History, optimism and re-dedication: A Review of Time to Reclaim Nigeria (4)
By Edwin Madunagu
LAST Thursday, at the end of the third segment of this appreciation of Chido Onumah's Time to reclaim Nigeria, I realized that should I continue with my original plan of approach, that is, chapter-by-chapter exercise, I would end up with about seven more segments. As this would be unacceptable, I decided to approach the remaining appreciation thematically. But the new plan still gave me about the same number of segments. To solve my dilemma, I decided to stick to thematic appreciation, but to pick only four themes: Democracy and military governance, "June 12"; Political economy of corruption; and Time to reclaim Nigeria. In this fourth segment I shall look at the first two themes. The fifth and final segment, next Thursday, will be devoted to the last two themes. But this is a book to which I will continue to make reference for a long time.
Democracy and military governance: Here I refer the reader to two of Onumah's essays: In praise of dictatorship (Pages 77-80; July 10, 2006); and Will Rawlings be Africa's Pinochet? (Pages 182 -184; August 9, 2001). I lived through all the military regimes we have had so far in post-independence Nigeria; and I closely watched the early months of the regime produced by the December 31,1981 military coup in Ghana. I was 19-advancing to 20-when the first military coup took place in Nigeria on January 15, 1966. I was then a junior teacher and resident assistant boarding house master in my alma mater, Obokun High School, Ilesha, in present Osun State. I remember that when the coup was announced I abandoned my boys and hit the streets with other citizens – jubilating and ransacking government offices in the city.
I was still at Ilesha when the coup of July 29, 1966 took place and can still remember the resulting despondency and apprehension. I was, however, to learn later that the coup was greeted with jubilation in some parts of the country. By the time the Civil War broke out a year later I was already at Ibadan.
I can remember that the military coup of July 29,1975, which produced the regime headed by General Murtala Mohammed, was popularly received across the country except in the areas where Mohammed, as field commander, operated during the war. The abortive coup of February 13, 1976 which claimed the life of General Mohammed was largely unpopular across the country except, again, in the areas where Mohammed commanded Nigerian troops during the war. The coup of December 30, 1983 which terminated the "democratic and constitutional government of President Shehu Shagari" and produced Generals Buhari and Idiagbon, was generally well received among the masses and segments of the constitutional opposition. There was mass indifference to the coup of August 27, 1985 which produced the military president, General Ibrahim Babangida; but there was jubilation in the community of politicians and media institutions, whose experiences under Buhari and Idiagbon were, to put it mildly, harsh.
There was mass indifference to the alleged attempted coup of December 1985. The Gideon Orka-led attempted coup of Sunday, April 22, 1990 was popularly received in some parts of the country and segments of the population. The coup of November 1993 that brought General Sani Abacha to power was generally unpopular except possibly in the circles of small groups of politicians who had hoped that the general would actualize the result of June 12, 1993 presidential election which gave victory to Moshood Abiola. The alleged attempted coups of 1995 and 1997 were greeted with mass disbelief and cynicism. The change of government resulting from the sudden death of Sani Abacha in June 1998 and the accession to power of General Abdulsalami Abubakar was received with relief across the country.
To complete this narrative I shall briefly elaborate on the "foreign coup" which I earlier mentioned. I was in Accra, Ghana, a couple of days after the December 31 1981 military coup d'tat that removed the government of President Liman and installed the military regime of Air Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. I testify that from what I saw and heard and read, the coup was very popular with the Ghanaian masses. I spent several days in Ghana talking to several people across class and social boundaries. In particular, I spoke individually and collectively with several members of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC).
I was deeply impressed by the discussions I had with Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, Captain Kodjo Tsikata, Sergeant Akata-Pore and Chris Atim. Tsikata was the regime's security chief, Akata Pore was one of its ideologues and Chris Atim was the student leader representing the militant youths. I remember Sergeant Akata Pore telling me that their uprising should be compared to the French Revolution rather than the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. In response I told him that though I considered what had happened to be profoundly revolutionary, I would not compare the event either with the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution. On my return to Nigeria I took on a self-assigned task of mobilising Ghanaian "exiles" here to return to Ghana to take up appointments in schools, government departments and agencies. I was on my way to Ghana on my third trip when I was arrested at the airport. Gani Fawehinmi's threats led to my quiet release.
I have gone through these two narratives – one from Nigerian history, the other from Ghanaian history – in order to bring out the following propositions: One: That some military coups in Nigeria and the one of December 31, 1981 in Ghana were actually popularly received in all, or in substantial, segments of the country and, in particular, by many patriots, progressives, radicals and leftists. Two: That the initial jubilation and enthusiasm engendered by virtually all the popularly received military coups quickly died down, with some turning to disappointment, disillusionment and anger, on account of the policies and actions of the regimes. Three: That it is the duty of political historians, analysts, critics and commentators to explain generally and, then, case by case, the reasons for the initial jubilation and subsequent disillusionment.
Last Thursday, in the third segment, I recalled two facts of history brought out by Jack Woddis in his book, Armies and Politics: "On September 11, 1973, the Chilean army overthrew a democratic government and established a fascist-type tyranny. On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese army overthrew a fascist government and opened up the way to the establishment of a democratic system". My fourth proposition is that Jack Woddis' statement is not only factually true but also indicates two actual historical trends.
June 12, 1993 presidential election and the annulment of its result: Here, I refer readers to two of Onumah's essays: June 12: 15 years after (pages 99-102; June 12, 2008); and On June 12 we stand (pages 103 – 106; June 12, 2009). I read the two essays very closely to be able to put my finger on the author's understanding and interpretation of the import of "June 12". I can pick the following propositions (in his own words): "June 12 election was adjudged 'free and fair' for the simple reason that within the limitations placed by the military regime of General Babangida, Nigerians played by the rules. Compare that with what happened in 1999, 2003, and more recently, April 2007"; "One could rightly say that June 12 was a watershed in the nation's history. It was truly Nigeria's best opportunity at democratic reconstruction. It failed because of the inordinate ambition of a few individuals".
Furthermore: "On June 12, Nigerians of all walks of life made a fundamental political statement. On that day, the country's impoverished and forgotten masses were able to overcome the bogey of ethnicity and religious divisions by the ruling class, and showed these are weapons in the hands of this inglorious class to maintain its stranglehold on the country"; "No national honour would be too much for a man who won an election and was murdered for attempting to claim his mandate. He lost his business empire, and his wife was assassinated in the process". To these five propositions – which can be interrogated and expanded but which I endorse, in the main – I add my own proposition, namely, that the specific weight of radical and leftist forces in "Abiola's electoral entourage" was large enough to frighten segments of Nigeria's power blocs and the "international community". This fear tilted the "secret debate" is in favour of annulment.
Regards,
Chido Onumah
Coordinator, African Centre for Media & Information Literacy,
P.O.Box 6856, Wuse 11, Abuja, Nigeria
www.africmil.org
+234-7043202605
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