USA Africa Dialogue Series - About kill lists, drones and presidential power

May 30, 2012..............The President's Kill List..........Amy Davidson in the New Yorker


What is wrong with the President sitting in a room, looking at lists and portraits of people—a Somali man, a seventeen-year-old girl, an American citizen—and deciding whom to kill? That, according to long and troubling articles in both the Times and Newsweek, is a job Barack Obama has assigned himself. His aides, notably John Brennan, his counter-terrorism adviser, portray it as a matter of taking responsibility—if we are going to assassinate someone, or call in a drone strike to take out a camp in Yemen, the President should make the call—as if our only alternative were some sort of rogue operation, with generals or C.I.A. agents shooting at will. But responsibility involves accountability, which is something, in this case, that appears to be badly lacking. Obama has not taken on a burden, but instead has given the Presidency a novel power.
The "kill list" story is a reminder of how much language matters, and how dangerous it is when the plain meaning of a word is ignored. Each might include a mini-glossary: "baseball cards," for the PowerPoint slides with the biographies and faces of targets; "Terror Tuesday," meetings where targets are sorted out; "nominations" for death-marked finalists; "personality strikes" that aimed to kill a person, and "signature strikes" that went after a group of people whose names one didn't know because of the way they seemed, from pictures in the sky, to be acting. (From the Times piece, written by Jo Becker and Scott Shane: "The joke was that when the C.I.A. sees 'three guys doing jumping jacks,' the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp, said one senior official.") Signature strikes were also known as TADS, for terrorist-attack-disruption strikes, or just as "crowd kills." Both articles explore Obama's halting efforts to confine signature strikes to Pakistan, rather than Yemen and Somalia, and how he ultimately didn't, really. This is the kind of attack that, in one incident mentioned by Daniel Klaidman in his Newsweek piece, led to "persuasive" reports of dozens of women and children dying. A lawyer who saw that on "Kill TV," the feed that let the military and lawyers watch strikes, said later, "If I were Catholic, I'd have to go to confession."
More disturbing than childish names for brutal things are the absurd meanings ascribed to more sober terms. The key ones are "civilians and combatants," and "due process."
How do you minimize civilian casualties in a conflict? Ask a military planner or human-rights organization or just a sensible person and each might come up with a list of tactics, plans, litmus tests. And there were apparently elements of that in the White House's conversations. But ask a sophist or, as it happens, the C.I.A., and you might get this suggestion: change the definition. As the Times described it, Obama
embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties that did little to box him in. It in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.
In other words, if we thought that you were someone we should kill, and we did kill you, and you look to be the right age to be cast as an extra in a spy movie, you were guilty. Does that mean that, if a house is hit and the bodies of a father, mother, teen-age boy, and middle-school-aged girl are found entangled with each other, two are combatants and two are civilians?
These words are important because of the argument that we have to act to protect ourselves: there is a terrorist on a screen; hit him now. But how are we deciding who a terrorist is? In some cases, we don't even know the names of people we're killing, in countries where we are not actually at war. In others, we do know their names, and don't care who dies with them. (In one strike, in which the identity of the man was known, according to the Times, Obama made a deliberate decision to kill his wife and in-laws along with him.)
The method we have built, over a couple of hundred years, for sorting out questions of guilt and innocence and probable cause, is due process. And that may be the most degraded phrase of all.
The Obama Administration has sought and killed American citizens, notably Anwar al-Awlaki. As the Times noted, "The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel prepared a lengthy memo justifying that extraordinary step, asserting that while the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process applied, it could be satisfied by internal deliberations in the executive branch." In other words, it's due process if the President thinks about it. One wonders how low the standard for "internal deliberations" are—if it might be enough if Obama mulled it over while walking his dog. And if an American whom the President decides is a threat can be assassinated in Yemen, where Awlaki was hit, why not in London, or Toronto, or Los Angeles? (Awlaki's teen-age son, an American citizen who had not been accused of anything, died in a separate strike.)
These are not far-fetched concerns. The Times quoted Michael Hayden, who served as the director of the C.I.A. under George Bush:
"This program rests on the personal legitimacy of the president, and that's not sustainable," Mr. Hayden said. "I have lived the life of someone taking action on the basis of secret O.L.C. memos, and it ain't a good life. Democracies do not make war on the basis of legal memos locked in a D.O.J. safe."
As Jane Mayer has written in The New Yorker, drone strikes, as opposed to ground troops, bring with them a comforting illusion of distance. Picturing Obama going through the lists in a bright office in Washington shows where that daydream leads, and how deceptive it can be. A drone-based conflict may, in the short run, keep some troops from harm, but it may also take the debate about war and peace out of the public sphere and into what is, in political terms, a much darker space.
Brennan and other officials interviewed by the Times and Newsweek said that Obama had enormous faith in himself. It would be more responsible, though, if he had less—if he thought that he was no better than any other President we've had or ever will. The point isn't just the task, or burden, he takes on, but the machine he has built for his successors to use. Perhaps, just to suggest a range, he could picture each of the Republican contenders from this past season being walked through the process, told how it works, shown some of those video clips with tiny people and big explosions, and taking it for a test drive. Never mind whether Obama, in particular, sighs or loses sleeps or tosses a coin when he chooses a target: What would it mean for a bad, or craven, or simply carelessly accommodating President to do so? In the end we are not really being asked to trust Obama, or his niceness, but the office of the Presidency. Do we?
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/05/the-presidents-kill-list.html?printable=true&currentPage=all#ixzz1wTlQurko
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/05/the-presidents-kill-list.html
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/opinion/too-much-power-for-a-president.html?_r=1&emc=eta1




NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL........Too Much Power for a President........May 30, 2012
It has been clear for years that the Obama administration believes the shadow war on terrorism gives it the power to choose targets for assassination, including Americans, without any oversight. On Tuesday, The New York Times revealed who was actually making the final decision on the biggest killings and drone strikes: President Obama himself.
And that is very troubling.
Mr. Obama has demonstrated that he can be thoughtful and farsighted, but, like all occupants of the Oval Office, he is a politician, subject to the pressures of re-election. No one in that position should be able to unilaterally order the killing of American citizens or foreigners located far from a battlefield — depriving Americans of their due-process rights — without the consent of someone outside his political inner circle.
How can the world know whether the targets chosen by this president or his successors are truly dangerous terrorists and not just people with the wrong associations? (It is clear, for instance, that many of those rounded up after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks weren't terrorists.) How can the world know whether this president or a successor truly pursued all methods short of assassination, or instead — to avoid a political charge of weakness — built up a tough-sounding list of kills?
It is too easy to say that this is a natural power of a commander in chief. The United States cannot be in a perpetual war on terror that allows lethal force against anyone, anywhere, for any perceived threat. That power is too great, and too easily abused, as those who lived through the George W. Bush administration will remember.
Mr. Obama, who campaigned against some of those abuses in 2008, should remember. But the Times article, written by Jo Becker and Scott Shane, depicts him as personally choosing every target, approving every major drone strike in Yemen and Somalia and the riskiest ones in Pakistan, assisted only by his own aides and a group of national security operatives. Mr. Obama relies primarily on his counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan.
To his credit, Mr. Obama believes he should take moral responsibility for these decisions, and he has read the just-war theories of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.
The Times article points out, however, that the Defense Department is currently killing suspects in Yemen without knowing their names, using criteria that have never been made public. The administration is counting all military-age males killed by drone fire as combatants without knowing that for certain, assuming they are up to no good if they are in the area. That has allowed Mr. Brennan to claim an extraordinarily low civilian death rate that smells more of expediency than morality.
In a recent speech, Mr. Brennan said the administration chooses only those who pose a real threat, not simply because they are members of Al Qaeda, and prefers to capture suspects alive. Those assurances are hardly binding, and even under Mr. Obama, scores of suspects have been killed but only one taken into American custody. The precedents now being set will be carried on by successors who may have far lower standards. Without written guidelines, they can be freely reinterpreted.
A unilateral campaign of death is untenable. To provide real assurance, President Obama should publish clear guidelines for targeting to be carried out by nonpoliticians, making assassination truly a last resort, and allow an outside court to review the evidence before placing Americans on a kill list. And it should release the legal briefs upon which the targeted killing was based.
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Obama and Drone Warfare: Will Americans Speak Out? By Medea Benjamin at NationofChange
http://www.nationofchange.org/obama-and-drone-warfare-will-americans-speak-out-1338448122
On May 29, The New York Times published an extraordinarily in-depth look at the intimate role President Obama has played in authorizing US drone attacks overseas, particularly in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. It is chilling to read the cold, macabre ease with which the President and his staff decide who will live or die. The fate of people living thousands of miles away is decided by a group of Americans, elected and unelected, who don't speak their language, don't know their culture, don't understand their motives or values. While purporting to represent the world's greatest democracy, US leaders are putting people on a hit list who are as young as 17, people who are given no chance to surrender, and certainly no chance to be tried in a court of law.
Who is furnishing the President and his aides with this list of terrorist suspects to choose from, like baseball cards? The kind of intelligence used to put people on drone hit lists is the same kind of intelligence that put people in Guantanamo. Remember how the American public was assured that the prisoners locked up in Guantanamo were the "worst of the worst," only to find out that hundreds were innocent people who had been sold to the US military by bounty hunters?
Why should the public believe what the Obama administration says about the people being assassinated by drones? Especially since, as we learn in the New York Times, the administration came up with a semantic solution to keep the civilian death toll to a minimum: simply count all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants. The rationale, reminiscent of George Zimmerman's justification for shooting Trayvon Martin, is that "people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good." Talk about profiling! At least when George Bush threw suspected militants into Guantanamo their lives were spared.
Referring to the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, the article reveals that for Obama, even ordering an American citizen to be assassinated by drone was "easy." Not so easy was twisting the Constitution to assert that while the Fifth Amendment's guarantees American citizens due process, this can simply consist of "internal deliberations in the executive branch." No need for the irksome interference of checks and balances.
Al-Awlaki might have been guilty of defecting to the enemy, but the Constitution requires that even traitors be convicted on the "testimony of two witnesses" or a "confession in open court," not the say-so of the executive branch.
In addition to hit lists, Obama has granted the CIA the authority to kill with even greater ease using "signature strikes," i.e. strikes based solely on suspicious behavior. The article reports State Department officials complained that the CIA's criteria for identifying a terrorist "signature" were too lax. "The joke was that when the C.I.A. sees 'three guys doing jumping jacks,' the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp, said one senior official. Men loading a truck with fertilizer could be bomb makers — but they might also be farmers, skeptics argued."
Obama's top legal adviser Harold Koh insists that this killing spree is legal under international law because the US has the inherent right to self-defense. It's true that all nations possess the right to defend themselves, but the defense must be against an imminent attack that is overwhelming and leaves no moment of deliberation. When a nation is not in an armed conflict, the rules are even stricter. The killing must be necessary to protect life and there must be no other means, such as capture or nonlethal incapacitation, to prevent that threat to life. Outside of an active war zone, then, it is illegal to use weaponized drones, which are weapons of war incapable of taking a suspect alive.
Just think of the precedent the US is setting with its kill-don't-capture doctrine. Were the US rationale to be applied by other countries, China might declare an ethnic Uighur activist living in New York City as an "enemy combatant" and send a missile into Manhattan; Russia could assert that it was legal to launch a drone attack against someone living in London whom they claim is linked to Chechen militants. Or consider the case of Luis Posada Carrilles, a Cuban-American living in Miami who is a known terrorist convicted of masterminding a 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people. Given the failure of the US legal system to bring Posada to justice, the Cuban government could claim that it has the right to send a drone into downtown Miami to kill an admitted terrorist and sworn enemy.
Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence, called the drone strike campaign "dangerously seductive" because it was low cost, entailed no casualties and gives the appearance of toughness. "It plays well domestically," he said, "and it is unpopular only in other countries. Any damage it does to the national interest only shows up over the long term."
But an article in the Washington Post the following day, May 30, entitled "Drone strikes spur backlash in Yemen," shows that the damage is not just long term but immediate. After interviewing more than 20 tribal leaders, victims' relatives, human rights activists and officials from southern Yemen, journalist Sudarsan Raghavan concluded that the escalating U.S. strikes are radicalizing the local population and stirring increasing sympathy for al-Qaeda-linked militants. "The drones are killing al-Qaeda leaders," said legal coordinator of a local human rights group Mohammed al-Ahmadi, "but they are also turning them into heroes."
Even the New York Times article acknowledges that Pakistan and Yemen are less stable and more hostile to the United States since Mr. Obama became president, that drones have become a provocative symbol of American power running roughshod over national sovereignty and killing innocents.
One frightening aspect of the Times piece is what it says about the American public. After all, this is an election-time piece about Obama's leadership style, told from the point of view of mostly Obama insiders bragging about how the president is no shrinking violent when it comes to killing. Implicit is the notion that Americans like tough leaders who don't agonize over civilian deaths—over there, of course.
Shahzad Akbar, a Pakistani lawyer suing the CIA on behalf of drone victims, thinks it's time for the American people to speak out. "Can you trust a program that has existed for eight years, picks its targets in secret, faces zero accountability and has killed almost 3,000 people in Pakistan alone whose identities are not known to their killers?," he asks. "When women and children in Waziristan are killed with Hellfire missiles, Pakistanis believe this is what the American people want. I would like to ask Americans, 'Do you?'"
And Tom Hayden adds in his newsletter:
Medea Benjamin's new book ( Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control) should be in every activist's backpack and handed to every member of Congress and military affairs reporter. Besides having a direct impact, it will increase the legitimacy of, and broaden the impact of Code Pink for having policy acumen.
Of particular interest is Benjamin's assessment of the prospects for an anti-drone movement, based on interviews in several countries, including veterans of the anti-land mine campaign of the late 1990s, and recent efforts to create oppositional networks, especially in Europe. Here in the US she describes two efforts at building loose umbrella coalitions since 2009. These are the seedlings from which strong trees grow.
Unlike the view of many who think Predators and Reapers are harbingers of a Brave New World, I think they are better analyzed as weapons chosen for their lethality, invisibility, and low-taxpayer costs by governments in retreat, like ours in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wars simply not won by platforms in the sky.
As was proven during the Central American wars, thousands of Americans can be mobilized for peace or solidarity even when US casualties are low and taxpayer costs hidden. Some are mobilized for moral or religious reasons, others out of rage at our government's secret killings, still others from a sense that there will be blowback. We already see dedicated American networks of activists protesting and being arrested at the remote locations where the drone strategy is carried out. Millions of Pakistanis regularly take to the streets, their energy fueling the potential presidential campaign of Imran Khan, which Benjamin mentions. (p. 185) And of course, mainstream journalists inevitably are drawn to uncover state secrets.
And while Benjamin does not describe them as allies, her cause has powerful supporters in the ranks of Long War counterinsurgency strategists like David Kilcullen. They see drones as antagonizing local civilian populations in places like Pakistan, and steering Pentagon policy and funds away from their preferred alternative, counterinsurgency. As a result they continue to blow the whistle on drones and civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Pakistan, through their outlets like the Long War Journal and New America Foundation.
As military strategies, both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are headed for gradual defeat in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As most of the Western troops leave, drones will cover their tracks in blood, keeping insurgents from suddenly seizing power, and serving to protect military and political reputations.
As Leon Panetta famously said, drones "are the only game in town," but the White House, Justice Department and Pentagon already "acknowledge that they worry about public perception." (New York Times, May 29, 2012). And Benjamin has only just begun.
Barack Obama, the current villain in her narrative, is doing a favor by beginning to open a "public conversation" about this hitherto taboo subject. Now there is no excuse whatsoever for Congressional silence, which Benjamin scathingly condemns. One of her keenest revelations is about the fifty-member "Congressional Unmanned Systems Caucus," that influences key defense committees to ensure the flow of drone contracts to their home districts. Apparently these politicians are trying to avoid branding as The Predators Caucus. But it seems only a matter of time before Congressional liberals open their eyes to citizen pressure for transparency and accountability concerning drone warfare.
Benjamin is encouraging a vital discussion about strategies and tactics, not defining a single correct demand for the rising anti-drone movement. But there is one option she leaves out, which might be unifying across a broad range of ideologies and parties. The new drone warfare should be subject to an expanded version of the existing 1973 War Powers Act.
Once the issue is open to conversation, no one can make the case for secret Executive Branch warfare with any credibility. This is not like the early Cold War period when the secret government, mainly the CIA, carried out coups, assassinations and secret wars with impunity. Or, if you like, it actually might be very much like the opening rounds of the Cold War. In either perspective, that Cold War rash of bloody conspiracies eventually crashed because of resistance, awakenings, exposes, scandals and whistleblowers. We are still living with the toxic debris, in Guatemala, Cuba, and of course Iran. In time, however, cumulative public opinion caused the Congress to pass the War Powers Act, imposing for the first-time limits on the Executive's war-making prerogatives. It was a flawed and compromised War Powers Act, but it gave rise to a new Congressional willingness to exert an oversight, approval and funding role for the legislative branch of government. Nixon and Kissinger were infuriated at the rebuffing of their imperial presidency.
But now the Obama administration is narrowly interpreting the War Powers Act as applying only to something it calls "sustained fighting," which it defines as the "active exchange of fire with hostile forces," and/or the direct deployment of ground troops. In Libya, the Pentagon claimed the right to "occasional strikes by unmanned Predator UAVs against a specific set of targets." The Pentagon's budget language for Libya even asserted the right to "find, fix, track, target and destroy regime forces."
None of these presumed rights are protected by the language of the War Powers Act, which apparently never was designed for prolonged counterterrorism strategies, certainly not ones involving drones. If I am wrong, let the White House release the legal briefs in which the constitutionality of their Libya campaign was debated.
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Please also see the Bureau of Investigative Journalism website - http://www.tbij.com
or particularly here:
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/
A Little History of Drones.........the full article has all the links
by Cora Currier.......ProPublica, May 31, 2012
http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-drones
The idea of unmanned flight had been around for decades, but it was in the 1990s, thanks to advances in GPS and computing, that the possibilities for drones really took off, as the New Yorker recently recounted . While hobbyists and researchers looked for uses for automated, airborne cameras, the military became the driving force behind drone developments. According to the Congressional Research Service, the military's cache of U.A.V.'s has grown from just a handful in 2001 to more than 7,000 today .
This February, Congress cleared the way for far more widespread use of drones by businesses, scientists, police and still unknown others. The Federal Aviation Administration will release a comprehensive set of rules on drones by 2015.
The Shadow Drone War: Obama's Open Secret
As the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, the Obama administration has escalated a mostly covert air war through clandestine bases in the U.S. and other countries. Just this week, the administration's drone-driven national security policy was documented in this book excerpt by Newsweek reporter Daniel Klaidman and a New York Times article .
Both the CIA and military use drones for "targeted killings" of terrorist leaders. The strikes have been an awkward open secret, remaining officially classified while government officials mention them repeatedly . Obama admitted the program's existence in an online chat in February, and his counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, gave a speech last month laying out the administration's legal and ethical case for drone strikes.
The crux of it is that they are a precise and efficient form of warfare. Piloted from thousands of miles away (here's an account from a base outside Las Vegas [20]), they don't put U.S. troops at risk, and, by the government's count, harm few civilians.
How Many Civilians Do Drone Strikes Kill?
Statistics are hard to nail down. The Long War Journal and the New America Foundation track strikes and militant and civilian deaths, drawing mainly on media reports with the caveat that they can't always be verified. The Long War Journal tallied 30 civilian deaths in Pakistan in 2011. The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which also tracks drone strikes , consistently documents higher numbers of civilian deaths — for Pakistan in 2011, at least 75. Obama administration officials, the New York Times reported this week, have said that such deaths are few or in the "single digits."
But the Times, citing "counterterrorism officials," also reported that the U.S. classifies all military-age men in a drone strike zone to be militants, unless their innocence is proven after the attack. If that's true, it raises questions about the government statistics on civilian casualties. One State Department official told the Times that the CIA might be overzealous in defining strike targets — he told them that "the joke was that when the C.I.A. sees 'three guys doing jumping jacks,' the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp.
What About the Political Fallout?
The U.S. has also used airstrikes to side-step legal arguments about the boundaries of the campaign against al Qaeda. Both Bush and Obama administration officials have argued that Congress' September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force extends to al Qaeda operatives in any country, with or without the consent of local governments.
Drone strikes are extremely unpopular in the countries where they're deployed. They've led to tense diplomatic maneuvers with Pakistan, and protests and radicalization in Yemen. Iraqis have also protested the State Department's use of surveillance drones in their country.
Domestic concerns about civil liberties and due process in the secret air war were inflamed last fall, when a drone strike in Yemen killed Anwar al Awlaki , an al Qaeda member and a U.S. citizen. Weeks later, Awlaki's 16-year-old American son was also killed by a drone.
Costs and Crashes
Drones are cheap relative to most military manned planes, and they were a central feature of the Pentagon's scaled-back budget this year. But drones aren't immune from cost overruns. The latest version of the Global Hawk surveillance drone was put on the back-burner this January after years of expensive setbacks and questions about whether they were really better than the old U-2 spy planes they were slated to replace.
And while drones may not carry pilots, they can still crash. Wired has also reported on drones' susceptibility to viruses .
Another problem? The Air Force is playing catch-up trying to train people to fly drones and analyze the mountains of data they produce, forcing them to sometimes rely on civilian contractors for sensitive missions, according to the LA Times. The New York Times reported that in 2011, the Air Force processed 1,500 hours of video and 1,500 still images daily , much of it from surveillance drones. An Air Force commander admitted this spring that it would take "years" to catch up on the data they've collected.
Drones, Coming to America...
There are already a number of non-military entities that the FAA has authorized to fly drones, including a handful of local police departments . How drones might change police work is still to be determined (the Seattle police department, for example, showed off a 3.5-pound camera-equipped drone with a battery life of a whopping 10 minutes .)
Police drones may soon be more widespread, as the FAA released temporary rules this month making it easier for police departments to get approval for UAVs weighing up to 25 pounds, and for emergency responders to use smaller drones. The Department of Homeland Security also announced a program to help local agencies integrate the technology — principally as cheaper and safer alternatives to helicopters for reconnaissance. The Border Patrol already has a small fleet of Predators for border surveillance. (The LA Times has more on the Customs and Border Protection's use of drones in the interior , during floods and fires, and on criticisms of drones' success in stopping illegal border activity .)
Law enforcement officials are staving off a backlash from privacy advocates. The ACLU and other civil rights groups have raised concerns about privacy and Fourth Amendment rights from unprecedented surveillance capability — not to mention the potential of police drones armed with tear gas and rubber bullets, which some departments [51] have proposed. Congressmen Ed Markey, D-Mass., and Joe Barton, R-Texas, co-chairs of the Congressional Privacy Caucus, have asked the FAA to address privacy concerns in their new guidelines.
One of the first drone-assisted arrests by a local police department took place in North Dakota this year, with the help of a borrowed DHS Predator. It was deployed, as the New Yorker detailed, to catch a group of renegade ranchers in a conflict that originated over a bale of hay.
Scholarly drones
Universities actually have the most permits to fly drones at this point, for research on everything [53] from pesticide distribution to disaster preparation. As Salon points out , the Pentagon and military contractors are also big funders of university drone research.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, an advocacy group that has been outspoken about privacy concerns related to drones , put together the map below of entities authorized to fly drones by the FAA.
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