election cycle. --
> Alliances, factions, and evidence of links to foreign governments or
> insurgent/separatist groups. -- Opinions of ethnic, religious, and other
> population groups towards the government and political opposition.
> NIPF Priority for DEPS Chad: 4, Mauritania: 5, Senegal: 5
> HUMINT Priority for DEPS Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 5H, Niger: 5H
> C. Socio-Economic Issues
> 1) Agriculture and Food Security (FOOD). -- Government plans and actions
> regarding agricultural output, food security, and food safety. --
> Willingness to cooperate with U.N. and other donor agencies on food-related
> issues. -- Details about food prices and food trade and public reaction to
> increasing food prices. -- Indications of environmental factors affecting
> agricultural output. -- Government policies and initiatives to increase
> agricultural producer income. -- Status of, and prospects for, cash and
> subsistence crops. -- Indications of invasive species affecting food
> security or development. -- Details about manipulation of food aid by
> government or warlords to enhance power.
> NIPF Priority for FOOD Chad: 5
> HUMINT Priority for FOOD Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> 2) Foreign Aid and Relations (FPOL). -- Governments' and leaders' views on
> foreign nations and international organizations, particularly China, Iran,
> and India. -- Foreign alliances, aid, and activities, including those
> withheld from public view. -- Details on international trade issues and
> economic assistance needs and requests. -- Governments' actions and
> intentions regarding existing U.S. Status of Forces Agreements and the Rome
> Convention's International Criminal Court (Article 98).
> HUMINT Priority for FPOL Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
> 3) Criminal Activities (CRIM). -- Details of corruption and cross-border
> criminal activity, including weapons trafficking, human trafficking, alien
> smuggling, illicit finance, and cigarette smuggling. -- Government and law
> enforcement plans and intentions to combat criminal activity. --
> Organizations, activities, methodologies, alliances, and vulnerabilities. --
> Cooperation with terrorist or insurgent groups. -- Key investors,
> facilitators, beneficiaries, and corrupt officials.
> HUMINT Priority for CRIM Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 4H, Chad: 5H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 4H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 4H, Senegal: 5H
> 4) Health and Infectious Diseases (HLTH). -- Details of infectious diseases
> and general health conditions, including number of cases, percentage of
> population affected, fatalities, dates, areas of occurrence, and impact. --
> Government policies, plans, and efforts for disease prevention and
> identification. -- Nutrition-related health of population, including
> refugees. -- Vaccination practices, capabilities, and response related to
> drug-resistant and Emerging and Re-Emerging Diseases, particularly polio and
> tuberculosis. -- Effect of HIV/AIDS or other diseases on military,
> government, or economic performance. -- Public attitudes towards disease
> prevention and treatment programs. -- Indications of infectious plant,
> animal, or zoonotic diseases (animal to human transmission) with potential
> economic or public health consequences. -- Details about contaminated food,
> water, air, and soil. -- Information on medical facilities, including
> capabilities and training.
> NIPF Priority for HLTH Chad: 4
> HUMINT Priority for HLTH Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> 5) Population and Refugee Issues (DEMG). -- Population movements in the
> region, and governments' involvement and response. -- Indications of actual
> or potential refugee movements within or into the region. -- Locations and
> conditions of refugee camps and informal refugee and internally displaced
> persons (IDP) gathering sites and transit routes. -- Government capability
> and willingness to assist refugees and IDPs. -- Health and demographic
> statistics of refugees and IDPs. -- Dynamics and impact of migration and
> demographic shifts. -- Efforts to repatriate refugees.
> NIPF Priority for DEMG Chad: 3, Mali: 4, Mauritania: 4, Niger: 4
> HUMINT Priority for DEMG Burkina Faso: 4H, Cape Verde: 4H, The Gambia: 4H,
> Senegal: 4H
> 6) Economic Institutions and Initiatives (ECFS). -- Policies, strategies,
> and efforts to improve economic growth. -- Leadership views on economic,
> trade, and fiscal policies and regulatory enforcement. -- Identities and
> roles of governments' economic policy-making and regulatory
> bodies/officials. -- Macroeconomic statistics regarding trade, budget,
> balance of payments, and national economies, including reliability or
> manipulation of data. -- Public perception of economic conditions, including
> youth employment prospects. -- Nature and extent of underground banking
> systems. -- Details on economic assistance needs and partnerships, and
> effectiveness of aid. -- Financial data transmission systems and accounting
> methods. -- Details of natural resource development activities, including
> financing.
> HUMINT Priority for ECFS Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 5H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 4H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> 7) Environmental Issues (ENVR). -- Details of plans and efforts by
> governments, NGOs, and others to combat deforestation and desertification,
> including the Great Green Wall project. -- Governments' willingness and
> ability to manage exploitation of natural resources and respond to natural
> and man-made environmental disasters. -- Capability and willingness to
> protect nearby sea lanes, and fishing grounds and other Exclusive Economic
> Zone claims. -- Negotiating positions at international environmental
> meetings. -- Government and public perceptions regarding environmental
> issues.
> NIPF Priority for ENVR Niger: 5
> HUMINT Priority for ENVR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The
> Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> D. Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR).
> -- Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned
> upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information
> systems, command and control systems, networks, and technologies used by
> government, military, and private sector. -- National leadership use of, and
> dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and
> information systems. -- Details about national and regional
> telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, service providers,
> vendors, and training. -- Details about internet and intranet use,
> infrastructure, and government oversight. -- Plans and efforts to acquire
> U.S. export-controlled telecommunications technology. -- Details about
> information repositories for Radio Frequency Identification-enabled systems
> used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. --
> Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of
> principal civilian and military leaders.
> NIPF Priority for INFR Chad: 4
> HUMINT Priority for INFR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H,
> Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
> II. Country-Specific Issues
> A. Chad: Sudan/Darfur Issues (SRCC-2).
> -- Details about Sudanese-backed insurgency in Chad and Chadian-backed
> insurgency in Sudan and related population movements. -- Indications of
> actual or potential refugee or IDP movements, especially Sudanese and
> Central African Republic refugees. -- Human rights abuses against refugees
> currently located in Chad. -- Government's political will and intention to
> engage Sudanese-backed separatists. -- Military capability to combat
> Sudanese-backed separatists. -- Role of international institutions in
> stabilizing domestic uprising. -- Details about Chadian insurgents'
> relationship with the Government of Sudan. -- Details about the government's
> relationship with Sudanese insurgents in Darfur. -- Presence or activities
> of international terrorist groups in insurgencies.
> CLINTON
> * guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010
>
> --
>
> Toyin Falola
> Department of History
> The University of Texas at Austin
> 1 University Station
> Austin, TX 78712-0220
> USA
> 512 475 7224
> 512 475 7222 (fax)
> http://www.toyinfalola.com/
> www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa
> http://groups.google.com/group/yorubaaffairs
> http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa
> Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
> For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
> For previous archives, visit
> http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
> To post to this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com
> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
> unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the "USA-Africa Dialogue Series" moderated by Toyin Falola, University of Texas at Austin.
For current archives, visit http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue
For previous archives, visit http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/index.html
To post to this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to USAAfricaDialogue-
unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
No comments:
Post a Comment