The Gbagbo Conundrum
Kwasi Gyan-Apenteng
To say that outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo of La Cote d'Ivoire has a multiple personality is to state the obvious because all of us do. In Mr. Gbagbo's case, one discerns two distinct profiles and they are getting in the way of each other and creating confusion in the minds of people, including some who should know better. Thus, some of the issues swirling around Gbagbo's bid to remain president, and the responses to it have to do with political wars of the past.
Perhaps, a bit of history would help to illustrate the point I am about to make. At the time of independence, Africa was roughly divided into two camps. One advocated rapid decolonisation, and a quick break with the colonial past, pan-Africanism and rapid industrialisation. In that camp were countries like Ghana, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Morocco, etc. On the opposing side were most of the francophone (except Mali and Guinea) countries and Nigeria. La Cote d'Ivoire was a vocal member of the second group and its independence leader, Mr. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, was said to have laid a bet against Nkrumah as to which of the two different development and political models would deliver a better outcome after ten years of independence.
In this polarised continental atmosphere, the leaders in one camp were denounced and demonised by those in the opposite camp. Thus, Houphouët-Boigny was seen as an opponent of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah; and he gave covert and overt support to Nkrumah's opponents led by Dr. J. B. Danquah and Professor Kofi Busia. As with almost all independence leaders, the Ivorian leader brooked no opposition in his country while denouncing Nkrumah as a dictator, and it stands to reason that Nkrumah also gave succour to the Ivorian leader's opponents, many of whom were living in Ghana.
Dr. Laurent Gbagbo, a young political firebrand emerged as one of the main opponents of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and mobilised opposition to the late president from his base at the University of Abidjan where he taught history. He founded the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) which emerged as the popular vehicle for struggle around the usual left issues of anti-apartheid, pro-Palestine, pan-Africanism solidarity and a nudge to socialism at home. Gbagbo ran and lost in the 1990 elections and benefited from the ban imposed on all other major potential candidates by Robert Guéï's political junta in 2000. When Guéï tried to rig the election result against Gbagbo, the latter led a revolt that resulted in Guéï's overthrow and Gbagbo's successful installation as President.
How would Gbagbo of the 1970s to 2000 have reacted if an incumbent president of his country decided to remain in office in the face of considerably reasonable evidence that he had lost the confidence of his compatriots as expressed in an election. It is reasonable to imagine that he would have been at the front of the barricades demanding that the right thing be done. The tension in Ivorian politics, which is beginning to define African attitudes in the 21st century, is also about reconciling the two Gbagbo profiles on offer to the public.
Fast-forward to 2010 and you realise that most of Gbagbo's ardent supporters are in reality hankering after a man and an age that have both long disappeared. Some African leaders are supporting Gbagbo because he supported the liberation struggle in the 1970s or that he supported or still supports the cause of the Palestinian people, and stuff like that. In truth, the Gbagbo of old, that symbol of democratic renewal and the darling of the left and progressive forces, who was equally supported by the West, is getting in the way of a proper appreciation of what the current crisis in La Cote d'Ivoire is about.
It is neither about Gbagbo not Alassane Ouattara. It is about democracy and its most basic principle for which Gbagbo fought and went to prison twice in his life; the elective principle was at the core of everything Gbagbo fought for and won acclaim. The election in La Cote d'Ivoire in 2010 bears some resemblance to what happened in 2000 when under severe pressure, the comical but deadly dictator of that time, Robert Guéï organised elections that he hoped to win. When the results appeared not to go according to his plans he ordered the electoral commission to scrap the entire exercise and proclaim him winner against Gbagbo. The ensuing popular uprising led to the coronation of Gbagbo who declared himself president.
In 2010, Gbagbo was a less reluctant believer in the election but it had taken five long years for the country to reach that point – under his watch. Under the circumstances of the elections, it is more than probable that some things could have gone amiss, but all credible observers say that Ouatarra won. That appears to be at the centre of the controversy in the country, but a closer inspection should suggest that if Gbagbo had won, the results would have been announced in hours and not days after the ballot closed. The fact that a close Gbagbo ally tore up the election results on live TV shortly before the Electoral Commission's declaration confirms that fact.
Gbagbo's allies and apologists are calling for a re-run of the election on grounds that there were difficulties with the results in some parts of the country, but the Gbagbo of old would have given short shrift to this argument as indeed he did when Robert Guéï tried to pull the same trick eleven years ago. As has been said repeatedly, there is nothing like a perfect election, and the last Ivorian election is no exception. However, on a balance, almost all credible observer groups have said that Gbagbo lost the election.
The pity of it is that Laurent Gbagbo has moved himself from the column of the small band of genuine African heroes into the baddies column. But this is not only a personal tragedy for Gbagbo but has serious implications for politics and political thought in Africa. In the short term, Gbagbo's behavior, coming on the heels of similar obstinacy by Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and Kenya's Mwai Kibaki, who both lost elections but toughed it out, may denote a trend in which losing incumbents decide to refuse or accept an election verdict. We should not forget that Gbagbo told a live TV audience that he would accept the verdict of the electorate but that was before he lost the same election.
Perhaps, the key to the Gbagbo conundrum lies with the Ivorian armed forces, or the part of it that staunchly backs the incumbent. It can be argued that a way out of the crisis must involve a properly organised and supervised transition in which the role of the armed forces (and the rebel army) now and the in the future is spelt out. This is because coming out of a civil war situation in which Ouatarra was the defined "enemy" of the Gbagbo supporters, the fighting forces would have a say in how their principals behave in the post election period. That has to be part of the political settlement because it is obvious that the confidence building measures that were supposed to be in place before the elections have not been sufficient.
In all of this, the Gbagbo of old would have been on the side of democracy, change and fair play. That would have been the legacy he would crave. If he looks behind him, he would realise that perhaps not all those lining up to offer support have the same instinct. Dr. Laurent Gbagbo is a professor of history so it should not be too difficult for him to distance himself from himself and choose a suitable legacy for his life's work. It would be wise for him to choose before a choice is forced on him
gapenteng@hotmail.com
This piece was first published in my Daily Graphic (Ghana) column last Saturday.
Kwasi
(Kwasi Gyan-Apenteng, Journalist & Communications Consultant)
Programme Coordinator, Cultural Initiatives Support Programme
Du Bois Centre, PMB CT 219, Cantonments, Accra
Tel: +233 21 770677
Please copy OFFICIAL correspondence to kgapenteng@cispghana.org
ALSO
President, Ghana Association of Writers
PAWA House, Accra
No comments:
Post a Comment