From: Daniel Elombah <elombahperspective@gmail.com>
Subject: ||NaijaObserver|| Re: FROM THE ARCHIVES: Keeping Biafra Alive [Time Magazine, Dec. 06, 1968]
To: Raayiriga@yahoogroups.com
Cc: "USAAfrica Dialogue" <USAAfricaDialogue@googlegroups.com>, "NaijaPolitics e-Group" <NaijaPolitics@yahoogroups.com>, "OmoOdua" <OmoOdua@yahoogroups.com>, "nigerianid@yahoogroups.com" <nigerianID@yahoogroups.com>, "naijaintellects" <naijaintellects@googlegroups.com>
Date: Sunday, October 28, 2012, 7:57 AM
- Category: DANIEL ELOMBAH
- Published on Thursday, 25 October 2012 22:50
- Written by Daniel Elombah
The Soviets became major arms suppliers to the FMG (Nigeria) at the outset of the war when the US embargoed arms to both sides and the British hesitated. The FMG gives frequent assurances that the Soviet involvement is only a matter of wartime necessity and portends no political realignment of Nigeria's traditional pro-Western
stance. We have no evidence that the FMG has thus far granted any significant political concessions in return for Soviet arms. However, Soviet prestige and acceptance has increased.
Soviet intentions are unclear. They probably consider Nigeria a target of opportunity to extend their influence at Western expense and relatively little cost to themselves. Whether requested or not, they have not gone beyond the provision of military equipment, including aircraft and the training of pilots. Although disappointed and perhaps somewhat embarrassed--at slow FMG military progress, they appear willing to continue their support in the belief that prolonged fighting and FMG frustrations will increase the political value of their help. - US Memo, February 10, 1969
USSR-NIGERIA: Bilateral Tensions Increase as War Drags On - Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972
Released by the Office of the Historian
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
RSE-24, April 2, 1969
To:
The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: USSR-NIGERIA: Bilateral Tensions Increase as War Drags On
Moscow's views of its interests in Nigeria in general, and of its relations with Lagos in particular, are important factors in assessing the possibility that the Soviets might be interested in a compromise solution to the Nigerian civil war. This paper analyzes current Soviet-Nigerian relations and concludes that the USSR may be inclined to look more favorably on such a solution than it has before now.
ABSTRACT
Even while strong Soviet military and political support for Federal Nigeria in the civil war continues, relations between Moscow and Lagos are becoming increasingly characterized by disagreements, disappointments, and frictions. Recent points of tension include: disgust by high Nigerian Government officials at the Soviet handling of a naval visit to Lagos, refusal by Nigerian leader Gowon to let a Soviet technical team inspect a defense facility, Moscow's rejection of Nigerian pleas for more sophisticated military support, and growing Soviet disappointment with the course of the war.
The civil war, and Moscow's exploitation of it, have made possible a considerable increase in Soviet presence and visibility in Nigeria. But the war may now be nearing the end of its utility for the USSR as a vehicle for improving its position there. Moscow's dilemma is that its bid for greater influence in Nigeria may come increasingly into conflict with other international considerations, e.g., its relations with Paris (Biafra's chief supporter), its image in the face of humanitarian sympathy for Biafra's plight, and signs of growing African sentiment for a compromise peace settlement. Yet if the Soviets decreased their military commitment to the Nigerian Government -- or, given Nigerian exasperation with the war, even if they kept it at its current level -- they could imperil what they have already gained in Lagos.
The Soviets may well be reappraising their Nigerian policy with an eye to seeking or supporting a compromise solution which could bring the war to an end. There are two cases in which they would probably not be interested in such a solution: (1) if they felt that their support for a settlement would cause the Federal Government to think that they had sold it out, and (2) if the British position in Nigeria eroded to the point where Moscow believed it could replace London as Lagos's chief patron. On the other hand, if British influence remained strong and if the Soviets thought they could play the role of a Tashkent-style mediator without sacrificing their significant presence in Nigeria, they could possibly be tempted to support a negotiated settlement.
Bilateral Problems Proliferate
Nigerian distrust of Soviet motives, which still pervades important elements in the government (including its chief, General Gowon, as well as some other military leaders), has manifested itself in several ways recently. Gowon reportedly was incensed at the behavior of Soviet Ambassador Romanov during the Soviet naval visit to Lagos March 5-9. In an attempt to regain custody of a Soviet seaman who had jumped ship in Lagos harbor, Romanov apparently told the Nigerian police that Gowon himself had ordered the immediate release of the would-be defector. At a staff meeting March 10 Gowon denounced Romanov as a liar. The naval visit also occasioned a personal dispute between Romanov and Admiral Joseph Wey, the Nigerian navy commander, who had succeeded in postponing the visit several times and then in limiting it to fewer days than the Soviets wanted. Wey also publicly called Romanov a dishonest man and accused him of saying malicious things about him.
Despite the great importance of Soviet military aid, the Nigerians have tried jealously to protect themselves from Soviet snooping. Lagos has consistently attempted to limit the size of the Soviet Embassy there and to control Soviet front organizations. In January Gowon refused to allow a Soviet technical team to inspect a defense facility in Kaduna, even though the team had been invited to do so by the Nigerian Defense Ministry.
For their part, the Soviets have not increased their level of military support for Federal Nigeria, although they have continued to furnish additional quantities of the types of equipment already provided. (Moscow has supplied an estimated $13 million worth of arms to Nigeria since mid-1967.) In February Moscow rejected a Nigerian request for Soviet pilots to fly night missions over Biafran territory (Egyptian pilots now used have proved inefficient on such missions and are reluctant to continue them). Moscow has failed to supply Lagos with weapons (e.g., radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns or surface-to-air missiles) which could interdict arms flights to Biafra. Moreover, intelligence reports have indicated that the Soviets are disappointed with the Federal Government's failure to win the war quickly.
The Civil War: Past Plus, Future Minus for the Soviets?
From a relatively small base two years ago, the USSR has in-creased its presence and visibility in Nigeria considerably. In addition to their influence over the Nigerian left, which is exercised chiefly through the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party (a crypto-communist party founded in 1963), the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, and the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship Society (the largest of its kind in Africa), the Soviets are now being treated with increased friendliness by senior civil servants and civilian politicians. Despite the problems connected with the naval visit, it was the Soviet navy's first to Nigeria, and as such symbolizes the USSR's growing prestige there. As a result of its military aid, Moscow also has succeeded in stationing a Military Attache in Lagos. While by no means the dominant foreign power in Nigeria, the USSR has made remarkable progress in a basically Western-oriented country.
It is the civil war, which Moscow exploited by responding promptly to the Federal Government's need for arms, that has made these Soviet inroads possible. However, the war may be nearing the end of its utility for the Soviets as a vehicle for improving their position in Nigeria. By limiting the quality of the military equipment it is supplying to Lagos, Moscow has laid itself open to possible Nigerian charges that it is interested only in prolonging the war to protect the growth of Soviet influence in Nigeria. Persistent Soviet refusals to meet Nigerian pleas for a higher level of military aid would be likely to produce still more bilateral tensions, which could culminate in a full-scale Nigerian effort to limit and even diminish the Soviet diplomatic, cultural, and economic presence. If the Soviets retaliated by reducing military and/or economic aid, they could jeopardize further the influence they have worked so hard to create.
On the other hand, if Moscow were to escalate the level of military aid with the aim of producing a quick and decisive Federal victory, it could run the risk of aggravating France, Biafra's chief supporter, and possibly of provoking an increase in French aid. This in turn could result in continued military stalemate and thus confront Moscow with the same questions all over again. French support for Biafra is thus a partial deterrent to an increased level of Soviet military assistance to Federal Nigeria. Moreover, unhappy Soviet experience with heavy commitments to the UAR and -- in the sub-Sahara Africa -- to Ghana and Mali indicates that the USSR would be unlikely to expand dramatically its military investment in Nigeria.
Moscow's dilemma is that its goals in Nigeria may come increasingly into conflict with international considerations (its relations with Paris, its image in the face of humanitarian sympathy for Biafra's plight, signs of growing African sentiment for a compromise peace settlement). To ease their position, Soviet policy-makers may look with more sympathy than they have before on a compromise settlement which could allow Moscow to retain most of its gains in Federal Nigeria, while recouping its prestige in eastern Nigeria. Indeed, Biafra is an area to which the Soviets devoted most of their attention before the war began, and there is evidence that they have been in intermittent contact with Biafran representatives since the outbreak of hostilities. Soviet press and propaganda organs have consistently referred to the Biafrans and their leader, Col. Ojukwu, as misguided but not malevolent.
There is other fragmentary evidence that Moscow has not locked itself too tightly into support of the Federal side. A March 17 article in the London Financial Times quoted "reliable sources" to the effect that high-ranking Biafran officials had been approached by Soviet representatives who suggested that Moscow could use its influence in Lagos to win a political settlement acceptable to the Biafran leadership. It is possible that the Financial Times story is no more than a Biafran attempt to drive a wedge between Moscow and Lagos, but it may contain a germ of truth.
Whither the Soviets?
Under what conditions would Moscow be disposed to seek, or agree to, a negotiated compromise settlement of the war? The Soviets would not favor such a settlement if they thought that it would undermine their goal of preserving and increasing their influence in Nigeria. If Soviet support for a settlement caused the Federal Government to feel that the Kremlin had sold it out, the Soviets would probably not be interested. If, on the other hand, Moscow thought it could play the role of a Tashkent-style mediator, winning bouquets from both the Nigerian and Biafran side (as well as from Africa and the neutralists in general), it could be very tempted.
In the coming weeks, the Soviets can be expected to be very sensitive to two major considerations. The first is British influence in Nigeria. If the growing unofficial sympathy in Britain for Biafra were to damage the British position in Lagos, or if the British Government were to take any unilateral action which could be construed in Nigeria as abandonment of the Federal side, the Soviets would probably be inclined to reiterate their sup-port for Lagos, on the assumption that they would stand to gain what the British lost. Thus, Moscow's support for a negotiated settlement probably depends on the continuation of British influence in Federal Nigeria.
The second major Soviet consideration is whether, in a war which the Nigerians seem unable to win at the present level of Soviet (as well as British and other outside) aid, the Soviets can maintain the influence they have gained and still refuse an enhanced level of military support. Their policy of limited military assistance has paid off so far. But will it continue to pay off as tensions between the governments in Moscow and Lagos increase? Or will Soviet exasperation at Nigerian military and economic inefficiency and Nigerian exasperation at Soviet failure to provide advanced weapons combine, as the war drags on, to erode the influence which Moscow has gained in Nigeria? The current situation in Nigeria suggests that Soviet policy there is entering a period of greater flexibility, during which Moscow may be increasingly willing to seek a way out of its growing dilemma by means of a compromise settlement of the war.
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 11:33 AM, Mobolaji Aluko
<alukome@gmail.com> wrote:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844641,00.html Friday, Dec. 06, 1968
World: Keeping Biafra Alive
Perhaps the most important single reason for battered Biafra's continuing survival against the attacks of the Nigerian Federal Army is a steady infusion of French military aid. Although the French will not acknowledge their role, one of the worst-kept secrets of the war is the fact that armaments are flown into the secessionist state almost nightly from two former French colonies, Gabon and the Ivory Coast. Hard proof of responsibility for the arms lift, however, is hard to come by, as TIME Correspondent James Wilde reported from the Gabonese capital of Libreville:
EVERYBODY in this shabby capital knows about it, but few will talk. The unmarked planes, however, are there for all to see: four DC-4s, three DC-3s and a single Constellation, parked on the palm-lined seaside tarmac. Patient research shows that the aircraft have varied registration—French, German, Belgian, Zambian, Biafran and Gabonese. Each afternoon, three or four planes taxi to the nearby military airfield for loading, then take off for Biafra at 6 p.m. sharp. They return around midnight, after the 900-mile round trip. Just as predictable as the flights is the black Citroen, owned by the French security police, that follows me to the strip.
There are two sets of pilots flying the Biafra run, one English-speaking and the other French, and they are carefully segregated. The English-speaking flyers are housed in the dilapidated, mosquito-ridden Hôtel de la Rèsidence, run by a waspish French brunette named Jackie, whose sole virtue seems to be that she is able to count in English. Eighteen of the pilots are Rhodesian and South African, all clad in the uniform of the British colonial in Africa: highly polished shoes, long socks, neatly pressed shorts and starched bush jackets. Carefully holding themselves apart are several ex-RAF types, moustached and bearded, who punctuate their clipped, casual conversation with dated bits of Battle of Britain slang like "wack-o," "bang-on," "piece of cake."
At the Rèsidence bar one night, a cheerful group strolled in after, as one put it, "delivering the goodies." Though the flyers had obviously been ordered not to talk about their employers, some relaxed sufficiently after several pink gins to joke about their cargoes of "birth-control pills"—or ammunition. "You only need one of them, mate," a pilot chuckled. All the pilots have one thing in common—they fly to get a stake. "I'm only in it for the money," one sad, balding man told me. "I've got a wife and five kids and I want to put a down payment on a house in Salisbury." Another Rhodesian had a second motive: "That Harold Wilson is a bastard. He's against Biafra and he's buggering us too. This is a chance to bugger him." Everyone roared with laughter.
The few French crews have a much pleasanter home. They are housed in the ultramodern Hotel Gamba, where they spend their off-duty time devouring expensive meals ($25 and up) and socking away wine at $15 a bottle. Clad in soiled shorts and sweat-stained shirts, their bare feet stuck into rubber Japanese zori, they look to be a much scruffier lot than the colonial swells at the Rèsidence. They are much more close-mouthed as well. All attempts to start conversations fail; their thin, long-nosed Gallic faces remain blank.
Despite serious problems in obtaining sufficient high-octane aviation fuel, the French seem determined to carry on. An abnormal number of tankers recently unloaded at Libreville. The cargo included long, rope-handled wooden boxes, of the sort France uses to transport ammunition. The cases were taken in a French army truck to the military airport, where several other boxes marked "Army Rations" were in evidence.
There are rumors that France may have decided to take over the entire mercenary show in Biafra. The Biafrans have expelled Colonel Rolf Steiner, the German ex-Legionnaire who had commanded their crack mercenary-led unit (TIME, Oct. 25). On arrival here in Gabon, Steiner refused to answer questions, but an aide admitted that the Steiner party had been escorted to the Biafran airport in handcuffs. The speculation is that Steiner was fired because the Biafran military had grown increasingly jealous of his privileged position with Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu and had done their best to see that Steiner's troops did not get their share of ammunition and rations. The German, in retaliation, supposedly commandeered a food convoy, a deed that led to his ouster.
The French do not want publicity on their role in Biafra. But why are they so intent on keeping the war alive? A businessman here says the reason is Biafran oil: "A million barrels of oil a day, or about one-third the production capacity of Kuwait. That kind of oil production is worth gambling for, even if the odds are against you." In addition, Charles de Gaulle relishes any chance he finds to annoy the British, who are backing the Nigerian government. A third reason may well be that a united and progressing Nigeria would be a threat to the French economic dominance of West Africa. Seemingly, the French cannot lose. If Biafra wins, they may get a good deal on the oil. Should events take a turn for the worse, France probably will help Biafra set up a government-in-exile here in Gabon. If, as seems possible, French arms shipments succeed in prolonging the war one or two years, then even if Biafra is defeated, an exhausted Nigeria will not be a threat for some time to come. And the joy of it all is that France is not directly involved—or at least no one so far can prove that Paris is.
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