erroneously posted and have since deleted the all too simplistic essay
riddled with so many platitudes which seem to be the trade mark of
Frank Eso).
Reality is more complex than he would like us to believe.
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/dr-gary-k-busch/the-impasse-in-the-ivory-coast.html
23 Jan, 2011
The Impasse In The Ivory Coast
The electoral standoff between President Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara
in the Ivory Coast is far more than just a typical electoral conflict
between African candidates. It exemplifies and dramatizes some of the
root conflicts which beset Africa, It is a paradigm case of self-
serving ignorance on the part of an international community; the
woeful inadequacies of the United Nations and its peacekeeping
efforts; and the generational splits within African political
leaderships which entrench old and compromised leaders in positions of
power, trading on stories of old victories and sacrifices and, thus,
effectively shutting the door to the rise of younger talent within
their parties.
There is a great deal of reference made to the actual results of the
second round of the election. There were egregious lapses in the
process in the rebel-held areas of the North and, if the observers are
to be believed, irregularities as well in the South. Just how these
two match up to each other in terms of numbers has never been tested
by any outside party. The Electoral Commission improperly gave its
verdict on incomplete and untested tallies and the Constitutional
Council overturned these tallies in one day of consideration. In fact,
as far as anyone knows for sure, and the African Union has produced an
internal memo which states the same thing after its examination, no
one really knows who was the victor and who can say so with authority.
However, the Constitutional Council was empowered by the Ivoirian
Constitution to be the final arbiter of all electoral decisions and it
was they who announced the victory for Gbagbo.
Democracy cannot work without sovereignty because without sovereignty
an elected government has no foundation for its laws, policies and
court decisions. This why a Constitution is so critical to any
democracy as it codifies the rules under which the citizens subsume
their individual power into a common weal. Without reference to a
Constitution, government is illegitimate and there is no agreed common
weal. And, if for some reason, sovereignty is tainted or diluted,
democracy cannot function in anything but a trivial manner. These are
all descriptors of the political situation in the Ivory Coast.
It might be useful to examine the fundamental concerns of the Ivoirian
citizens in these matters, as opposed to the narrower interests of the
politicians.
Legitimacy:
President Gbagbo and his FPI Party won the election of 2000. They then
formed a government and attempted to govern. There was resistance to
the Gbagbo administration by the PDCI and the RDR, as the FPI began to
remove some of the remaining vestiges of Houphouetism which had
survived the military rule under Guei. Among these was the derogation
of much of the Ivoirian national powers to the former French colonial
power. The Pacte Coloniale, which had tethered the economy, trade,
finance and military structures to France was carried out in every
Ivoirian ministry, bank and institution by the hundreds of French
nationals sent to the Ivory Coast as 'advisors' under the French
Ministry of Co-operation. In some Ministries there was one Frenchman
for every Ivoirian. Ivoirian sovereignty was demeaned by the presence
of the French 'co-operants' who made many of the actual decisions in
running the country. French soldiers and police were based in the
Ivory Coast and were responsible for the training, equipping and
deployment of the Ivory Coast forces; indeed they were also
responsible for the promotions given to Ivoirian officers.
French business was given the right to operate monopolies in crucial
sectors of the economy. French companies control water, electricity,
construction, port operations, transport, a dominant part of the oil
and gas industries and much of the food trade. Under the new Gbagbo
government this tight control was relaxed as far as possible. When a
new bridge was to be built in Abidjan the French quoted a very high
price. The Chinese offered to build a two-level bridge on the same
site for about half the price tendered by the French. The co-operants
in the ministries assured that there was no acceptable technical
specification which would allow the Chinese to win the right to build
the bridge. The bridge wasn't built.
The Ivoirian economy was operated under French control and guidance.
The use of the CFA franc meant that 85% of the cash flows of the
Ivoirian economy were banked in Paris under the control of the French
Treasury, after passing through a central BCEAO bank in Senegal. This
was 'flag independence' with a vengeance. The Ivory Coast had a flag,
a national anthem and a seat at the UN. The French controlled almost
everything else. The sovereignty of the country was founded in law but
handled, in reality, much as it had been under colonial rule. When the
FPI and Gbagbo moved to shake off these shackles they were also
attempting to assert the sovereignty of the Ivory Coast and the
primacy of the Ivoirian Constitution. That is what gave them their
legitimacy.
Ivoirite:
There is a great deal of propaganda being circulated that the Gbagbo's
FPI is a regional party which is hostile to the North, particularly to
the immigrant Muslim populations from Burkina Faso and Mali who have
settled in the Ivory Coast. This is not true. It was the government of
Henri Konan Bedie, the PDCI successor to the long-time leader,
Houphouet-Boigny, who exiled and drove from the Ivory Coast more than
12,000 Burkinabes as soon as he took office. This was not the FPIs
doing; it was done by the PDCI opposition who now attack the FPI for
being hostile to the North. Foreigners may be impressed but no one in
the Ivory Coast with even a short memory is fooled.
This hypocrisy is even more pronounced over the issue of Article 35 of
the Constitution. The rebels and the two opposition parties of the
South (the PDCI and the RPR) made the issue of Ivorian parenthood a
major impediment in the search for peace. The main candidate of the
RPR, Alessane Dramane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister, had been
prohibited from standing for the Presidency because his father came
from Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Ouattara, himself, travelled
on a Burkina Faso passport... This prohibition derived from Article 35
of the Constitution. It is Gbagbo who is being blamed for this.
However, the truth is very different. This Constitutional amendment to
Article 35 which advanced the notion of 'Ivoirite' was voted upon and
ratified by the country in a referendum and was supported by both the
RPR and the PDCI. They both had major national campaigns seeking a
'yes' vote on the proposed Constitution; both Bedie and Ouattara
personally campaigned for a ratification of the Constitution. This was
not a Constitution of the FPI or Gbagbo; it was a reform Constitution
of Guei in consultation with the RPR and the PDCI. They lived to
regret it but it was their creature.
When the parties at the Linas-Marcoussis negotiations raised the
amendment of this Article 35 as an issue it was not opposed by the
Gbagbo Government. In subsequent negotiations, Gbagbo agreed to put
this as a bill in front of the National Assembly. The National
Assembly met and voted to repeal those sections of Article 35; there
was no controversy. There was no impediment raised to Ouattara running
for President. Indeed, the shock was that the PDCI, the party which
banned Ouattara from running, was locked in an electoral alliance with
Ouattara.
The Rebellion:
On the Wednesday, in September 2002, when the rebellion began, there
were about 650 rebels holed up in Bouake. These were Guei appointees
who had been purged from the Army. They had little equipment and
ammunition, as they had expected a conflict of no more than five days.
President Gbagbo was in Rome, meeting the Pope and the rebels felt
sure that the coup could take place quickly with the President out of
the country.
Fortunately for Gbagbo, his loyalist Army was led by his Minister of
Defence, Moise Lida Kouassi; a former cellmate of Gbagbo's when they
were jailed under Houphouet-Boigny. The internal security was in the
hands of another cellmate, the Minister of the Interior Emile Boga
Dougou. The team of the President and his two Ministers represented a
powerful force for change in the Ivory Coast and had substantial
support from the Ivory Coast population... The Gbagbo government had
demonstrated, during its short term in power, a spirit of nationalism
which had mobilised the population.
As the coup began in the second largest town, Bouake, the loyalist
troops under Lida Kouassi responded. They were able to surround the
rebels, trapping them in the city, and killing about 320 of them. They
were positioned for a final onslaught on the remaining 300 rebels but
were suddenly stopped by the French commander of the body of French
troops stationed in the Ivory Coast. He demanded a delay of 48 hours
to evacuate the French nationals and some US personnel in the town.
The loyalist army demanded to be allowed to attack Bouake to put down
the rebels but the French insisted on the delay. As soon as there was
a delay, the French dropped parachutists into Bouake who took up
positions alongside the rebels. This made it impossible for the
loyalist troops to attack without killing a lot of Frenchmen at the
same time.
During those 48 hours the French military command chartered three
Antonov-12 aircraft which were picked up in Franceville in Gabon.
These Ukrainian-registered aircraft were filled with military supplies
stocked by the French in Central Africa. Two of the planes started
their journey in Durban where Ukrainian equipment and military
personnel were loaded on board. The chartered planes flew to Nimba
County, Liberia (on the Ivory Coast border) and then on to the rebel
areas in Ivory Coast (Bouake and Korhogo) where they were handed to
the rebels. Busloads of troops were transported from Burkina Faso to
Korhogo dressed in civilian clothes where they were equipped with the
military supplies brought in by the French from Central Africa and the
Ukraine.
All of a sudden there were 2,500 fully armed soldiers on the rebel
side as mercenaries from Liberia and Sierra Leone were also brought in
by the same planes... They were equipped with Kalashnikovs and other
bloc equipment which was never part of the Ivory Coast arsenal. France
supplied sophisticated communications equipment as well.
Once the rebels were rearmed and equipped, the French gradually
withdrew, leaving operational control to the Eastern European
mercenaries who directed the rebels in co-ordination with the French
headquarters at Yamoussoukro. The French continued to subvert the
loyalist army at every turn and attempted to purge the army of its key
officers. The rebels succeeded in assassinating Boga Dougou and taking
the wife of Lida Kouassi as hostage in a rampage in Abidjan. The
French, who were bound to defend the legitimate government of the
Ivory Coast under the same Pacte Coloniale, turned things on their
head and armed and equipped the rebels. They have continued to support
the rebels and have provided a protective shield for them by dividing
the country in two and patrolling the dividing line. The French-
sponsored Presidents of neighbouring countries (Niger, Mali and
Burkina Faso) have assisted the French in their support of the rebels,
just as they assisted the rebels in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Rebel Rule:
When the French were able to divide the country in two, the
inhabitants of the North found that they were sheltering foreign
mercenaries and failed Ivoirian soldiers who had been cashiered from
the Army. The civil servants in the North left in fright. Doctors,
nurses, teachers, professionals of all sort fled the North for the
safety of the South. There was no one of any competence to run the
institutions in the North. The schools closed; the hospitals shut
their doors; civil administration came to a close; politics was
dominated by the rebellion. Many of the rebels quarrelled with each
other over 'turf', Soro's plane was shot down by a missile and he
escaped with his life although his comrades were killed. There was no
repair of the roads or the infrastructure. Rebels and French
peacekeepers raided the banks and stole all the money that was there.
Some of the French peacekeepers were tried and sentenced for rape,
murder and bank robbery in French courts. The rest walked free.
Most of these rebels were not Ivorian at all. They were the wandering
mercenaries of the Liberian and Sierra Leone wars who had attached
themselves to the military coup leader, Robert Guei whom Gbagbo
defeated in a free election. There were three rebel groups which
appeared in Ivory Coast: The Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (MPCI) -
which was the first to take up arms against the government; The
Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP); and The Ivorian Popular Movement
of the Great West (MPIGO). Of these the MPCI had a political base
within the Ivory Coast formed from Guei supporters and the large
immigrant communities of Burkinabes, Malians and Guineans who had come
to Ivory Coast as economic migrants. The other two groups were ad hoc
groups of Liberians, defeated Sierra Leonean rebels and Guinean
dissidents offered shelter and support by Charles Taylor of Liberia.
The familiar faces from the Liberian civil war could be seen in the
television clips of the rebels. Moskito Bockarie from Sierra Leone was
familiar face among the rebels. Ukrainian pilots and mercenaries from
these wars and the wars in the Congos and Angola appeared regularly. A
substantial proportion of the rebels spoke English with each other
rather than French. These parties later coalesced into a fragile
coalition of 'Houphouetists' for the election
No one in the North paid taxes. No one paid rent (but they did pay for
protection). No one paid for the utilities provided to the North by
the South. Education virtually ceased. Soldiers were billeted on a
supine Northern population. Industry died. Commerce thrived in
stealing the cocoa, coffee, cotton and hardwoods of the North and
shipping them to the world market through major French traders
operating in the North. No customs or excise duties were paid and a
small business of importing duty-free mopeds became the staple
industry of lower-level soldiers. Rebel leaders suddenly acquired
large sums of money and started buying property in Paris and banking
their wealth in Ouagadougou. Despite ruling the North for almost ten
years in safety and impunity these rebels have not been able to set up
any government, civil service or a political infrastructure in the
lands they occupy. This is one major reason for the citizens in the
South to fear the empowerment of the rebels and their political
godfather, Ouattara, in Abidjan. They have no record of any civil
achievement nor have they built any structures for administering to
the needs of the country.
Even now, their indifference to the needs of their own people is
evident. The pro-Ouattara coalition Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes
pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP) has called for civil disobedience
to protest the stalemate. In the North those schools which were
partially resuscitated in 2007 are now closed in response to the
appeal, according to Save the Children in Côte d'Ivoire, This means
some 800,000 primary-age students are not in school.
The Condominium:
Perhaps the most devastating effect of the rebellion was the reaction
of the French and the international community to the division of the
country. In an effort to restore order and constitutional rule the
treaties signed in Linas-Marcoussis, Accra, Pretoria and Ouagadougou
were designed to restore peace and order in the Ivory Coast; all
enshrined the notion of condominium. That is, the international
community insisted that the Prime Minister step down and be replaced
by an appointee chosen by them and that there were Cabinet posts
reserved for the ministers appointed by the rebel political parties.
Gbagbo and the FPI, who had been democratically elected in 2000, had
to accept a prime minister not of their choosing and a Cabinet made
up, in part, by rebels.
These new Cabinet ministers demanded large salaries, cars and jobs in
their ministries for their friends and families. No notion of
competence or training was used in the selection of the new Cabinet
ministers. Only that they were chosen by the rebel bands. In fact, few
actually showed up to work. The civil administration of the country
was incoherent and conflicted as the national interest took second
place to the demands of rival Cabinet ministers. The FPI was
effectively stymied by internal dissent from a Prime Minister who
refused to obey the wishes of the President and a Cabinet which
refused to obey any rule other than the Law of the Jungle. The United
Nations sought an international agreement to beef up the French
presence in the Ivory Coast and sent 'peacekeepers' to the country.
These have remained there ever since, effectively commanded by the
French military which has the communications and heavy equipment
there. The UN peacekeepers are an extension of the French military
that have also been transformed into UN peacekeepers by UN decree.
In 2006 the International Advisory Group appointed by the United
Nations decided that the National Assembly should also be abolished
because the rebels were not officially represented in it. The citizens
reacted against this demand and took to the streets in protest. The
French peacekeepers retaliated by destroying the Ivory Coast Air
Force. They seized the airport and sent a hundred tanks and armoured
personnel carriers to oust Gbagbo from office by violence. The
citizens gathered at the Hotel Ivoire which was on the way towards
Gbagbo's residence and, unarmed and peacefully, they confronted the
hundreds of French soldiers in their tanks. The French soldiers,
following a direct order from Chirac and his Minister of Defence Aliot-
Marie, opened fire on the protestors with automatic weapons and
snipers on November 9, 2006 and killed 68 unarmed civilians and
wounded 1,300 more. The United Nations and the French offered no
apologies to the Ivory Coast citizens for this act of war against the
country which widened the distrust of their real intentions. The
United Nations was seen as an enemy of the Ivoirian people and an
institution which did not respect the sovereignty of the Ivory Coast
state.
Disarmament:
They key to the Ivory Coast dilemma is that there has been no
disarmament. Every peace agreement that has been signed, every
mediation which was accepted by the parties, every political agreement
among the parties has stipulated that the rebels must disarm. This was
agreed by them over and over but they have refused to disarm. The
terms of the election required that at least two months before the
election there would be a verifiable disarmament of the rebel forces.
This was not adhered to and the international community has refused to
act to make the rebels disarm since the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in
2002. Every compromise that the Gbagbo government made under these
agreements was prefaced by an agreement that the rebels would disarm.
The Gbagbo government was held to its commitments under these
agreements but the rebels were left alone.
This question of disarmament is not just a military matter. It has to
do, as well, with the ability of electoral officials to move freely
throughout the country to prepare a valid electoral roll. In the
absence of any civil service infrastructure in the North it became
vital to allow officials to wander freely in the North to engage in
the verification of voter's credentials. They could not do this
without armed guards and protectors because the warlords of the North
controlled the registration process. It was impossible to prepare a
valid and reliable electoral roll without disarmament. It was also
impossible to certify a free and fair election when voters were
intimidated by armed men patrolling the electoral stations, preventing
people from voting, and threatening the observers. This is all
documented in the AU report.
The international community cannot complain that the election was not
free and fair when it was they, for almost ten years, which allowed
the rebels the freedom not to disarm and to achieve impunity from any
sanction. The Ivoirian people asked how it was possible to have a
proper election in a country divided in two parts and where a fully-
armed rebel force was allowed to continue to retain its weapons in
defiance of every agreement it had made.
The Military:
There have been many observers who have noted that the Ivory Coast
military remains loyal to President Gbagbo. This is not really
surprising as each soldier and officer took an oath which pledges them
to the defence of the Constitution. Since President Gbagbo is the
constitutional president it is no mystery. Perhaps more importantly,
when the rebellion took place those who sympathised with the rebels
deserted the Ivory Coast army and fled north. The army was purged of
dissidents and became much more homogeneous of the ethnic groups of
the South. This was not entirely true of the police and gendarmes.
When the hostilities ended there was an effort by the United Nations
to integrate the rebels with the regular army. This was an impossible
task. The rebels demanded that they keep their rank and pay in the new
army and demanded to be paid their wages for the period in which they
were in rebellion. They demanded to retain their own chain of command
and armour. This was clearly a non-starter with the loyalist army
command and troops. They said they would explore integrating some
units, but only after they disarmed. The rebels refused to disarm and
participated in seven attempted military coups against the Ivory Coast
state since 2004, led by French officers sent directly from France for
this purpose and Burkinabe and Malian mercenaries provided by the Mali
and Burkina Faso governments.
Clearly there is no basis for the integration of the two opposing
forces and no wishful thinking of the United Nations will make it
otherwise. However, if the United Nations and the French decided not
to assist the rebels the loyalist forces of the Ivory Coast would be
able to destroy the rebel forces throughout the country in less than a
month. That is why they demand UN protection and ECOWAS troops to do
the fighting for them. Although there is a sanction in place by the UN
in the acquisition of the Ivory Coast military to acquire weapons
there is no effective balancing sanction against the rebels. This
situation has made it more difficult for the loyalist forces but has
not proved to be a major hurdle. The three hundred rebels and their
hired security mercenaries which are sitting around the Golf Hotel
protecting Ouattara have been armed by the United Nations and are
wearing UN uniforms and identifying badges.
The Demographics:
A vital dimension to this conflict is the fact that most of the Ivory
Coast population is under 26 years of age. There is a great gap
between the population and the group of geriatrics which run the
political structures in the country. In reality, there are very few
people in the country who want either Ouattara or Gbagbo. Ouattara is
not popular because he is considered the "Godfather of the Rebellion"
and a Black Frenchman. His loyalties lie with the IMF, the World Bank
and his friends in France. He remains a symbol of "Francafrique". On
the other hand there are very few citizens who like Gbagbo. Since 2006
he has effectively renounced his opposition to French neo-colonialism.
He renewed many of the French contracts which maintained the monopoly
of France in the Ivory Coast economy without any transparency or
competitive bidding. He renewed all the contracts for electricity,
telephone and water. He gave Bollore the control of the new container
terminal in the port of Abidjan and new construction contracts to Mr
Fakhoury. He allowed Total to build a new refinery and pipelines and
gave Total a new oil lease on the border with Ghana. He turned on his
former friends in the labour movement and consolidated power, and its
rewards, in his own hands and those of his cronies.
The problem for the electorate in the Ivory Coast is that they are
stuck. They must choose between two unsavoury candidates. Younger,
more dynamic leaders in the ranks of the national parties are stifled
by the dead hand of the gerontocracy and kleptocracy which rules the
political scene. There are trained and competent potential leaders in
the FPI and the PDCI and RDR parties who can unite to bring about some
progress. Right now the electorate refuses to support Ouattara because
he is the leader of the rebels; not because he is not competent. They
do not want the rebels to duplicate in the South what they have
destroyed in the North. They support Gbagbo because he is the
constitutional leader and, at least for the moment, seems to have
given up the notion that he could become the fair-haired boy of
Francafrique. He is taking a nationalist view which is very popular.
The UN has made it clear that without Gbagbo there is only Ouattara,
the French and the rebels. That is not a choice they want to make. The
young people of the Ivory Coast have shown over and over that they
want to see a leadership which asserts Ivoirian sovereignty in the
face of external powers seeking to dominate them. This is the twenty-
first century; colonialism is dead and should be buried. If there is
an end to the neo-colonialism and an ascendance of real Ivoirian
sovereignty then democracy will stand a chance. They can use the
levers of power to oust the gerontocracy and build a better tomorrow
for a united Ivory Coast.
West African Conflict and the Jihad:
One of the most important aspects of this conflict is largely
overlooked but is crucial to understanding the consequences of this
conflict. Since the days of the Liberian and Sierra Leone civil wars
Al-Quaeda has increased its presence and influence in West Africa. In
the weeks preceding the 9/11 attacks in New York, the representatives
of Al-Quaeda completed a US$20 million 'blood diamonds' deal with the
RUF in Sierra Leone According to official reports the Lebanese
diamond trader, Aziz Nassour, used his couriers to exchange US$300,000
a week for blood diamonds every week for almost ten months ending
September 2001. The couriers took scheduled flights from Brussels (the
heart of the diamond trade) to Abidjan. They then took smaller planes
on charter from Wesuwa Air to fly to Monrovia and Freetown where they
picked up the diamonds from the RUF. The Al-Quaeda operatives set up
safe houses in Monrovia and Freetown to trade diamonds for arms for
the rebel movements. Two of them, Samih Ossaily and his mistress.
Nora, were arrested and jailed. Several others were freed, but the
operation has grown and spread. These were mainly Sunni Muslims.
However they were soon joined by Iranian-backed Shia. Hezbollah now
has offices and trading spots across West Africa and the DRC.
The bulk of the traders and carriers are Lebanese. These are not the
traditional Lebanese in West Africa who were primarily Maronite
Christians. These have been supplanted by Lebanese Shia Muslims
attached to Hezbollah and Amal. They act as the arm of the Iranians
and their Revolutionary Guards. Wherever there are problems in West
Africa one can find Shia Muslims trading guns for diamonds and gold. A
recent case was discovered in Nigeria with a shipment of weapons from
Iran. These Al-Quaeda and Shia traders are the main suppliers of
weapons to rebel movements across Africa. The RUF rebels in Sierra
Leone transplanted their affinities to the Ivory Coast when they went
to fight as mercenaries in the rebellion in the North.
In Mozambique there are several training camps for West African
jihadists. They arrive from Pakistan or the Gulf through Kenya and are
flown down, business class, to Mozambique. They then disappear for a
period of months. They then appear as graduates and, with pockets full
of cash; they try to make their way home. Many are picked up by the
Mozambique authorities and put in camps. Periodically the Mozambicans
gather them together and deport them to their home countries. There
have been flights of Guineans, Malians, Burkinabe and Senegalese from
Mozambique to their home countries. Once home they are theoretically
jailed. In fact most are soon released.
This accounts for a large and growing group of jihadists across West
Africa, especially in the Muslim north of most sub-Saharan countries
with a border on the Sahara or the Sahel. These groups have been
active in creating an Al-Quaeda movement in the region and have been
active in insurgencies, kidnapping of French technicians and rearming
a wide range of rebel groups. The Al-Quaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb
(AQIM) are a source of equipment and markets and operate their own
airline. They use around eleven aircraft (Boeing 727s and some
Antonov) and fly throughout the region from Algeria and the Sahel.
In addition they work closely with the burgeoning cocaine trade from
Colombia into West Africa which uses smaller airports in Mauretania,
Mali, Sierra Leone and the main drug importing country of Guinea-
Bissau. There is a synergy between the Al-Quaeda operators and the
drug barons. There is a giant and profitable trade in diamonds, gold
and cocaine throughout West Africa run by drug lords and jihadists.
The Western powers, especially the US DEA have these under
surveillance and US Special Forces have set up military training
programs, JCET (Joint/Combined Exchange Training) with the African
militaries to combat these.
That is why it is such a mystery to understand why, in the face of
this Muslim radicalism which is sweeping West Africa that the Western
powers and the UN are fighting to impose a Muslim rebel leader as head
of the Ivory Coast. To most military officers this is madness. In
Nigeria when Goodluck Johnathan consulted with his generals (many of
whom now come from the Middle Belt, not the North) they said to him
"After Jos and Abuja do you really want us to shoot Christian
civilians to put the Muslims in charge of Ivory Coast?"
Why Do The Western Powers Support Ouattara?
Aside from the fact that the French have a vested interest in keeping
the Ivory Coast as a colony and not allowing the Ivoirian defiance to
spread to its other neo-colonial enterprises, there is still a
question why the US, Britain and the EU go along with France in this
policy. The UN is easy to understand. One should not expect any more
from an incompetent and ignorant Secretary-General and his political
fixer who doubles as his personal envoy to the Ivory Coast. They are
reacting to an affront to their dignity. They found they cannot order
member states about and reacted when opposed. They are no threat
except for the media. This doesn't explain why the Western countries
can be so openly hypocritical in their singling out of the Ivory Coast
as an example.
There are seventeen more elections to go this year in Africa and most
will be as rigged and divisive as the Ivory Coast election. Most of
the African Presidents on whom they are relying on to kill Ivoirians
for them are illegitimate, corrupt and often murdered their
predecessors before taking office or were elected by rigged ballots.
This cannot be any kind of a principled defence of democracy;
especially as they overlook other recent ballots (Burma, Belarus,
etc.) which were egregiously rigged. The answer is more likely to be
economic.
One of the most significant events in West Africa last year was the
purchase of the Swiss oil trading company Addax by the Chinese firm
Sinopec. Addax was a frequent deliverer of oil to the Ivory Coast and
was a major player in the West African oil mafia. The loss of a key
player to the Chinese was seen as a real threat. Since then the French
oil companies have been buying up oil assets in the region using
obscure shell companies. The Western oil companies seem to be using
the Ivory Coast as the first battle against the Chinese moving into
the oil and gas business in the region.
The Gulf of Guinea is rapidly becoming a major international oil play.
Abidjan has a good refinery and will soon have another. Looking
through the list of vessels delivering crude to the SIR refinery in
Abidjan more than half were Addax vessels. Now they are Addax/Sinopec
vessels. This has frightened the oil companies, especially Total. They
do not have the money to compete with the Chinese and now Russian
companies like Lukoil are entering the Gulf of Guinea market in a big
way as well. The only way the French can compete is to try and
maintain control of the strings of power in the Ivory Coast to find
ways to delay or deter the Chinese and Russian invasion in what they
thought of a their patch. The US and European countries share this
ambition. Perhaps that is their reason for their blind and self-
destructive policy in the country.
The Way Forward:
It should be abundantly clear to everyone that this impasse is not
going to be solved by additional pressure on Gbagbo. Each day his
support grows and each day that Ouattara is holed up in his tent at
the Hotel Golf costs the UN a lot of money and face. The ECOWAS
countries are unwilling and incapable of putting together an invasion
force. Moreover it would likely impinge on their nationals residing in
the Ivory Coast. Despite the provocations of the rebel band in Abidjan
life there is pretty calm and uninterrupted. No one is being
threatened except when the people in Abobo or similar enclaves are
agitated by the rebels and attack the police. There has been a
substantial rearmament of the loyalist forces by other, friendly
African states and whoever is sent to fight will know he has a war on
his hands. The 50-odd present of the population which voted for Gbagbo
will not just roll over and disappear. The war will go on for a long
time once it is started and civilian casualties will be high. There is
every likelihood of African states with very powerful armies entering
the fray on behalf of Gbagbo.
The way forward seems clear. There will never be a resolution of who
won this last second round of the election no matter how many times
the UN says so. The answer is to send Ouattara back home to the North
and to prepare for a new election which is monitored. First, however,
the UN forces must insist that the rebels disarm. That would finally
be a useful project for the UN. If there were disarmament there could
actually be a free and fair election. Perhaps it would be possible to
persuade Gbagbo to allow the FPI to choose another candidate. That
would save face for the international community and would almost
certainly lead to a better democracy than the tainted version being
peddled by Ban Ki-Moon and his friends. It has been Ouattara's
candidacy and his ties with the rebels which has sustained Gbagbo in
power for so long. His candidacy is what has prevented the FPI from
choosing a new candidate. Perhaps the international community can be
persuaded that real democracy is a positive choice in this business.
If not it will be the Ivory Coast's poor citizens who will continue to
pay the price.
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