From: chifu_wa_malindi <chifu2222@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM
Subject: [Mwananchi] Kenya: THE GREAT TRANSITION AND THE GIKUYU QUESTION
To: Mwananchi@yahoogroups.com
THE GREAT TRANSITION AND THE GIKUYU QUESTION
FRIDAY, 23 MARCH 2012 23:55 BY JOHN GITHONGO
Deputy Prime minister Uhuru Kenyatta being installed as a Kikuyu elder in a colorful ceremony that was attended by more than 30 members of parliament and three cabinet ministers at Ihura Stadium In Murang'a. Photo/Jesse Mwangi
Though not loudly articulated in public the defining narrative is: Gikuyus fought for independence, in part leading to a powerful sense of entitlement post-independence.
THE RECENT DEATHS of two powerful businessmen-politicians - John Michuki and Njenga Karume, may they rest in peace, attenuates the fact that Kenya is going through its most major transition since independence. It is happening in slow motion as these things often do. Strong willed, forceful and wealthy individuals like Michuki and Karume occupied a huge chunk of Kenyan, but even more so, Gikuyu, political bandwidth. The collective historic narrative of what Kenya is and how it came to be affected how many Kenyans especially Gikuyus contextualised themselves in the Kenya project.
A cultural disorientation as a result of their passing especially among older Gikuyus has quietly deepened. It compounds the infuriating helplessness and existential confusion that gripped the minds of the Gikuyu elite when the post-election violence in the Rift Valley saw Gikuyus bear the brunt of murder and ethnic cleansing. Election related violence was nothing new. The clincher here is that all this happened while a Gikuyu occupied State House. Things simply aren't supposed to turn out like that. Incumbency brings with it certain implicit assurances and guarantees – economic, social and political – to supporters of a Kenyan president, his kith and kin in particular.
Also implicit but increasingly explicit among the non-Gikuyu political elite is that Kenya should not have a Gikuyu or Kalenjin president after the next poll ie it's the turn for another tribe to assume the Presidency; another's time to eat. It also betrays a low level of confidence in the rule of law. Such an unspoken compact exists in Nigeria too where the presidency is understood and accepted as needing to rotate between the Northern communities and their Southern counterparts in cycles that aren't enshrined in any law or constitution but in the wider public understanding of `the way things should be'.
KENYA'S FIRST EXIT THE STAGE
The inevitability of life's dusk has arrived for an entire generation of `firsts'. `Firsts' because they were the first to lead in Kenya as bureaucrats, politicians and in commerce after independence; the first to fly in aeroplanes, the earliest African millionaires… Kenya's stability has in part been due to the durability of this elite who got their start in the 1950s and 60 s. This entire generation within our elite is passing after rich full lives. That Michuki served as a colonial District Officer and remained at the top of public life to his death is symptomatic of a huge transition underway. The generation that has always ruled Kenya is giving up the ghost. What does this mean for us as Kenyans and in this particular time what does it mean for the Gikuyu elite?
Politics abhors a vacuum. Combine this with Kenya's youth bulge (a generation whose sense of history averages no more than 10 years back), on-going constitutional reform and the political implications of the ICC process on the ruling elite and it all points to a season of major realignments and potentially heightened political volatility. For the passing generation were and are not systematic mentors to a new cadre of leaders.
Though not loudly articulated in public there were and remain elements of this elite for whom the defining narrative is: Gikuyus fought for independence during the Mau Mau, in part leading to a powerful sense of entitlement post-independence. Ironically, of course, those who assumed power after independence weren't the ones who'd `fought for independence' at all but mostly those who'd collaborated with the colonial administration.
This section of the elite sincerely believe their tribe works hardest, makes the best entrepreneurs, the best managers of the economy and other stereotypes long cultivated. It is an attitude which even when implicit deeply offends non-Gikuyus some of whom in turn harbour opposing equally simplistic stereotypes of Gikuyus as crooked, greedy, treacherous, untrustworthy, arrogant etc. At the heart of Kenya's current political contradictions this toxic narrative of sloppy stereotypes and generalisations rests. It is thus, for example, that leaders who have been charged with crimes against humanity seem to be effectively mobilising and consolidating the support of their ethnic political bases to reject the ICC process.
This is being done apparently without realising the irony of the fact that these very same supporters in 2008 and through 2009 were eagerly championing the fact that the crimes of the PEV could only be dealt with by the ICC. The moral challenge here for Kenyans is an important one – it is the rule of law versus loyalty to kith and kin before all other identities.
ODINGA: KENYA'S CENTRE OF POLITICAL GRAVITY
In truth the leaders who are passing represent a class. Even when their political interests appeared to diverge, economic ones converge closely. A deeply pragmatic, non-ideological, almost cynical grouping, many worked well with Moi while disparaging him behind his back so long as their economic interests were not undermined. In the mid-1980s, a number of Gikuyu owned banks collapsed, many after government agencies like the NSSF withdrew their deposits.
This was the economic break with Moi that was politicised rapidly especially after the infamous queue voting debacle during elections in 1988 and then after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the collapse of the Iron Curtain, elements of the Gikuyu elite came out openly against Moi culminating with detention of Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia. Throughout the 1990s this antagonistic stance prevailed. In 2002, Moi's Project Uhuru was roundly defeated by a coalition led by Mwai Kibaki that had Raila Odinga (who had defected from KANU) as its centre of gravity.
He remains so to this day. He enjoys a highly consolidated ethnic voting bloc of supporters and the boldness to do the politically unthinkable. It was Raila who broke with FORD Kenya to form the NDP. He then engineered a `cooperation' strategy with KANU. This collapsed dramatically when President Moi designated Uhuru Kenyatta his successor. Raila decamped once again and joined what became the NARC alliance. His "Kibaki tosha!", endorsement helped put Mwai Kibaki in State House.
With all due respect to the dearly departed, this Makerere generation of `firsts' that is passing were state consolidators and accumulators - not nation builders. As a result almost immediately after independence, the ideology of `African socialism' that ostensibly provided the vision for Kenya's political, economic and social development was abandoned. One of its key authors Tom Mboya was assassinated.
Others who remained committed to a more Pan African ideology in even the vaguest or broadest terms, like Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and others, were marginalised. Unsurprisingly, when confronted with the political uncertainties that came with Mzee Kenyatta's failing health in the late 1960 s, this elite's political innovation in responding was not to move towards a more inclusive future; it was not a `national' Kenyan solution.
Instead they created a tribal group - the Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) – a sub nationalistic political organisation. Land buying companies and other such projects were the accompanying economic corollary. These essentially ethnic innovations on the political and economic front betrayed the fact that the ruling elite of the 1960s through to the late 1970s could not imagine a greater space, a Kenya belonging by all.
KENYA: STRONG STATE WEAK NATION?
Kenya is a strong State but a weak Nation. Serikali was strong in part because the British left behind a state machine primed for a major counter insurgency as a result of the Mau Mau rebellion. No serious attempts were made to change this underlying structural reality, the skin colour of the occupiers merely changed. We are paying the price for this today. For when our top leaders were forming tribal groupings to deal with national issues, in other countries leaders were doing the heavy lifting to build nations; where the tribal identity was being overtaken by the national one.
Our ruling elite were genuinely shocked that the rest of Kenya would seethe with such resentment that both the 2005 referendum and the 2007 election were to a large extent driven by these parochialisms and bitterness, creating the 41 versus 1 narrative. Many non-Gikuyu I have spoken to insist that 2005 and 2007 processes were given compelling currency because they provided an opportunity `to put the Kiuks in their place' as it were. Mitigation of this narrative of exclusion, especially in the 1990s when elections were accompanied by state-sponsored ethnic cleansing by the Moi regime, came from the Church, the international community and political opposition in Parliament, civil society and media.
THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CHURCH
As we head into the next election the Church has shrunk tremendously in the eyes of Kenyans as an inclusive agent of transformation who reject impunity, corruption and inequality; and, most importantly stand in defence of the poor and marginalised. In part this was because of partisan positions adopted by the Church especially around the 2007 elections. Gone are the days when a statement of national import from the Kenya Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church or the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) would be front page news in the media.
Such has been the loss of credibility and legitimacy of the Church in our society. This is not necessarily a healthy state of affairs for a country still healing. The tools of reconciliation – forgiveness, redemption, spiritual healing etc belong to a considerable extent with our religious leaders. Bishop Desmond Tutu led the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, religious leaders led the same kind of initiative in Liberia for example.
The current round of essentially political rallies dubbed `prayer meetings' traversing the country points to how low the Church has fallen. Don't get me wrong, Church leaders have a duty to minister to all their flock. What is most curious is that they aren't praying for the thousands of victims of PEV with the same vigour and passion. But then neither have they prayed for the poor majority of Kenyans who've had the economic rug pulled away from under their feet as a result of dramatic rise in the cost of living. In addition to this we now have Bishops and Reverends in parliament. MEGA (a successor to GEMA) today is headed by a retired Bishop. The alliance between the Church, media, international community and NGOs of the 1990s broke down.
A convergence between commercial and political interests has changed the character of media too. For the NGO sector a tendency towards careerism among some and the ethnic and political divisions wrought by the PEV has undermined its passion, clarity and unity. This is changing as a coalition government that creates profound ambivalences vis-à-vis issues such as corruption and impunity generally, begins to strike out against its perceived enemies at the current time: NGOs and the international community.
Over the coming months you will hear much whining about sovereignty, interfering foreigners plotting regime change etc. The international community was sincerely shocked by the barbarism of the Post-Election Violence (PEV) and jumped into the deep end of Kenyan politics to help save the situation. We inadvertently handed over a good chunk of our sovereignty when it took Kofi Annan backed by the international community to help talk us out of burning down our own house.
Over the last decade the generation of `firsts' has overseen the near meltdown into civil war in 2008; has overseen the decentralisation of corruption creating a feeding frenzy that's intensifying as elections approach; and, has overseen an unprecedented devolved criminalisation of Kenyan society especially since 2003 – money laundering and the drug trade in particular.
The transition we are entering is huge and partly God-made. The upcoming election is merely an adjunct to it. Our aging elite didn't and don't have an ideology beyond the religion of cash. With a new constitution in place, Kenya has an extraordinary opportunity to change this. To create a more inclusive system of governance and to attack head on the inequalities that have become ethnicised and politicised. At the first instance, this requires leadership, and here I am not talking about committees and taskforces.
I often ask myself where we would be now if after being controversially sworn in as head of state and the signing of the coalition agreement on February 28, 2008, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga had, say, moved State House to Eldoret for a month, then to Kisumu and other cities where the violence was driven not only by elite political mobilisation but also by a deep sense of ethnicised grievance. President Museveni of Uganda at one point tried this when he moved State House to Gulu to deal with the troubles there directly.
But no such dignifying action, that's essential to reconciliation, was forthcoming in Kenya; no move to reconcile communities by affirming them and their grievances before sending in the committees and taskforces. It doesn't matter where the President hails from. Once he swears the oath of office he is the leader of all Kenyans even those whose guts he may hate.
An entire generation of wazee who've held sway since independence seem hardwired against inclusivity. No constitution can fix this catastrophic leadership failure. In the meantime as they pass into history it remains to be seen what the new crop of leaders would offer. Inclusivity and equity and ethnicised perceptions in their regard are the key software issues confronting Kenyans. It doesn't matter how fast the economy grows or how many roads we build. We cannot economically grow ourselves out of the fundamental underlying political contradictions that are Kenya's bane. Ethnicised perceptions of inequality in particular. They need to be tackled head on.
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Mokili
An informed discourse by Gothongo that should
inject reason in the discussion about ethnicity, the state, and competition for
power in Kenya. Indeed this is the needed approach at a time when competing ethnic
forces are regrouping in order to capture the state with the intended goal of
using the gained power for narrow interests even though the goal may be
camouflaged in nationalist rhetoric. I have often said, and I hope Githongo
agrees, Kenya is attempting a bloodless revolution post 2007 backstopped by
friends who sincerely wish the country to establish a firm basis for movement
forward in all directions. Expectedly, status quo forces are frightened of the
possible outcome and they are hell-bent on subverting if not halting the
movement altogether. The Limuru GEMA meeting is but one example of this. There
are others. At this point, Kenyans for change and the international community
supporting them must remain steadfast and fight recalcitrant backward looking
forces that have nothing to offer the country other than selective nostalgia of
good old days that are neither good to those of us who remember differently,
nor that old really.
http://www.the-star.co.ke/weekend/siasa/68284-the-great-transition-and-the-gikuyu-question
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