RE: USA Africa Dialogue Series - On the Matter of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse - and Three American Memos {Re- Kurt Vonnegut: Biafra: A People Betrayed

Those who know, and know what it means to know, revere Chinua Achebe even when they do not agree with the great man.

Thank you Ikhide.

 

oa

 

From: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com [mailto:usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Ikhide
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2012 2:07 PM
To: Toyin Falola
Subject: Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - On the Matter of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse - and Three American Memos {Re- Kurt Vonnegut: Biafra: A People Betrayed

 

Folks,

 

I need to point out that I found Kurt Vonnegut's essay as a source in Chinua Achebe's book, There Was A Country. Achebe is a meticulous writer, providing sources everywhere. Many of our writers would not know to go to Professor Toyin Falola as a reference, not as long as there is a Western scholar babbling stuff about "Africa," Achebe did.  The sources alone are worth the price of the book. Again, I think people should buy the book - and read it. ;-)

The responses to Achebe's book have been interesting. the personal attacks on him are however unhelpful distractions and diminish the attackers only. This forum has the ability to show leadership and debate the issues rather than the person(s). Again, let me restate ad nauseam, there is plenty to disagree with in the book, for example, Achebe says:

"I have written in my small book entitled The Trouble with Nigeria that Nigerians will probably achieve consensus on no other matter than their common resentment of the Igbo. The origin of the national resentment of the Igbo is as old as Nigeria and quite as complicated. But it can be summarized thus: The Igbo culture, being receptive to change, individualistic, and highly competitive, gave the Igbo man an unquestioned advantage over his compatriots in securing credentials for advancement in Nigerian colonial society. Unlike the Hausa/ Fulani he was unhindered by a wary religion, and unlike the Yoruba he was unhampered by traditional hierarchies. This kind of creature, fearing no god or man, was custom-made to grasp the opportunities, such as they were, of the white man’s dispensations. And the Igbo did so with both hands. Although the Yoruba had a huge historical and geographical head start, the Igbo wiped out their handicap in one fantastic burst of
energy in the twenty years between 1930 and 1950."

Achebe, Chinua (2012-10-11). There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra (Kindle Locations 1226-1233). Penguin Group. Kindle Edition.

Achebe lost me here. And as I stated on Facebook,  my own people do not resent the Igbo. Achebe lost me there, yes. But I certainly understand why he would say that. The Igbo have suffered pogroms, massacres, genocide, economic and political marginalization and a man can be forgiven for those feelings. What I find surprising is how little of Achebe's works have been read even by many of Nigeria's star writers. I have read up to 50 percent of the book on my kindle and I can say that very little of it is new that Achebe has not previously said. The beauty of the book however is how it tells a story as if it is all new. Achebe is a master story teller. 

Outside of my father, no man  has influenced my world view more than Achebe himself Achebe has taught me all these years to read and read often and to think and think a lot about words.  Everything has context. These words that I excerpted were first written in that great little book that roared, The Trouble With Nigeria. Many of his thoughts are articulated in several other essays as he meticulously documents in the various sources in the book. He is harsh in his assessment, not only of the Nigerian experiment, but on the Biafra leadership. He is harsh on Ojukwu and provides credible other sources who are severe critics of Ojukwu. He is harsh on the January 15, 1966 coup plotters and he fairly ridicules Ifeajuna. He has kind words for Awolowo but you wouldn't know that from the uproar over one excerpt of his thoughts in the Guardian (UK).

I have always thought that as a (contrived) people, our cowardice is primeval/savage. The criminals who did this to millions of women, children and the defenseless are still alive as "statesmen." The dead are immortalized in currency notes and their evil names adorn airports. If you do not start from a point of truth and courage, you have a broken compass. 

Finally, this may sound fatalistic, I have zero hope that we will be able to right our wrongs, we do not seem to be wired that way. It helps that we tend to be lazy about these things and only react rather than be proactive. Time will in a perverse way take care of things. History reminds us of that. The only progress we have ever made has been out of external forces. Look at the cellphone and the Internet for instance. We have had little to do with any progress that we've made. It is the truth. And it is a shame.

- Ikhide

Stalk my blog at www.xokigbo.com
Follow me on Twitter: @ikhide
Join me on Facebook: www.facebook.com/ikhide




________________________________
From: Mobolaji Aluko <alukome@gmail.com>
To: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2012 11:55 AM
Subject: Re: USA Africa Dialogue Series - On the Matter of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse - and Three American Memos {Re- Kurt Vonnegut: Biafra: A People Betrayed




Franklyne Ogbunwezeh:

In the essay "Biafra: A People Betrayed" by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.,  what you don't really come away with is the answer to the implied question "By who?"

Here is a telling passage, in which I have highlighted a few sentences in red that may begin to provide some answers:


QUOTE

http://journeytoforever.org/rrlib/biafra.html

The guest to my right was Dr. S. I. S. Cookey  [ S.J.S. COOKEY? http://www.ngdelta.com/detail6.html], who had taken his degree at Oxford and who was now provincial administrator for Opobo Province. He was exhausted. His eyes were red. Opobo Province had fallen to the Nigerians months ago. Others were chatting prettily, so I ransacked my mind for items that might encourage Dr. Cookey and me to bubble, too.But all I could think of were gruesome realities of the most immediate sort. It occurred to me to ask him, for instance, if there was a chance that one thing that had killed so many Biafrans was the arrogance of Biafra's intellectuals. My mind was eager to ask him, too, if I had been a fool to be charmed by General Ojukwu. Was he yet another great leader who would never surrender, who became holier and more radiant as his people died for him?

So I turned to cement. I remained cement through the rest of the evening, and so did Dr. Cookey; Vance and Miriam and I had a drink in Miriam's room after the party. Owerri's diesel generator had gone off for the night, so we lit a candle.

Miriam commented on my behavior at the party.

"I'm sorry," I said. "I didn't come to Biafra for canapes.

What did we eat in Biafra? As guests of the government, we had meat and yams and soups and fruit. It was embarrassing. Whenever we told a cadaverous beggar "No chop," it wasn't really true. We had plenty of chop, but it was all in our bellies. 

There was a knock on Miriam's door that night. Three men came in. We were astonished. One of them was General Philip Effiong, the second funniest man in Biafra. He had a tremblingly devoted aide with him, who saluted him ten times a minute, though the general begged him not to. The third man was a suave and dapper civilian in white pants and sandals and a crimson dashiki. He was Mike Ikenze, personal press secretary to General Ojukwu.

The young general was boisterous, wry, swashbuckling, high as a kite on incredibly awful news from the fronts.Why did he come to see us? Here is my guess: He couldn't tell his own people how bad things were, and he had somebody. We were the only foreigners around. He talked for three hours. The Nigerians had broken through everywhere. They were fanning out fast, slicing the Biafran dot into dozens of littler ones. Inside some of these littler dots, hiding in the bush, were tens of sands of Biafrans who had not eaten anything for weeks and more. What had become of the brave Biafran soldiers? They were woozy with hunger. They were palsied by shock. They had left their holes. They were wandering.

General Effiong threw up his hands. "It's over!" he cried, and he gave a laugh that was ghoulish and broken.

UNQUOTE


Food for thought....

And there you have it.



Bolaji Aluko



On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 8:40 AM, franklyne ogbunwezeh <ogbunwezeh@yahoo.com> wrote:

Dear all,
>
>
>Kurt Vonnegut's background is important. Vonnegut never made history all about Biafra. He is epistemically incapable of doing that. He wrote the history he saw playing out before his own very eyes. His background as having witnessed Allied atrocities in Dresden may have been a wonderful school for his appreciation of the the plight of the powerless. It may have brought home to him, the fact that great writers have never supported power with their trade, to wreck havoc on the weak and the powerless. Dresden and Biafra were two different theatres of atrocity committed on a people by Global power players. Dresden had no military significance to the German war effort at the time the Allies decided to firebomb the city to smithereens during the dying days of the World War II. Dresden is a symbol of wickedness and inhumanity during a war. Dresden is largely ignored because it was an atrocity committed by the victors.
>
>
>
>Biafra was another such theatre, where the vultures and other local and international scavengers converged to bludgeon a people, whose crime was in desiring freedom. War crimes were articulated and championed by Gowon, Obafemi Awolowo, and Adekunle; and amply perpetrated on the innocent women and children of Biafra. And todays, those who are "kinky with guilt" are so very determined to embezzle that fact of history.
>
>
>Thanks to courageous men like Vonnegut. Thanks to courageous men like Achebe, that history is being read again and being discussed. Thanks to these folks, the righteous anger of a people and the corrosive guilt and fear of those who profitted from that genocide are being simultenously aroused. Lets hope that this leads to a dawn of a new era for Nigeria.
>
>
>
>Living in Germany and being at home with Dresden and the atrocities of the Allied Forces on that city, would make one understand where Vonnegut is coming from. That may have inspired him to hate whenever power is being used to bludgeon those whose only crimes were the desire to be free. Vonnegut was a witness to what happened in Biafra. A fact which apart from Achebe, many on these listservs cannot lay claims to. Whatever he saw, he related, and left intepretations to those whose stock in trade it is. What I just did was to cite a very apt comment that Vonnegut delivered in his rendition. 
>
>
>And Vonnegut's background never disproves that assertion.
>
>
>Franklyne Ogbunwezeh
> 
>* ************** *************** ****************** *************** ***********
>What constitutes a disservice to our faculty of judgment,
however, is to place obstacles in the way of assembling truth's fragments, remaining content with a mere one- or two-dimensional projection where a multidimensional and multifaceted apprehension remains open, accessible and instructive.
>
>
>Wole Soyinka, Between Truth and Indulgences
>
>
>________________________________
> From: Mobolaji Aluko <alukome@gmail.com>
>To: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com
>Sent: Monday, October 29, 2012 1:10 PM
>Subject: USA Africa Dialogue Series - On the Matter of Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse - and Three American Memos {Re- Kurt Vonnegut: Biafra: A People Betrayed
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Dear All:
>
>
>On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 6:52 AM, franklyne ogbunwezeh <ogbunwezeh@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>>"It's hard to prove genocide," said Hall. "If some Biafrans survive, then genocide hasn't been committed. If no Biafrans survive, who will complain?"
>>
>>                           Vonnegut
>>
>>
>>Very apt. Very very apt. 
>>
>>
>>
>>Thank you Vonnegut for being a witness to history, inspite of the onslaught of revisionism we have today.
>>
>>
>>Franklyne Ogbunwezeh
>
>
> 
>
>
>Franklyne Ogbunwezeh:
>
>
>Kurt Vonnegut's witness to history is certainly not Biafran - or not only Biafran - but Dresdenian, which you (should) know something or two about, living in Germany as you are.  You have heard (or read) his book Slaughterhouse 5?
>
>
>Well, here is a quick bio of KVJ:
>
>
>QUOTE
>
>
>http://www.wdog.com/rider/writings/KVJ_soitgoes.htm
>
>
>In 1940 he started a three year stint at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. His father encourages him to study "something useful" so he pursued a double major in chemistry and biology in preparation to become a biochemist (Klinkowitz, ix). During his time at Cornell, he is also a columnist and managing editor for the school daily, The Cornell Sun. His scholastic career is pretty much normal until his Junior year, when he is hospitalized with pneumonia. This lapse in school attendance causes him to lose his draft deferrment and he enlists in the US Army.
>
>
>In 1943 his Army training at Carnegie Institute of Technology began, studying mechanical engineering. In 1944 he returned home to Indianapolis to visit his family on Mother's Day before heading out to England. That Mother's Day, in 1944, his mother overdosed on sleeping pills, committing suicide. Then Kurt went off to war. He joined the 106th Infantry Division in England.
>
>
>A few months later, on December 19, 1944, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. was captured by the Germans at the Battle of the Bulge. He is sent as a POW to Dresden, and believes that his role in his war is over. Dresden was not a military target; as Jerome Klinkowitz, a noted Vonnegut critic, pointed out, the city was considered "an architectural and artistic treasure" (x).
>
>
>But on the night of February 13 and 14, 1945, Dresden was destroyed by Allied fire-bombing. German casualties numbered 135,000 to 200,000, the vast majority of which were civilians: women, children and the elderly. This is more people killed than at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. As Vonnegut said, "I was present in the greatest massacre of European history, which was the destruction of Dresden by fire-bombing" (Allen, 3). Vonnegut and the other POWs, along with most of their German stewards – the only real military personnel in the city – survived the fire-bombing by remaining in the underground meat locker they were being held in, which was protected from the heat and smoke above: Slaughterhouse-Five. He and his fellow POWs were pressed into serving as "corpse-miners" after the bombing. They dug through rubble to collect and cremate bodies of dead Germans. This whole experience seriously affected Vonnegut, and provided the center for
Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), which is considered his magnum opus.
>
>
>In late April of 1945, the Russians had overtaken Dresden, and after a confusing period immediately preceding the armistice, he was repatriated to the American forces in Europe.
>
>
>UNQUOTE
>
>
>
>
>Terrible things happen in war - and yes, (starvation) genocide is very hard to prove. And the West knows it, particularly in the light of ceaseless negotiations for land, air and see food corridors, as outlined in the August 1968 memo below (during the last few months of the Johnson Administration;  November 22, 1963 - January 20, 1969) and two January 1969 Memos (during the first few days of the Nixon Administration January 20, 1969 - August 8, 1974).
>
>
>MEMO 1: NSC: Edward Hamilton (NSC Staff) to PSA Rostow (August 12, 1968)
>MEMO 2: US White House:  Kissinger Memorandum to the President (January 28, 1969)
>MEMO 3: CIA Intelligence Memo:  The Biafran Relief Problem (January 29, 1969) 
>
>And there you have it.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Bolaji Aluko
>
>
>
>
>___________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>
>MEMO 1: From Edward Hamilton (NSC Staff) to PSA Rostow (August 12, 1968)
>
>
>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 398
>
>
>398. Memorandum 
>From Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff 
>To the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 (#fn1) 
>Washington, August 12, 1968. 
>
>
>WWR: SUBJECT Status Report on Nigeria
>
>
>I thought it might be useful if I elaborated on the points I was making this morning. 
>
>
>The Nigerian problem has not changed much in your absence, except to get progressively worse. It now stands as follows: 
>
>
>1. The two sides are in conference in Addis under the auspices of the OAU and the Chairmanship of Haile Selassie. The Feds have tabled a 9-point peace plan which, though still demanding that the Biafrans renounce secession, is by far the most realistic proposal yet offered. The proposal promises outside truce supervision by a neutral force (perhaps composed of Indians, Canadians and Ethiopians) an Ibo-dominated government for the Ibo heartland, a largely Ibo police force in Ibo areas, guarantee against a flood of Federal troops into Iboland, and a somewhat qualified promise of amnesty for the rebels. The Biafrans have flatly and publicly rejected this scheme, because it would require them to give up secession. As of Friday night, our people in Addis thought there was little hope that the talks would survive this week. 
>
>
>2. However, H.I.M. [HS IMPERIAL MAJESTY] took things in hand and made it very difficult for either side to walk out. They are meeting again today on the basis of his secret proposals (to which we are not privy). Our betting is that Selassie is trying to get agreement on relief as a separate matter from the political settlement, which apparently is not yet possible. 
>
>
>3. We are doing everything we can—which is really very little—to help the Addis talks along. The President approved and sent a public message to H.I.M. before the start of the talks, as well as a confidential message to Houphouet-Boigny, who is likely to be the strongest influence on the rebels. We also made a demarche with Gowon in Lagos. We have now sent contingency messages from Rusk to H.I.M., to be delivered if the talks break down, which press for agreement on relief whatever the status of the political issues. 
>
>
>4. On the relief front, there has been little but frustration. Estimates of the extent of suffering vary, but the range (e.g., 400– 600 per day passing the point of no return of protein starvation) are sufficiently horrible to make the differences meaningless.
>
>
>The Red Cross has been flying 16–20 tons of food a night in its lone DC–4 (3 more DC–4’s are due soon). Even these flights have now been stopped, however, because Biafran arms planes have taken advantage of the reduced flak Gowon puts up against mercy flights, so that Gowon has stopped making any special provisions and the Red Cross has had some near misses. Thus, at the moment there is no relief food at all getting into Biafra. 
>
>
>5. Nor, I am afraid, is there a dependable mechanism for getting food in if the political settlement came tomorrow. The Red Cross has been woefully slow and ineffective in arranging the logistics, and I am afraid our Mission in Lagos is too sensitive to the feelings of the Federal Government to have done much pushing. 
>
>
>6. Today, therefore, we launched Bob Moore, Joe Palmer’s Deputy, to Geneva to try to (a) get the Red Cross thinking in terms of the airlift proposition I mentioned this morning, and (b) get the machine built which could provide the food if the politics will allow. Moore’s dispatch was made with a reasonable fanfare, which should help some at home. 
>
>
>7. The constraints on relief remain unchanged. The Nigerians will allow a land corridor, but not an airlift unless we can guarantee it won’t be used to aid arms shipments to Biafra. Biafrans will accept food by air but not by land, on the ground that any food which passes through Federal territory is likely to be poisoned. The Red Cross will not engage in any relief operation which does not have the explicit approval and full cooperation of both sides. 
>
>
>8. There is one possible break this afternoon. The Red Cross thinks Ojukwu is about to agree to set aside a particular airstrip solely for relief use. The Red Cross has instructed its Lagos man to try that out on Gowon. This may work, although Gowon is under immense pressure from his hawks (which include almost the entire Hausa population) not to allow any relief, particularly any which involved air traffic into Biafra. 
>
>
>9. All of this is happening in the shadow of what is pretty clearly a buildup for a new Federal offensive designed to take the 10,000 square miles still held by the rebels. Joe Palmer, who has just returned from Nigeria, thinks this will happen within the next couple of weeks. There are also mounting reports on increased Biafran military activity, allegedly (though probably falsely) led by French officers. If either or both sides take the offensive, the relief problem becomes almost impossible. We have had a strong go at the Feds on this point, but their answer is a forbidding “The other side has left us little choice.” 
>
>
>10. The public pressure here mounts daily. Biafran starvation has been front page news almost constantly while you were away, and I have learned this afternoon that Time now plans to do next week’s cover story on this problem. American opinion is heavily pro-Biafran, though without much knowledge of the facts. Both the Vice President and Senator McCarthy have issued very strong statements urging that we “cut red tape” and “do more than futile gestures.” Unless Haile Selassie can bring off a miracle, we’re clearly down to the nitty gritty on this one with no solution in sight:
>
>
>*Gowon cannot accept Biafran secession and hold his Government and the rest of the Federation together. 
>*Ojukwu, bolstered by De Gaulle and Houphouet-Boigny, still believes he is better off holding out than allowing his troops to be disarmed and risking slaughter of the Ibos. 
>*The Red Cross is slow, timid and inept. 
>*The Brits are acting as though they have decided that the only solution is a military solution imposed by Gowon. 
>*The French are actively pro-Biafran. 
>*The OAU is pro-Nigerian but split by the fact that four of its members recognize Biafra. 
>*The Russians are largely disinterested and identify with the Nigerians to the degree that they are interested. 
>*U Thant and the Pope make strong statements but are largely powerless. 
>*Our own approach has been and is to 
>(a) stimulate the Red Cross to serve as the international cover for a relief operation; 
>(b) press, largely confidentially, on both sides to agree to a settlement, or at least to a relief agreement; 
>(c) offer any and all help necessary to make a relief operation work; 
>(d) push particularly hard on Gowon to dramatize the fact that it is not the Federal Government that is keeping the food out of Biafra; and 
>(e) work out the logistics of the relief scheme so that it is ready to move as soon as political arrangements are made.
>
>
>As I told you this morning, my own view is that our best hope is to persuade Gowon to permit air drops of food from planes departing from Federal territory. This would allow him to inspect cargoes to be sure there are no arms; dramatize the fact that he wants to aid the hungry; and it would actually move sizeable amounts of food into Biafra. From here on in it’s a race between this scheme and the military offensive we think is planned.
>
>
>________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>
>MEMO 2: US White House:  Kissinger Memorandum to the President
>January 28, 1969
>
>
>__________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972
>Released by the Office of the Historian
>
>
>MEMORANDUM
>THE WHITE HOUSE
>WASHINGTON
>
>
>Tuesday, January 28, 1969
>
>
>MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
>FROM: Henry A. Kissinger 
>SUBJECT: U. S. Options in Biafra Relief
>
>
>You asked for a study of the Biafra relief problem by January 28. A member of my staff prepared the attached survey. I have taken the liberty of underlining the most significant parts.
>
>
>Underlying is a sketch of the background of the problem with a useful map. I thought it important to trace in some detail the interplay between politics and food. Each of the following Tabs, however, is designed to stand alone for a quick overview.
>
>
>At Tab A. is a list of six basic realities of the U. S. involvement in the relief effort.
>
>
>At Tab B are the main options for expanding relief into Biafra. (The data here are drawn from recent AID and Defense studies, but the details of cost and availability might be subject to change in a formal, up-to-the-minute review by all agencies concerned.)
> 
>Recommendation:
>
>
>That you authorize me to sign the NSSM at Tab C. This would get the bureaucracy moving toward consideration of alternative Biafra relief programs at an early NSC meeting.
>
>
>There are no exact numbers on the scale of the human tragedy gathering in Biafra. But all our sources do agree that more than a million people are likely to be in danger of starvation over the next 2-3 months. The disaster certainly overshadows direct U.S. interests in Nigeria. There would be no question about evacuating the 5500 U.S. citizens or sacrificing the $300 million private investment on the Federal side if these stood in the way of relief. The heart of our dilemma, however, is that our instinctive moral concern and involvement with this tragedy cannot be separated from the political tangle -- either in the eyes of the two sides, or in the real impact of relief on the course of the war and its broader consequences for Nigeria and Africa. Policy must be measured in terms of (1) its effect on our ability to help get in relief, and (2) long-range damage as well as the immediate disaster.
>
>
>Background of the Problem
>
>
>The civil war is rooted in the failure of the first generation of British-tutored politicians to make something of independence and unity. While London and Washington poured in money and high expectations, corruption grew apace and decisions were drained of content by the tribal bickering that lay behind the facade of national parties. In one sense the first coup in 1966 was a classic effort by young officers to set things right. But they were also eastern Ibos who murdered with ritual flair a northern Hausa Prime Minister along with the Premiers of the Northern and Western States.
>
>
>An Ibo general stepped in and tried honestly to hold the union together for a year. But the coup leaders went unpunished and the spiral was rapid. Six months later the general was murdered and 30-40,000 Ibos were savagely slaughtered in the North. Young colonels in a coalition of West and North took over in Lagos. The East (2/3 Ibo, 1/3 minority tribes) took back a flood of terrified Ibo refugees from the rest of the country and talked secession. There followed a predictable sequence of mutual bad faith, mounting chauvinism and outflanking of moderates. The war began in July 1967. It has come down to a stand-off with the rebels -- rechristened Biafra -- holed up in the Ibo heartland, about half the territory they began the war with. The Feds out-number the Biafrans 2:1 in effectives, but French arms and higher morale give the rebels parity for the present.
>
>
>The Two Sides
>
>
>Federal Military Government (350, 000 sq. miles, 47 million). General Gowon -- 36, Sandhurst-trained, devout Baptist -- rules almost literally by unanimity over a tenuous coalition increasingly strained by the standoff. The Western Yorubas, about 1/3 of the coalition, are stirring ominously in tax riots and seditious talk by local politicans. The army seems to remain reasonably solid, if not tightly controlled from Lagos. There is an urge for unity among the elite of all factions, though the strongest cement at this point is probably common tribal hatred of the Ibos. The Feds have cultivated a little elan in discovering they could run the country without the Ibos, who were the backbone of commerce and civil service in the north as well as the south. The Nigerians are proud and latently xenophobic, with a special rancor toward the U.S. that comes of being a guilty offspring who disappointed parental hopes.
>
>
>They conduct the war with often incredible ineptness both in battle and public relations. They tolerate the Red Cross relief operation on both sides but would hardly be averse to winning by starvation. They were outraged by the recent U.S. sale of eight old transports to the Red Cross and other relief agencies. For Gowon's regime the logic is simple: food keeps the rebellion alive as well as the rebels.
>
>
>Current Position: The Feds still insist that Biafra must renounce sovereignty before they'll talk peace in earnest. Within a "federal structure" they have talked about schemes for Ibo protection, including an international police force. But they are vague on questions of political amnesty and the place of Ibos in the future federal army. They see the outside world, and particularly us, drifting toward the rebels out of evil design or misguided sympathy. They feel their own war-weariness, are frightened and emboldened by it, and are probably very near a xenophobic outburst which would find an external scapegoat for their frustrations. Our eight transports almost triggered it. Recent intelligence indicates that the Feds plan a major offensive in March before the spring rains bog everyone down. Barring a real escalation in weaponry or expertise from outside sources, their prospects of breaching the rebel perimeter are still slight. That failure would bring
Lagos to the boiling point.
>
>
>Biafra (3, 000 sq. miles, 4-6 million). Colonel Ojukwu -- 35, British-trained, erstwhile playboy -- presides over the popular support and military morale of a people convinced that defeat means extinction. The Ibos are the wandering Jews of West Africa -- gifted, aggressive, Westernized; at best envied and resented, but mostly despised by the mass of their neighbors in the Federation. They have fought well (by African standards) against heavy odds; their cynical public relations use of the starvation has been brilliant.
>
>
>Current Position: Ojukwu says in one breath his sovereignty is not negotiable, yet in the next talks about a compromise "confederation" or "commonwealth" which he never defines. He has ruled out the British as mediators and distrusts the OAU, just as the Feds accept-it, because of its pro-Federal stance. Biafra proffers a "ceasefire" knowing that neither Gowon nor his coalition could survive a hiatus which only gave a respite to the rebel-lion. The rebels seem more aware than before of their desperate food situation, but are convinced they can hold out (or will be bailed out) until the Feds collapse. Short of that, Biafra is almost certainly unable to win the war militarily. If Gowon (as he likes to see himself) is Lincoln fighting it out in the Wilderness with draft riots and copperheads back home, Ojukwu is Jeff Davis before Gettysburg with time on the side of secession.
>
>
>Relief and Diplomacy
>
>
>The immediate food crisis is on the Biafran side, which has been reduced to a 70- by 40-mile enclave in Federal-held territory. The only relief access is to the one working airstrip used for both arms and relief flights at night only. The planes come from two small islands off the coast. The religious voluntary agencies (some U.S., some European) fly from Portuguese Sao Tome. But Portugal has been sympathetic to Biafra and occasional arms flights also go in from Sao Tome. The Red Cross had been flying from Fernando Po until stopped last week by their landlord, the government of Equatorial Guinea. That problem is a mixture of high-handedness by the Swiss Red Cross people, perhaps some pressure on the Guineans from the Feds, and mostly the urge of a new and uncertain black regime to show the white men in their midst who's boss. State is hard at work on this. The Red Cross should be able to "rent" a grace period to continue flights until an agreement is
negotiated.
>
>
>For the moment, deaths have probably gone down in Biafra as a result of the 300 tons or so of protein concentrates flown in per week before the block on Fernando Po. But the fall harvest in Iboland is being consumed, and they face a carbohydrate famine which will have still greater impact on the population and require much greater bulk than the present relief airlift could possibly handle. The tortuous politics of relief boil down as follows:
>
>
>-- Both sides have obstructed relief, but the balance of guilt rests with Biafra. In part, there are military priorities over food, but in the last account the rebels know well there's political profit in going hungry.
>
>
>-- Biafra blocks daytime relief flights (which could substantially increase deliveries) because they're afraid Fed MIGs will tailgate and knock out the airfield (which the MIGs avoid at night or in daylight when anti-aircraft is free to shoot at anything in the air.) The rebels also enjoy the "cover" their arms flights get from relief planes at night, should the Feds grow bolder after dark.
>
>
>-- The Feds endorse daytime flights in principle (to isolate the night arms run and maybe get a daytime crack at the field despite pledges to the contrary). But they regard (with reason) the voluntary agencies flying from Portuguese Sao Tome as pro-Biafran potential gun-runners, and thus illegal. And they don't want the Red Cross, which they do accept, flying in the fuel necessary to distribution of food.
>
>
>-- The Feds want the airlift to operate from Federal territory, which would let them inspect the food for hidden arms. Biafra argues a Federal-based airlift means poisoned food (a potent fear in West Africa) and at very least that relief would be hostage to their mortal enemy. The relief people contend a Federal base will (a) hamstring their flights where military operations would take precedence in already overtaxed facilities, (b) cripple what does go out with endless bickering over what's relief (fuel, spare parts, tools) and what's military.
>
>
>-- The Biafrans oppose an overland corridor unless it's policed by an army as big as the Feds' to prevent a sneak breakthrough. The Feds talk about a corridor -- again, in principle -- but manage objections to specific proposals and usually demand prior agreement by the rebels.
>
>
>Over all this are two hard facts about the total relief picture:
>
>
>1. Without either (a) a major enlargement of the present airlift (air drops, building another "neutral" airstrip inside Biafra, etc.) which would bring a break between the Feds and the relief operation or (b) a land corridor, we can only scratch the edges of the food crisis soon upon us.
>
>
>2. Of the 4 million people ,now existing on outside relief and medicine, easily half are dependent on the continuation of the International Red Cross (read white - foreign) operation in Federal-held territory.
>Where Others Stand
>
>
>The British could change things dramatically if they gave the Feds covert help with pilots to interdict the arms flights into Biafra. We have evidence they may have been trying that half-heartedly, but there are no results and time is running out for Gowon. Otherwise, London tries to look as energetic as possible to quiet backbench critics. The British have no real negotiating leverage in spite of -- or because of -- their arms supply to the Feds.
>
>
>The French are behind the arms flights from neighboring Gabon that save the rebels. They think the Feds will break up first and they'll have a dynamic new client amid the wreckage of an Anglo-American dream in Africa. It's a cheap investment -- justified so far by events and, one suspects, de Gaulle's romantic taste for underdogs.
>
>
>The French have responded to US urging and Red Cross pleas by saying finally they'll approach Ojukwu on accepting daytime flights. But there is no sign, and much evidence to the contrary, that they're backing off from their gamble on Biafra's survival.
>
>
>The Soviets jumped in as arms suppliers to the Feds after we declared an embargo on both sides and the British were slowed by Parliamentary conscience. Gowon is at pains to assure us that Moscow is a temporary patron of last resort. So far, in fact, the Soviets have little to show for their MIGs and unskilled Egyptian pilots. But they too hold the key to interdiction with a few pilots who can fly the MIGs at night. The most recent CIA estimates are that Moscow is content to wait for the right moment, if ever, to play that trump.
>
>
>Obviously, the Soviets don't have a vital interest in Nigeria, and they may shrink from greater involvement as the war drags on and their new clients in Lagos weaken. Despite their aid, they're prey eventually to the general xenophobia awakened in Nigeria by the war. But the Soviet move to become an arms supplier must be seen in several lights: (a) in contrast to their low-profile, de facto retreat from Africa in the last five years; (b) in the wider context of new foothold in the Middle East; (c) as a response to our own discomfort in Nigeria and the "long-reach" mentality in some Soviet quarters; and (d) for its impact on the U.S. public and Congress (so far, slight).
>
>
>The Africans. All but four of the OAU (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tanzania, Zambia) support the Feds. The latest OAU Summit Resolution at Algiers in September reaffirmed the stand. Nigeria's plight is seen as a Pandora's box on a Continent where 2,000 ethnic groups are squeezed into 41 states and secession is a recurrent nightmare for most leaders. The balance of forces is too varied country-to-country for Africa to splinter if Biafra makes it. Yet a rebel victory would probably invite imitation in several vulnerable spots. 
>
>
>The odds are heavy it would at least tear apart the rest of Nigeria.
>
>
>Real or imagined, fears about the war's impact are widespread among Africans. They want the war over as much as we do. But they have no real leverage on either side,. and Emperor Haile Selassie has all but exhausted his prestige in four different rounds of abortive talks. We and the Africans have talked a lot about their solving their own problems; this one is just too hard and came too early before power caught up with good intentions.
>
>
>U.S. Congress and Public: I need not describe this in detail. The public outcry has been passionate if not always sophisticated. On the Hill the Problem joins unlikely allies such as Kennedy and McCarthy, Brooke and Russell, Lukens and Lowenstein. The pressure has been intense; it is bound to grow. Senator Kennedy is now all but calling for an independent Biafra. The public campaign is well-financed and organized -- an amalgam in part of genuine concern and left-wing guilt feelings over Vietnam. The same people who picket on our "interference" in Asia also demand we force-feed the starving Nigerians.
>
>
>U.S. Policy and Options
>
>
>BASIC REALITIES
>
>
>1. We must not be enmeshed in irrelevant experiences of our past involvement in Africa. Others -- most notably the Congo -- have put down secession and minimum U.S. help (a few C-130's in quick operation) made a difference. Unlike most in Africa, this is a real war.
>
>
>2. At the very minimum -- for moral reasons let alone domestic politics --we must mount every reasonable effort to get in relief. But we must decide what is "reasonable" in terms of long-range damage as well as the immediate disaster.
>
>
>3. Our role is important but it alone will not ensure a solution. We have little leverage beyond threats or promises of greater embroilment. Neither national interest nor national security justifies U.S. military intervention. There is no prospect that U.S. military intervention -- with the political disaster it would bring -- would solve the relief problem.
>
>
>4. To the degree we have leverage, we have it only with the Feds. We need their active cooperation in one half of the relief effort and at least their tacit acceptance in the Biafran half to avoid a military clash. We need their trust for any peace-making role we might assume. The relief effort and our political influence can survive the continuing displeasure mixed with hopeful expectation about our role in Biafra. Neither relief nor influence would survive a break with the Feds.
>
>
>5. There is at least an even chance an outright Fed military victory would bring some slaughter of the Ibos. The rebel charges of genocide are exaggerated and unproven. Gowon is an honorable man who knows Nigerian unity would be lost if victory led to mass murder. But he may not be able to bridle his Northern troops fresh from the bush. "One Nigeria" is probably still possible, but we must be prepared to deal with some possibility of atrocities as a result, or scuttle the concept as carrying an unacceptable risk of "complicity" in supporting the Feds even diplomatically.
>
>
>6. The passage of time as starvation grows and Fed coalition weakens --only reduces our options. A rapid end to the war is the best way to save most of the people now threatened by starvation. We simply don't know how long the Biafrans can live with current prospects, or how long the Fed coalition will hold together. The odds are now that the coalition will outlast the food, but it's close.
>
>
>RELIEF OPTIONS
>
>
>The Need (This does not deal with the 2-3 million people in Federal territory, where presently there are no problems of access.)
>
>
>Estimates vary widely because of the very fluid situation in Biafra. Also, State has shrunk from sending in a relief expert for fear (probably well-founded) of trouble in Lagos, and we must rely on private figures and fragments from one or two CIA sources. Put together, the relief agencies, UNICEF, CIA, etc. see the need as follows:
>
>
>Population in danger in Biafra -- 1. 5 to 3. 5 million over next 4-6 mos.
>
>
>Relief needed (based on minimum caloric needs, and adjusted for bulk carbohydrate shipments) -- 30 to 40, 000 tons per month 
>
>
>In practical terms, these are obviously wide ranges. But until (if ever) we have more documented figures, our relief experts accept these and advise that we prepare for the high -- or worst -- calculation.
>
>
>Present Airlift (assuming resumption of Red Cross operation from Fernando Po) 
>
>
>Night flights, 15 - 18 planes = 4, 000 tons per month maximum
>
>
>Conditions: -hazards of night operation
>- intermix with arms flights and vulnerability to Fed attack
>- insufficient air-ground control
>-limited capacity of present aircraft
>
>
>Result: Actual deliveries have never reached the capacity of 4, 000 tons.
>
>
>Options
>
>
>1. STEP-UP ONE
>
>
>Substitute larger planes = 8, 000 tons per month maximum available commercially
>Conditions:  - Same as present airlift above
>- added airfield maintenance on islands and in Biafra
>Cost: $3 - 4 million for lease or sale of aircraft
>
>
>TAB B
>
>
>2. STEP-UP TWO
>
>
>Dayflights, substitute = 12, 000 tons per month maximum 15 C-130-type aircraft
>Conditions: - major improvement of airfield facilities in Biafra and on islands
>-Biafran agreement to day flights or construction of second airfield
>-recruitment of new crews, probably making necessary use of U.S. military personnel
>Cost: $16 million per month for operations
>$2-3 million for airfield improvement or construction
>
>
>3. STEP-UP THREE
>
>
>Add Air Drops to Step-Up Two = 23, 000 tons per month maximum with 10 more C-130-type aircraft
>Conditions: - additional base airfields since islands at capacity in Step-Up Two
>-additional personnel (100 - 200) again involving U.S. military
>-additional ground control to insure distribution in Biafra
>Cost: $36 million per month for operations
>$3 - 4 million ancitipated rental for additional fields
>
>
>4. STEP-UP FOUR
>
>
>Day flights, 35 aircraft = 30 - 40, 000 tons per month maximum with 17-ton capacity
>Conditions: - Major involvement U.S. military personnel and aircraft
>- Security and maintenance usually requested by Joint Chiefs
>-Massive reconstruction of present airfields (amounting to U.S. take-over)
>-Major improvement distribution facilities in Biafra
>-Biafran agreement to day flights or second airfield
>Cost: est. $200 million minimum total for 3-4 months
>
>
>TAB B
>
>
>5. STEP-UP FIVE
>
>
>Land relief corridor = 35 to 45, 000 tons per month maximum into Biafra combined with present relief flights
>Conditions: - Agreement by Federal Government and Biafra
>--Some improvement of roads and bridges
>Possible provision of additional trucks and ferries
>--Improvement of port and storage facilities in Federal territory
>--Added distribution in Biafra
>Cost: est. $8 million per month for operations
>
>
>Political Constraints on Relief Options
>
>
>Each Step-Up would be heavily dependent on U.S. initiative, money and equipment. Most require U.S. personnel. Others have shown by now that they lack either the resources, the will, or both.
>
>
>STEP-UP ONE (substituting larger planes), by itself, would probably move the Feds to sever relations with us. The urge would be stronger in Lagos to eject the Red Cross, but they might continue operations in Federal territory at the price of discontinuing aid to Biafra.
>
>
>STEP-UP-TWO through STEP-UP FOUR would, by all estimates, definitely bring a break with the Feds. We must be prepared to (a) encounter military attack on relief aircraft, (b) sacrifice the Red Cross operation in Federal territory and take over the airlift ourselves, (c) have personnel subject to ground attack in Biafra by Federal planes and troops.
>
>
>STEP-UP FIVE (land corridor) would probably require (a) visible involvement of OAU or other Africans to mitigate Nigerian sensitivities to a heavily white operation and (b) manifestly workable guarantees against large-scale violation of the corridor to meet Biafran objections, or at least to satisfy world opinion that their objections were unreasonable in face of the need for food.
>
>
>NSSM 11 directed the preparation of papers on 1) alternative approaches and programs for expanding relief and 2) alternate views of the U.S. interest in Nigeria and Biafra.
>
>
>
>END
>
>
>
>
>______________________________________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>MEMO 3:  CIA Intelligence Memo:  The Biafran Relief Problem
>
>29 January 1969 
>
>
>_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972
>
>
>Released by the Office of the Historian
>DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
>Intelligence Memorandum
>
>
>THE BIAFRAN RELIEF PROBLEM
>29 January 1969
>No. 0611/69 
>
>
>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
>Directorate of Intelligence
>29 January 1969 
>INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
>
>
>The Biafran Relief Problem 
>
>
>Summary
>
>
>Biafran relief has become a charged inter-national issue that could severely strain and possibly rupture US-Nigerian relations. There is very little reliable information on the actual number of refugees or on the rate of starvation in Biafra, but it does appear that the situation will worsen within the next few months. The plight of the refugees has not had any significant effect on the policies of either side in the civil war, but the Biafrans use it for propaganda purposes, and at least some Nigerians favor starving the Biafrans into submission as the best war policy.
>
>
>As the war drags on, the federal authorities will probably become increasingly suspicious of foreign involvement in Biafran relief, and may feel compelled to react strongly against foreign countries backing stepped-up relief to the secessionists. Violent anti-US demonstrations could also occur.
>
>
>Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.
>
>
>The Seriousness of the Food Problem
>
>
>1. The area now under Biafran control is approximately one fourth that of the former Eastern Region which Colonel Ojukwu led into secession in May 1967. As a result of the Ibo exodus into Biafran-controlled territory as federal forces advanced, the population in present-day Biafra has increased from a prewar four million to somewhere between six and seven million. Even before the civil war this particular section of the Eastern Region was a densely populated area de-pendent on imported food.
>
>
>2. There is unquestionably starvation in the Biafran-controlled area and in the areas of the former Eastern Region overrun by federal forces. The number of deaths from starvation appears to have risen sharply during the period from last July through October. Deaths probably numbered in the hundreds of thousands, but ac-curate figures are not available. These deaths presumably occurred mostly among the very old, the young, and the sick, After October there was an apparent de-cline in deaths from starvation probably because of an improvement in the food distribution system, the in-creased airlift of food by relief organizations, and the fact that the main yam harvest occurred at this time.
>
>
>3. Forecasts on the seriousness of the starvation problem in the coming months range from a relatively low death rate to those predicting mass starvation. The US Embassy in Lagos has estimated that by July some 3.5 million Biafrans and some 2.25 million refugees in federal-held territory will be in need of food. Should the direst predictions regarding the food situation materialize and the worst circumstances prevail, some two to three million people in Biafra and in the federally occupied areas could die of starvation in the next few months. It does not appear that death from starvation will be anywhere near this serious, however. Moreover, a real if unmeasurable consideration in any such estimate is the Biafrans' ability to cope with the problem themselves. Colonel Ojukwu recently launched another campaign to increase food production, and it must be assumed that the Biafrans will turn their considerable ingenuity toward alleviating the problem.
>
>
>Sources of Assistance
>
>
>4. Relief to the Biafrans has come mainly from Joint Church Aid (JCA), an association of religious relief agencies operating from the Portuguese island of Sao Tome off the coast of Nigeria, and until early this month from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) based in neighboring Equatorial Guinea. The unofficial Catholic charity organization, Caritas, has also sent some relief supplies from Sao Tome, and the French Red Cross operates relief flights from Libreville.
>
>
>5. The ICRC operation was suspended early this month by the government of newly independent Equatorial Guinea for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the unstable situation that prevails in this tiny former Spanish dependency. There is a large Ibo work force on Fernando Po, which the government of Equatorial Guinea fears is bent on subversion. Equatorial Guinea also believes it is under pressure by its much larger neighbor and has come down firmly on the side of Nigeria over the Biafran question. When the territory was under Spanish control, the ICRC operation worked smoothly. After independence last October, however, tension developed between ICRC officials and the Equatorial Guineans who have described the relief workers as arrogant and disrespectful of Equatorial Guinea's sovereignty. Equatorial Guinean Government officials have also indicated that they are receiving much less financial compensation for the ICRC operation than the Spanish
did. Foreign Minister Ndongo has indicated that his country would consider reopening the airlift if the proper financial compensation were forthcoming. It is by no means certain, however, that he was speaking for his government, particularly the highly volatile President Macias, who has publicly committed himself not to permit ICRC night flights and who seems bent on using this issue to underscore Equatorial Guinea's independent status.
>
>
>6. All relief flights by the JCA and ICRC have been made at night. The Biafrans refuse to open their one operating airstrip to day flights, fearing that the Nigerians would use this opportunity to land troops on the airstrip. Also, the Biafrans want to continue night relief flights as a cover for separate arms flights. The ICRC had been transporting approximately 80 tons of relief supplies per night to the Biafrans, while the JCA is presently carrying about 100 tons of relief supplies nightly.
>
>
>Nigerian Attitudes on Relief
>
>
>7. Nigeria has reluctantly accepted the need for foreign participation in the Biafran relief effort, but Lagos has always been suspicious of the activities of the foreign relief agencies involved. Lagos would prefer that all relief be channeled through Nigeria, and, ideally, through Nigerian relief organizations. The federal authorities tacitly sanctioned the principle of daylight flights by the ICRC from Equatorial Guinea, but have never given their approval for night flights. Indeed, last November Lagos implied that planes flying into Biafra at night risked being shot down.
>
>
>8. The Nigerians object strongly to the JCA operation from Sao Tome, and with some justification. The JCA has completely bypassed Lagos in its operations, and arms are also being flown to the secessionists from Sao Tome. The same airplanes have been used for arms and relief flights, and it seems probable, although there is no definite evidence, that some of the planes have carried mixed cargoes. The JCA officials are definitely pro-Biafran and have not been too discreet about expressing these sympathies publicly.
>
>
>The Biafran Viewpoint
>
>
>9. The Biafrans have said that they welcome relief from any donors, except Nigeria, the UK, and the USSR--the "unholy alliance" which the Biafrans are convinced is bent on the extermination of the Ibos. The Biafran insistence that relief not be channeled through Lagos results from the secessionists' unwillingness to appear dependent on Nigeria for anything, on a genuine fear that Lagos would poison the food, and on the probably justifiable fear that Nigeria would use relief supply channels, such as a land relief corridor from Nigeria to Biafra, for military purposes. The Biafrans have done all they can to alleviate the refugee and starvation problems, but the secessionist leader-ship has given no indication--even during the July-October period--of being moved by the problem to a more compromising position with respect to the secession issue.
>
>
>Prospects
>
>
>10. As the war drags on, with a probable in-crease in starvation, the Nigerians are likely to be-come even more sensitive to "foreign meddling" over the relief issue. Some Nigerian leaders regard starvation as a legitimate weapon of war and see aid to the Biafrans as merely prolonging the fighting. Most Nigerians, and at least some federal leaders, regard foreign relief to Biafra as direct support to the secessionists in an attempt to Balkanize Nigeria. The strong adverse reaction that greeted the announcement in December that the US was furnishing C-97 aircraft--four to the ICRC and four to the JCA--provides evidence of the Nigerian attitude on this matter.
>
>
>11. Federal leader Gowon himself probably under-stands the US position on relief, but he has made clear to the US ambassador that the Nigerian people regard it as aid and comfort to the enemy. US efforts to reopen the ICRC's operation from Fernando Po have resulted in a definite increase in anti-US sentiment in Nigeria. The Nigerians recently leaked to the press a US note strongly urging--Lagos termed it demanding--the resumption of the airlift. In the Nigerian press and radio, the fact that US Secretary Rogers held his first official meeting with the Equatorial Guinean foreign minister was portrayed as further evidence of a change in US policy on Nigeria.
>
>
>12. Official Nigerian reaction to US efforts to increase relief to Biafra has thus far been confined to verbal expressions of displeasure. There has been stinging criticism of the US in the Nigerian press and radio, and some anti-US demonstrations have been held. It would seem likely that as the war continues, further efforts by the US on behalf of Biafran relief will provoke a dramatic increase in anti-US sentiment in Nigeria. This in turn would increase pressure on federal leaders to take strong official action against the US. In the highly charged atmosphere in Nigeria, further US efforts for stepped-up Biafran relief could also easily spark violent anti-US demonstrations that could threaten some of the 5,200 US citizens now resident in Nigeria.
>
>
>Source:  National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, 3/54.  Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
>
>
>_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 6:52 AM, franklyne ogbunwezeh <ogbunwezeh@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>>"It's hard to prove
genocide," said Hall. "If some Biafrans survive, then genocide hasn't
been committed. If no Biafrans survive, who will complain?"
>>
>>                           Vonnegut
>>
>>
>>Very apt. Very very apt.
>>
>>
>>
>>Thank you Vonnegut for being a witness to history, inspite of the onslaught of revisionism we have today.
>>
>>
>>Franklyne Ogbunwezeh
>>
>> 
>>* ************** *************** ****************** *************** ***********
>>What constitutes a disservice to our faculty of judgment, however, is to place obstacles in the way of assembling truth's fragments, remaining content with a mere one- or two-dimensional projection where a multidimensional and multifaceted apprehension remains open, accessible and instructive.
>>
>>
>>Wole Soyinka, Between Truth and Indulgences
>>
>>
>>________________________________
>> From: Ikhide <xokigbo@yahoo.com>
>>To: Toyin Falola <USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com>
>>Sent: Sunday, October 28, 2012 11:50 PM
>>Subject: USA Africa Dialogue Series - Kurt Vonnegut: Biafra: A People Betrayed
>>
>>
>>
>>"THERE is a "Kingdom of Biafra" on
some old maps which were made by early white explorers of the west coast of
Africa. Nobody is now sure what that kingdom was, what its laws and arts and
tools were like. No tales survive of the kings and queens.
>>
>>As for the
"Republic of Biafra" we know a great deal. It was a nation with more citizens
than Ireland and Norway combined. It proclaimed itself an independent republic
on May 30, 1967. On January 17 of 1970, it surrendered unconditionally to
Nigeria, the nation from which it had tried to secede. It had few friends in
this world, and among its active enemies were Russia and Great Britain. Its
enemies were pleased to call it a "tribe."
>>
>>Some tribe.
>>
>>The
Biafrans were mainly Christians and they spoke English melodiously, and their
economy was this one: small-town free enterprise. The worthless Biafran currency
was gravely honored to the end.
>>
>>The tune of Biafra's national anthem was Finlandia, by Jan Sibelius. The equatorial Biafrans admired the arctic
Finns because the Finns won and kept their freedom in spite of ghastly odds."
>> 
>>- Kurt Vonnegut
>> 
>>Read the rest of the essay here:
>> 
>>http://journeytoforever.org/rrlib/biafra.html
>> 
>>- Ikhide
>> 
>>Stalk my blog at http://www.xokigbo.com/
>>Follow me on Twitter: @ikhide
>>Join me on Facebook: www.facebook.com/ikhide
>>
>>
>>
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