Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement
§Mr. Masonasked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he will make a statement on the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact, particularly on the questions of overflying and testing Royal Air Force aircraft; and whether his Department will still have any maintenance staff in Nigeria.
92W
§Mr. BraineThe following statement was issued on 22nd January by the British and Nigerian Governments.
The British and Nigerian Governments have been consulting together about the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement. They have noted with concern that the scope and purposes of the Agreement have been widely misunderstood. In particular, fears have arisen that in consequence of the Agreement, Nigeria's freedom of action might be impaired and that she might even be drawn into hostilities against her wishes.The text of the Agreement shows that these and other anxieties which have been expressed are wholly without foundation. Nevertheless, in order to end misunderstanding, the two Governments have thought it wise to reconsider the need for a formal agreement.As a result, they have decided to abrogate the Agreement. Each Government will, however, endeavour to afford to the other at all times such assistance and facilities in defence matters as are appropriate between partners in the Commonwealth.Questions of overflying and testing will therefore fall to be dealt with under the normal arrangements for Commonwealth consultation and cooperation. There is at present in Nigeria an R.A.F. detachment employed in servicing and operating the Hastings aircraft engaged in support of the Nigerian elements of the United Nations Force in the Congo.
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http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui1.htm
MILITARY DEFENSE PACTS IN AFRICA (An Abridged Version)) By Nowamagbe A. Omoigui, MD
......
Nigeria
A defense pact may also fail to mature or might even dissolve on the basis of dynamic political changes or ethnic tensions within signatory countries and/or shifts in the threat environment. Nigeria provides a good example of ethnic competition for internal control of the state and its effects on negotiations for external defense pacts. The Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact was ratified by the Nigerian Parliament in November 1960 in spite of public opposition. To this day, it remains a mystery whether an alleged mutiny in the 1st Queens Own Nigeria Regiment at Enugu shortly after independence on October 1, perhaps influenced by events in the Congo, played any role in influencing parliament to ratify it. The mutiny was quickly nipped in the bud by British officers and has hardly ever been acknowledged or discussed in Nigeria since then.
However, on January 21, 1962 the pact was suddenly abrogated by the Prime Minister without reference to Cabinet or Parliament. It had initially been proposed by British Defense Minister, Duncan Sandys, in 1958. Driven by the fallout of the 1956 Suez crisis, his motivation was to gain a military base in Kano as an option to those in Cairo, Tripoli and Khartoum. On the domestic front, however, there was little support for either a British military base or over-flying rights. Nonetheless, among Northern People's Congress (NPC) politicians, the utility of British military back-up as a balancing force against the then southern dominated Nigerian Army officer corps and/or Action Group (western region) subversives was key. External factors were also decisive. There were tensions with Ghana's Soviet allied Kwame Nkrumah over policy. Disagreements with France over nuclear tests in the Sahara as well its designs on British Cameroon also loomed large. It was not reassuring that France had a defense pact with Cameroon .
With time, however, internal and external conditions changed. On the British side, new leadership (Harold Watkinson) had emerged in the Defense ministry, new technical breakthroughs had made for longer-range British aircraft, and economic travails did not favor expensive new capital projects. Furthermore, Watkinson felt that other than the base (which Nigeria did not want anyway) all the other components of the pact could be achieved informally. Thus, he reassured his Nigerian counterpart in October 1961 that Britain would not object to the abrogation of the treaty (Idang, Gordon J. "The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement." African Studies Review Bulletin 13, 2 (September 1970): 227-51.). On the Nigerian side, there had been demonstrations on the streets against the pact, rapid Nigerianization of the officer corps was in progress, and the relationship with Cameroon had improved after the British Cameroon plebiscite. Nigeria had also acquired more confidence on the African and world stage and Cold War tensions had eased somewhat. Difficulties with the NPC (Northern)/ NCNC (Eastern) alliance led the Prime Minister (who was a northerner) to seek rapprochement with the opposition Action Group (AG).
The AG had opposed the pact all along in part because Chief Obafemi Awolowo (the Yoruba opposition leader), was reportedly bitter that the British Governor-General allegedly called Tafawa Balewa and asked him to form a government before the final results of the December 1959 elections were in (Ayo Rosiji. Man with Vision by Nina E. Mba. 1992 Spectrum Books). In Action Group (Western regional) circles at that time, there were rumors that the 1958 Constitutional Conference in London might have been placed under covert surveillance and manipulated by British Intelligence and that Nigeria's independence elections may have been rigged.
The day after abrogation, and two weeks before the annual congress of the AG in Jos, Balewa invited the AG to join him in government. Nevertheless, Chief Awolowo (Awo) refused, leading to a split in the Action Group. These events were followed by a failed Ghanaian backed attempt to use civilian militia to overthrow the Balewa government on September 22,1962, a series of crises in the western region and eventually, Nigeria's first successful military coup d'Etat in 1966. Although there was no longer a defense pact, the Balewa government was tipped off about both coups by British sources but reacted to them differently with different results. In 1962, the alleged conspirators were preemptively arrested and charged to court for treasonable felony. Balewa, however, brushed off hints about the second coup. And in the state of confusion that reigned after his abduction on January 15, the refusal of the President of the Senate (Nwafor Orizu, an ethnic Igbo from the NCNC - who was also the acting President) to accept the appointment by the NPC dominated cabinet of an interim Prime Minister (Dipcharima, a northerner) closed whatever option remained to formally invite British troops in (with or without a pact) (Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve. Heinemann Educational Books 2001).
With no constitutional provision for such a move, Orizu chose to 'hand over' under pressure to the Army Chief, Major Gen Ironsi, (also of Igbo origin) allegedly to give him needed authority to put down the mutiny (by junior officers, mainly of Igbo origin). Along with the killings that accompanied the coup, this fateful decision, which Orizu later defended as 'patriotic', ushered in a very bloody chapter in Nigerian history (Nwafor Orizu: Liberty Or Chains — Africa Must Be (Autobiography). Excerpted in Vanguard - Reminiscences; Nigeria's First Military Coup and Why we Handed Over. Sat, 24 Apr 1999 (www.afbis.com/vanguard)). It remains unknown whether the British would have responded to an invitation from Acting Prime Minister Dipcharima in the same way as they did in East Africa two years earlier; but those familiar with the events of that fateful weekend claim the British had already agreed in principle to intervene if invited by proper authority. Interestingly, recently declassified American State department archives show that American intervention was also contemplated in Nigerian government circles before the Senate President 'handed over' to General Ironsi.
It is noteworthy that while every former British colony in Africa was offered a defense treaty at the time of independence, it could have been Awo's feeling that the British had a "secret pact" with the "North" [rather than Nigeria as a whole] that led to his opposition to the 1960 defense treaty, rather than the treaty itself. It is on record that politicians from the Moslem North opposed the initial motion for self-rule brought before the central legislature in March 1953 and subsequently asked Britain to permit the North to secede and form a separate colony. But on August 7, 1953 northern delegates to constitutional talks agreed to a loose federal system, removing one of the obstacles to eventual independence. However, on August 25, 1956, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, again publicly expressed reservations about self-rule in 1959 citing insufficient numbers of trained northern Nigerians (Thomas F. Brady. Self-Rule Delay Urged in Nigeria: Northern Leaders Say They Have Not Enough Trained Native Administrators. New York Times, September 9, 1956.). In his writings, Awolowo projected some of his frustrations with these developments with the phrase: "the problem of the North" (Obafemi Awolowo: Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, London, 1960).
None of this was helped by subsequent rumors that on the eve of the independence celebration, the flag of the northern Sokoto caliphate seized by British troops from Fulani Horsemen in March 1903, was returned in a formal ceremony. Its inscribed motto "Victory is with God alone" is said by some to be the motto not only of the Royal West African Frontier Force but also of the modern Nigerian Army, written in Ajami character. Looking back, whether, had it not been abrogated, the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact of 1960 would have changed Nigeria's political destiny will never be known. But it cannot escape attention that the sympathies of the middle-ranking officers who struck on January 15, 1966 were with the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) - political soul mates of those who opposed the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact of 1960.
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PHILOSOPHY FOR
INDEPENDENT NIGERIA
By
Obafemi Awolowo
A lecture delivered by Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Action Group (AG)
Leader, and Leader of Opposition in the Nigerian Federal
Parliament) to Nigerian Students at Conway Hall, London, on 3rd
September, 1961
Politically, the independence of a country can be viewed from two
angles: the corporate and the individual angle. A country is said to be
free only when it has unqualified control over its internal affairs. On the
other hand, a citizen of an independent country enjoys individual
freedom when he is free to say and do what he likes, subject only to
laws enacted by the freely elected parliament or the popular legislative
assembly of the land. The dependency of a country and the subjection
of its citizens to alien rule are conterminous. But the independence of a
country does not necessarily mean the freedom of its individual
citizens. It all depends on the !form of government. If, for instance, the
form of government is oligarchical, authoritarian, or totalitarian,
individual! freedom will almost invariably be denied to the masses of! the
people. The point must be made, however, that in times of national
crisis or emergency, it is legitimate for the Government to call upon the
citizens to surrender, for the duration, some measure of their individual
freedom, in order that the freedom of the country and its citizens may
be preserved from violation. In a democracy, therefore, and in normal
circumstances, the freedom of a country connotes the freedom of its
individual citizens. Furthermore, when the freedom of a country is
looked at in its complete functional embodiment, it exhibits two
conspicuous and inseparable facets. They are the political and
economic facets. A country can only be said to be truly free and
independent which has these two functional facets co-existing and
cohering in their inseparable absoluteness. I have emphasised the
inseparable nature of these two facets in order to focus attention to the
point that, for a subject people, political freedom is not the end of the
journey or struggle: it is nothing more than a most potent means to the
acquisition and consolidation of the economic and other facets of the
country's freedom. It is, I believe, generally agreed that political
freedom is meaningless unless it goes hand-in-hand with economic
freedom. Anyone who cares to read his history aright will readily concur
that the prime and sole motivation for imperialist predations,
conquests, and rule is economic in character. If the imperialist powers
can accomplish their economic exploitation of the weaker nations
without political control they will much prefer to do it that way. As a
matter of historical fact, colonial expansion began with the division of
the territories of the weaker peoples into economic spheres of
influence. It was when it became clear to the imperialists that economic
control would become precarious unless there was political control as
well, that the latter was imposed. In other words, it is erroneous and
dangerous to assume that the subjection of a country is at an end,
simply because it is politically free. In these modern times, the
economic subjugation of a country does take several, but not easily
perceptible, forms, with the result that many free nations are only
ostensibly so. The economic shackles they wear are heavy and
extremely depressing, but are visible only to the discerning eye. The
influence which a nation exerts, the respect which it enjoys, and the
prestige accorded to it on the world scene, depend on two important
factors: the size of its wealth and the calibre of its leadership. Granting
an incorruptible, courageous, public-spirited, enlightened and dynamic
leadership, the wealth of a nation is the fountain of its strength. The
bigger the wealth, and the more equitable its distribution among the
factors and agencies which have helped to produce it, the greater the
out-flow of the nation's influence and power. There are two intangible
essentials for the attainment as well as the preservation of freedom
(whether national or individual) which must be mentioned. They are the
will on the part of a people to be and remain free, and a recognition
that the subjection or suppression of other peoples is a standing peril
to freedom wherever it may exist. Again, in these modern days the
functions of a Government are multifarious. But the primal ones can
conveniently be classified under two headings:) its duty to the State to
preserve its corporate existence against internal disorder and external
aggression, and ii) its duty to the citizens to cater for their welfare and
promote their happiness. The general well-being of the citizen depends
on objective and subjective factors. He needs a healthy body which
can be reared only on good food, adequate shelter, decent clothing, a
reasonable measure of comfort and luxury, and a whole-some
environment. He needs a sound and cultivated mind which is free to
know and meditate upon the things of its choice. He has natural,
conventional, and legal rights which must be protected and upheld,
with impartiality and inflexible justice, mainly by the appropriate organs
of Government, and partly by the society in which he lives. But, of
course, the citizen owes enormous duties to the State and to his
fellow-citizens, which are regulated and enjoined by customary usages
and the laws of the land. No Government, however, can hope to
discharge its duties to the State and to the citizens satisfactorily or
effectively, unless it is, or at the very least strives continually to be, on
good terms with its immediate neighbours and the rest of the world. At
the same time, it must ensure at home as near a state of equilibrium as
possible among all the citizens, in their legitimate demand for equitable
shares of the national products. In other words, the internal affairs of a
State must be ordered by the Government in such a manner as to
guarantee! social justice and personal security to all, and the external
affairs conducted in such a manner as to promote world peace, and
undiscriminating respects for human dignity in all parts of the world. I
have made these fundamental and, I dare say, self-evident
propositions, because I consider them essential (1) to a proper
understanding of the doings and happenings in Nigeria since October
1, 1960, and (2) to a critical assessment of any proposals which I may
make in the course of this lecture. A good many things have happened
in Nigeria since October 1, 1960.
The first major act of the Government took place on the very day of our
independence. It is an act which in my considered judgement detracts
very seriously from the sovereignty which was that day conferred upon
us. On October 1, 1960, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria
(Viscount Head) and the Prime Minister (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa)
exchanged correspondence, by means of which an agreement was
concluded on that day between Britain and Nigeria. Under this
agreement, Nigeria assumes and undertakes all the rights and
obligations of Britain under any valid international instruments in so far
as they were applicable to Nigeria before the latter's attainment of
independence. These rights and obligations were not spelt out in the
correspondence; and in spite of repeated demands by my colleagues
and myself, the Federal Government has refused to inform the country
of these rights and obligations of Britain which our country assumed
and undertook on the day of her independence. Viscount Head, who by
the way is generally regarded as the ruler of Nigeria, did once volunteer
a public explanation of the agreement in reply to my criticism of it. He
said that the agreement was harmless, and that some of the rights and
obligations assumed and undertaken by Nigeria under it were those
under The Geneva Convention. My own view is that if we would be
party to the Geneva Convention, we must do so in our own right as a
sovereign state, not as Britain's underling or foster child. I have
consistently held the view that this agreement is much more dangerous
than the Anglo—Nigerian Defence Pact. Under the Pact (with which I
will be dealing briefly later), we know exactly what rights and
obligations we have assumed and undertaken. Besides, Nigeria as a
nation is directly a party to it. Under the agreement, the obligations
which we have undertaken are omnibus and undefined, and what is
more, they are all, without exception, Britain's obligations under any
valid international instruments, in so far as they were applicable to us in
the days of our subjection. Now, who is there in the Federal
Government, or among Nigerian politicians and intelligentsia as a
whole, to tell us with candour and unimpeachable accuracy the number
and contents of valid international instruments — both open and secret
— to which, in the days before October 1, 1960, Britain had, on behalf
of herself and of her territories overseas, committed herself? The
Monrovia Conference has been given a good deal of boosting by the
Western Press, and Sir Abubakar has been specially patted on the
back for the part he played in it. This is only to be expected. This
Conference is known to have been inspired and completely financed
by the more important countries of the Western Bloc. Undoubtedly, the
Monrovia Conference had been brought into being as a counter-poise
to the Casablanca Powers which do not appear to find favour with the
Western Powers and their Press. But whatever attitude the Western
Powers and their Press hold, there are outstanding attributes which the
Casablanca Powers possess, but which the Monrovia Powers are still
to demonstrate. First, the freedom of each of the countries which
constitute the Casablanca Powers is not only legally in existence, but
also is being made to be seen in all the country's doings at home and
abroad. Second, the resolutions passed at the Casablanca Conference
are positively constructive, and bear the radical stamp of contemporary
African nationalism at its best. In order to clinch this second point, I
would like to refresh your memories by giving you a summary of some
of the resolutions of each of the two groups of Powers. The resolutions
of the Casablanca Powers include:
1. The setting up of an African High Command.
2. The liquidation of colonial regimes through the liberation of territories
still colonised.
3. The elimination of all forms of racial segregation in African States.
4. The consolidation and defence of the sovereignty of! New African
States.
5. The acceptance of the objective of a political union of Africa, and the
taking of such steps as will lead to the! early attainment of this
objective.
6. The reaffirmation of Africa's non-alignment to any of the two East
and West Blocs.
7. The evacuation of all occupation troops from Africa.
8. The barring of Africa to all nuclear experiments. Those of the
Monrovia Powers include:
1. The recognition of absolute equality of sovereignty of all African
States irrespective of size and population.
2. Each African state has the right to exist and no African state should
try to annex another for any reason.
3. Should any African State desire freely and voluntarily to join with
another State no other African State should stand in its way.
4. All States should respect the principle of non-interference in the
internal and domestic affairs of any African state.
5. Each State should respect the territorial integrity of another State
and should not harbour, within its boundaries, any dissident elements
from another State who might wish to use that State as a base for
carrying out subversive activities against their own State.
6. Any conception of unity entailing the surrender of! sovereignty of any
African State to another is totally unrealistic.
It will be seen that, apart from the fact that the Monrovia Powers lack
the attributes of the Casablanca Powers, the Monrovia resolution are
actuated by fear, and place much, too much, emphasis on the minor
differences between some African nations. Before independence, cur
economy was dominated by Britain and her fellow-members of the
N.A.T.O. Since independence, we have made no effort to relax this
imperialist stranglehold on our economy.
On the contrary, we now throw the doors of our country wide open to
indiscriminate foreign exploitation. Every conceivable inducement is
being given to foreign investors of the Western Bloc to come to Nigeria
to exploit our natural resources in whatever way they choose. The type
of venture, its financial structure, and its location, are left entirely in the
hands of intending foreign investors. The assumption appears to be
that foreign businessmen are so altruistic and philanthropic that their
main concern would be to help the masses of Nigerian people, and not
to enrich themselves at our expense. In seeking foreign aid for our
development, our Government has allowed itself to be led into a blind
alley by its Western masters and mentors.
`Money has no earmark,' so says an old adage which is as true as ever.
But our present Government has so imbibed the prejudices of Britain
that it appears to see the very Devil himself in any foreign currency
other than British or American. It is now eleven months after
independence, and yet our Government has not succeeded in
producing a bold development programme for the prosperity and
happiness of our people, with the result that, economically, we just
drift, and become more and more dependent on foreign aid of a kind!
that is not likely to be in the long-term interest of Nigeria. I understand
— or more precisely the country has been promised by the
Government — that a five-year development programme is in
preparation. The architects of this programme are a Mr. Prasad from
the International Bank Mission and an American from the Ford
Foundation. The United States has promised substantial aid towards
the execution of the programme, but 90 per cent of such aid, I
understand, will be in the form of American goods. As a matter of
interest, it may be mentioned in passing that while Nigeria's proposed
five-year programme is already being studied in Britain and America,
for the past five months or so, even an outline of its contents has not
yet been made known to the Nigerian people or their parliament. In
other words, Sir Abubakar wants to clear the programme with Britain
and America first, before his Government can ever have the courage to
lay it before his fellow-citizens whose lives and fortunes are going to be
affected for good or for evil by the proposed programme. The
Government has also slavishly committed itself to British economic and
political ideals and prejudices. Words like nationalisation, public
ownership of the means of production, or socialism, are to the
Government what the rag is to a bull. The advocacy of the Opposition
for nationalisation
(a) of the Plateau Tin Mines where foreign companies declare as much
as 150 per cent yearly dividend
(b) of the entire mercantile marine operating in Nigeria, and
(c) of insurance businesses, as an interim step, has been roundly
condemned by the Government as heretical and mad. Instead, the
Federal Government has declared that industries shall not be
nationalised in Nigeria beyond the extent to which public utilities are
already public-owned. Before independence the Government of the
Federation was not so scared by the demand for nationalisation as it is
at present. Indeed in a Government publication, first issued in 1956
and reissued in 1958, it was made clear that in the event of any
industry being nationalised, fair compensation would be paid. It would
appear, therefore, that on the issue of nationalisation, which conflicts
with the basic economic ideal of the Western Powers, our present
Government has shown less courage in freedom than its predecessor
had done in bondage. In emulating British political ideals, the
Government has even gone much farther than the Tories of the
deepest dye would approve here in Britain. Up till today, Communist
literature is banned from entering Nigeria. Even though the public has
been told, after pressure from the Opposition, that permission has
been given for the opening of a Russian Embassy in Nigeria, every
obstacle is actually being placed in the way of the Embassy being
opened. The representative of the Russian Government, who has been
in Nigeria for some months now, stays in the Federal Palace Hotel.
Every effort of the Soviet Government to secure accommodation for its
Embassy is being secretly foiled by some countries of the! Western
Bloc with Embassies in Nigeria. I know a Nigerian !businessman who
has been threatened with reprisals by a! Federal Minister for daring to
offer suitable premises to the! Russian Government.
In keeping with the fashion obtaining among newly emergent Asian and
African nations, our Government has put the label of `Neutrality' on its
foreign policy. But our brand of neutrality' is, to all intents and
purposes, sui generis. In our neutrality', we are already militarily
aligned to Britain, and hence indirectly to N.A.T.O. In our `neutrality, we
do everything to prevent the opening of a Russian Embassy in Nigeria
and we do nothing to open one in Moscow ourselves. We proclaim
`neutrality', and yet Chief Okotie-Eboh, Federal Minister of Finance, on
his way to Soviet Russia as the head of our Economic Mission, went to
very great pains to assure an audience of British businessmen and
politicians here in London that though he was going behind the Iron
Curtain, they could rest assured that he was going to return from there
with his natural colour intact and untarnished. We proclaim `neutrality'
and yet the Sardauna of Sokoto, with the express consent of Balewa,
is moving heaven and earth to drag Nigeria into a Commonwealth of
Moslem States.
He has done more. As if the Northern Region is not just an integral
part of the Federation of Nigeria, and as if he is entitled under the
Constitution to pursue a separate foreign policy for the North, he has,
with the open acquiescence of Sir Abubakar, committed the Northern
Region to the Arab side in the Arab-Israeli dispute. We proclaim
`neutrality', and yet we refrain from participating in the Belgrade
Conference of `non-aligned nations'. Our Government's `neutrality' in
foreign affairs must, in the light of events, be said to have been
conceived in deceit and born in hypocrisy. Before I pass on to deal
with matters of purely domestic character, I would like to make one or
two observations. The emergence of Nigeria as an independent nation
was hailed as an event of exceedingly favourable portent for Africa. In
size, population, and natural resources, Nigeria is! indisputably a giant
in Africa. Those African nationalists who, since our independence, have
come to Nigeria for succour and added inspiration, have gone back to
their homes disillusioned and frustrated. The high hopes which were
cherished in Nigeria as an unassailable bastion in the last phase of
Africa's struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism of whatever
nature and guise, are fast receding. Among true African nationalists,
Nigeria, as at present led by our Government, is thoroughly suspect,
and does not enjoy the respect and confidence to which she is entitled
by virtue of her natural potentialities. At home, our pressing problems
not only remain unsolved, but are also not even being tackled with
vision and vigour, nor with the correct ideological orientation.
Education is still in its inchoate stages. The masses hunger after
education but are not being satisfied. In regard to primary education,
the position in the South is good. All children of school-going age are
now in school in the South. But it is very far from being so in the North.
A little over 250,000 children are now receiving primary education in
the North, as against 1.3 million in the East and 1.2 million in the West.
Secondary education ought to be free, but only the well-to-do can
afford to send their children to any post-primary schools. The award of
scholarships tenable in Institutions of Higher Learning, and for
technical and vocational studies, now lags very much behind the
present needs of the country, with the result that many a lustrous talent
is wasting and rotting away either in a soul-depressing job or in an
asylum. The finances of the Federation are being very badly managed.
We are now right on the brink of a balance of payments crisis. Yet,
according to the latest pronouncement by the Federal Minister of
Finance, our imports of consumer goods have increased appreciably;
but as far as is known no visible effort is being made for a big export
drive. I have told the Federal Government, on a number of occasions,
that unless the present adverse trends which. have continued for four
years are checked, Nigeria will, figuratively speaking, one day find
herself in a debtor's prison! Bribery and corruption, especially in high
places, are alarmingly on the increase. A large percentage of monies
which are voted for expenditure on public projects find their way into
the pockets of certain individuals. There is unemployment everywhere.
The standard of living in the country as a whole is very low, and in most
parts of the country the peasantry and the working class wallow in
abject poverty and misery. The cost of living is more or less the same
throughout the country. The fact reflects itself in identical salaries, in
different parts of the Federation, for Ministries and Parliamentarians; for
Government, Mercantile and other employees in the so called upper
brackets and the established grades. But this is unfortunately not the
case with the daily-paid workers and the peasantry who are in the vast
majority. The territorial disparity in their income is extremely and
senselessly wide, constitutes a social injustice of the worst kind, and is
an eloquent evidence of a complete absence of national approach to
the country's problems. Nigerianisation of the different sectors of our
public service moves at an unpatriotically slow pace. But as if this is
not damning enough, the situation is aggravated by the Federal
Government when, as it often does, it applies criteria which have no
regard at all for merit, in the advancement of some Nigerians. The
present dispensation is that, provided your Region of origin is in the
privileged category, and your connections in Government circles are
strong, mediocrity and want of requisite qualifications are no bar to any
high post, even though a number of other Nigerians who are infinitely
better qualified in all respects may be unjustly superseded. Our federal
structure remains unbalanced. The Northern Region bestrides the rest
of the country like a Colossus. As long as this Region remains a unit,
the party in power there, even in a free and fair election, will always
have an electoral advantage over other political parties. But elections in
the North are neither free nor fair. Various iniquitous devices were used
at the 1959 Federal Elections as well as in this year's Northern Region
Elections to ensure victory for the N.P.C. To this end, murders, arsons
and other forms of violence to the person and damage to property
were committed, and ballot papers were illegally distributed to N.P.C.
party faithfuls. I have three books of such ballot papers here with me as
exhibits. On the eve of any elections, opposition parties are precluded
from holding public meetings; mass arrests and imprisonment, with or
without trial, of their members are made; and leaders of such parties
are harassed and sometimes dragged to court on trumped-up charges.
I believe you have all heard of what happened to Messrs Tarka and
Olawoyin, and that you are aware that the Action Group Leader of the
Opposition in the Northern House of Assembly has not, because of
open threat of violence to his person, and the utter destruction of his
house and property, been to his home in Maiduguri since August last
year. Today the N.P.C. rules both the North and the Federation; and yet
its leaders refuse to change the name of the organisation to permit the
admission of Southerners into its membership. But of course the
Sardauna has declared, in his characteristically pompous manner, that
`N.P.C. is Nigeria and Nigeria is N.P.C.' Besides, he has never made
any bones about the fact that the Federation is being run by his loyal
lieutenants who must look to him, from time to time, for direction on
major issues. In actual fact, therefore, the centre of gravity of the
Federation is Kaduna not Lagos; and this degrading state of affairs will
continue so long as the present unbalanced and unusual structure of
our Federation persists. Many irresistible conclusions flow from what I
have so far said. Only some of them need be mentioned. In the first
place, de jure Nigeria is now free from alien rule, yet through the
activities of our Government she is de facto utterly subservient to
British control, direction and undue influence. Secondly, though
fundamental human rights are enshrined in our Constitution, yet the
rights of the commonality count for nought in the Northern Region.
Thirdly, democratic practices and processes are being rapidly
discredited in the Northern Region of Nigeria, simply because the
leaders of the N.P.C. who also rule Nigeria have never believed in a
democratic form of Government. Fourthly, because of the error of
omission of our Government, Nigeria is already beginning to slide in
Africa. African nationalists now look upon our Government as a tool
and a stooge of Western Imperial-ism. Fourthly, the actions of our
Government do not measure up to some of its pronouncements, and
its conduct is far from being guided or influenced by the ideals which
today animate and rule the hearts of the people of Nigeria. Sixthly, our
Government appears to find itself helplessly and hopelessly on an
uncharted sea, in the face of the country's problems.
These questions are now relevant. What do we do to accelerate our
progress on the road to modern development, to arrest the
deteriorating situation with which we are beset, and to retrieve the
integrity, honour and self-respect which true national sovereignty ought
to confer on our country? And, knowing what and what to do, how do
we go about accomplishing them?
There must be many and varied answers to these questions. A good
many have occurred to me, and I now want to pass on to you the more
important ones among them. I do so in tabular form.
1. The Anglo—Nigerian Defence Pact, and the October 1 Agreement
under which we assume and undertake all the rights and obligations of
Britain under valid International instruments, should both be abrogated
forthwith.
2. Every vestige and every channel of the undue influence of Britain
and her allies in and on Nigeria should be totally eradicated. This, in my
view, can be done in three significant ways. First, by the widening of
the circle of our international friendship, and in particular by the
immediate establishment of diplomatic, cultural, trade and other
mutually beneficial relations with Soviet Russia, China, and Eastern
Germany; second, by the progressive but accelerated termination of
our undue economic dependence on British and other Western
Agencies and Business concerns; and third, by the translation or
transformation of Nigeria into a Republic, and by the initiation, at an
early date, of steps to this end.
3. The Federal Government should right now set before the nation welldefined
economic objectives and development programmes which will
be embodied in a successive series of five-year plans. The objectives
and the programme should be sufficiently bold and expansive to fire
the imagination and stimulate afresh the hopes of Nigerians and their
fellow-Africans. To this end three important considerations must be
borne in mind. One, our economic objectives and development
programme must be rooted in and strictly guided by the socialist ideals
of
(a) equal opportunity for all,
(b) equitable distribution of the national products,
(c) the liberty, dignity, and well being of the individual, and
(d) brotherhood among all mankind.
Two, the admission of foreign investment into the country should be
carefully regulated, and channeled in the overall national interests. In
the words of the Report of the Conference on Administrative
Organisation for Economic Development — `To allow all foreign firms to
enter indiscriminately may stifle nascent local enterprise and jeopardize
the balance of economic expansion. It may also rob the country of
valuable sources of income.. . ` In this connection, a comprehensive list
of categories of industries, specifying those that are in the present and
in the near future reserved for the public sector, as well as those that
are, in the short term, reserved for the private sector, should be
prepared. Three, the development of agriculture (its modernization in
every sense of the word) must go hand-in-hand with industrialisation. If
agriculture stagnates, industries will either not grow, or become a bane
to the people.
4. In order that our planned economy may be in the best interest of our
people, a high-powered Economic Planning Commission should be set
up forthwith. This Commission would consist only of qualified Nigerian
economists and public men, and its membership should be full-time.
The Commission, may, from time to time, avail itself of such expatriate
expert advisers as appear to them to be sufficiently well-meaning, and
detached from local business interests. It will be the duty of the
Commission to produce a five-year plan for the Federal Government. It
will assess and appraise the various surveys of our natural and manpower
re-sources, establish priorities, determine the type and the
location of industries, work out and supervise details of the
development programme and the manner of its execution, and make a
periodic review and any necessary modification of the programme.
5. In order to correct the imbalance in our federal structure, more
States or Regions should first and foremost be carved out of the
existing Northern Region. To ensure viability, the North should, as a
first step, be broken into three States — the Middle Belt, the Bornu and
the Northern States. The Mid-West and the C.O.R. States should also
be created as already pro-posed.
6. To ensure the advent and growth of democracy and democratic
practices in the North, the following re-forms should he introduced
without delay: a) Emirs, District heads, Village Heads and Ward Heads,
and other Native Authority functionaries should, from now on, have
nothing at all to do with the maintenance of law and order during
election and on polling day, and should be present at polling stations
and in the polling booths only to cast their votes. b) During elections
(Federal, Regional or Local) there should be no restraint whatsoever on
public meetings. Political parties should be free to hold public meetings
where and when they choose, unless in the interest of law and order
the prescribed authority is of the opinion that meetings of rival political
parties should be regulated by the issue of permits, or by agreement
among local party leaders. For this purpose, the Nigerian Police Force
should be the pre-scribed Authority, and should also be responsible for
maintaining law and order during elections in the Northern Region as
well as in the other parts of the Federation. c) Where suitable buildings
are not available, polling booths with permanent materials should be
erected by the Federal Government. On no account should private
dwelling houses, palaces, or official residences be used as polling
booths or stations. d) Symbols should be painted on all sides of the
Ballot Box, and where this is not possible, they should be pasted on all
sides of the Box by means of a transfer system. All ballot boxes should
be made of steel. e) All Native Authorities shoud be democratised as
has for long been the case in the East and West. Those who operate
the present feudal system in the North and are, from head to toe,
steeped in un-abashed autocracy can never take kindly to the need for,
and the practices of democracy and of a free and fair election.
7. The foreign policy of Nigeria should be independent, and should be
guided by the following principles:
A. In respect to the world in general:
1. The promotion of economic
relations with all nations of the world.
2. Co-operation with all nations
of the world in so far as they respect the ideals for which we stand. 3.
Respect for the sovereignty of nations and non-!interference in their
domestic affairs.
4. The settlement of international disputes by peaceful
negotiations directly or through the agency of the U.N.O.
5. Attraction of foreign assistance (capital, technical skills and training opportunities
for Nigerians) on the most advantageous terms.
6. Lasting world peace through non-involvement in military pacts, discontinuance of the
armament race, and an end to the establishment of military bases on
foreign soil.
7. Respect for the United Nations Charter.
B. In respect to Africa in particular:
1. The immediate and complete freedom and sovereignty of all those
African States which are at present only nominally independent (a) by
the abrogation of any military or defence pact or ties as well as of all
rights and privileges appurtenant to such pact or ties and (b)by the
elimination of undue economic or technical dependence on any single
alien country.
2. The setting of a target date or dates in the very near
future for the complete liberation of all colonial territories wherever they
may be on the Continent of Africa.
3. The immediate termination of the
existence of any military base in any part of Africa and the evacuation
of all occupation troops on the Continent whether they are attached to
specific military bases or not.
4. The mobilisation of all the forces at our command to assist in the immediate extermination of apartheid in South Africa and the restoration to the African in South Africa of his
natural birth rights.
5. The outlawing of any form of discrimination or segregation against the black peoples in particular and Africans in general, in Africa and in other parts of the world.
6. The maintenance and defence of the dignity of the African (particularly black African),
and of the sovereignty of any independent African State against
derogation or violation from any quarter whatsoever.
7. The promotion and establishment of a community of interests among all the peoples
of Africa, and to this end to work assiduously for the realisation of the
ideal of a political union or a confederacy (whichever is practicable in
the prevailing circumstances) among all African States.
8. As a first practical step towards the emergence of an All-Africa political union,
the immediate division of the Continent into Zones.
9. The initiation of steps for the immediate introduction in Zones of a Customs and
monetary union as well as economic, technical, cultural and other
forms of essential co-operation, and the fostering of an early
emergence of a political union among the independent countries
situate within each zone.
10. Non-involvement of all African countries in
the present East—West power politics and struggles as well as nonpartisanship
in the Arab-Israeli dispute and conflict. It is my considered
view that our foreign policy should be bi-partisan, and should be taken
out of the arena of party politics. I have repeatedly made suggestions
to this effect both on the floor of the House of Representatives and
privately to Sir Abubakar, but in vain. There is only one answer to the
second question. In the national interest, all the progressive elements
in the country must come together now, and get themselves ready to
take over the Government of the Federation at the earliest possible
time. We do not have long to wait. Our chance will come in 1964 or
earlier. The life of the present Parliament comes to an end by effluxion
of time in 1964. But Balewa might choose to go to the country much
earlier. And the likelihood cannot be completely ruled out that the
present coalition, which is an enforced association of incompatibles,
might break and collapse under the mounting pressure of public
discontent and indignation.
Whatever happens, 1964 does not appear to me to be too far ahead. In the meantime, it is our duty to mobilise public opinion, and bring it to bear on the Government, to the end that
it shall accept a philosophy of action which springs from and is broadly
based on all the principles, objectives, and proposals which, within the
compass of this lecture, I have sufficiently elaborated. There are many
who are beginning to despair about the future of our great country.
May I reaffirm, in all humility and unshaken faith, that there is no cause
for despair. For, it is to the progressive and radical elements in Nigeria,
whose numbers are rapidly increasing, that the morrow of our
illustrious.
____________________________________________________________
Dear Leye,There you go. I forgot to mention the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact. Obafemi Awolowo (who was a British stooge according to Obi Nwakanma) alerted Nigerians to the evils of that pact, with condition that British troops could be sent to Nigeria at a moments notice, thus annulling military independence, an obvious concordant to political independence. Now Nnamidi Azikiwe (the leading fighter for Nigeria's independence, according to Obi Nwakanma) signed ON on that pact, along with the Prime Minister. Thanks to the "British stooge", the students of the University (we had only one at that time), from all ethnic nationalities rushed to Lagos to demonstrate against the pact and have it rescinded.I keep saying it, the more some folks try to shift blame for Nigeria's failure, the more they force us to reveal the fundamental damage caused from their side of the street.Thanks Prof.Adeniran AdeboyeOn Dec 7, 2012, at 1:16 PM, Leye Ige wrote:
Prof Adeboye,
That Lennox-Boyd had any opinion about anyone must be viewed within the context of what was on ground and not on some highfaluting "anti-colonialist" rhetoric; for what was on ground, what Obi Nwakanma referred to as" given the issues and the circumstances of the day" will determine its value. What then are the "issues and circumstances of the day"?
(1)The period 1952 to 1959 was adjudged to be the "GOLDEN ERA"(politically and economically) of the Western Region when the foundation and pursuit of our development was laid. So, that makes his assessment a reflection of was on ground. What was happening in the Eastern Region at that time?
(2) If there was an "NCNC Training School", it must have been in existence BEFORE Mandela's trip to Nigeria in 1962--unless we are being told the "school started" when he arrived. The question now is: where was the NCNC, the PROPRIETOR of the school, during the resistance to the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact, which was PRECIPITATED by the Leader of Opposition, Awolowo? What "training" were their students engaged in, when its proprietor COLLUDED with the NPC to CHANGE the original terms of the Agreement which PROMPTED Awo to release the ORIGINAL pact which then led to the demonstrations and eventual abrogation.
So, YES, Lennox-Boyd, even as being the colonial superintendent, was REALISTIC in his assessments,"given the issues and the circumstances of the day".
Leye Ige
--- On Fri, 12/7/12, Adeniran Adeboye <aadeboye@mac.com> wrote:
From: Adeniran Adeboye <aadeboye@mac.com>
Subject: Re: [NIgerianWorldForum] Re: NigerianID | FROM THE ARCHIVES: Memo (31st July, 1958) by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for Colonies
To: NIgerianWorldForum@yahoogroups.com
Cc: naijapolitics@yahoogroups.com, naijaintellects@googlegroups.com, igboevents@yahoogroups.com, igboworldforum@yahoogroups.com
Date: Friday, December 7, 2012, 3:29 AMDr. Nwakanma,I will be delighted when you write a post this short and I don't have anything to challenge or correct.1. I urge that you go over what you wrote only a week ago about Azikiwe and Nkrumah.2. Whatever Mbazulike Amechi told you about the NCNC Training School, he did not repeat it in the interview which is the only public document linking him to Mandela.3. You have used the word mentoring in instances where we have ONLY your word for it. In any case, tutoring/mentoring does carry a connotation of a master-ward relationship. I doubt that any of Nkrumah or Mandela would see himself in that light. Mine was not any strategic misreading; your choice of words had a definite inflationary agenda that needed to be punctured.Now on this current contribution of yours, you wrote:Lennox-Boyd whom you now celebrate because he wrote scathingly of Zik would have done Zik great dishonour if he wrote glowingly of him. His comments on Zik is a badge of honor given the issues and the circumstances of the day.Where exactly did you read me celebrating Lennox-Boyd? What you are reacting to is the comment I made when another person blamed Lennox-Boyd's negative account of Azikiwe's leadership as emanating from the Yoruba. I neither approved nor disapproved Lennox-Boyd's account, but I definitely denied his Yorubaness. Is that what you call a celebration?On matters of the appropriate structure for an emerging Nigeria, Awolowo and the AG had subscribed to TRUE FEDERALISM at least 10 years before 1957. You may read Awolowo's "Paths to Nigeria's Freedom" published in 1947. Similarly, Ahmadu Bello and the NPC saw nothing but danger and instability in a unitary arrangement, at the very least since 1953. Therefore, you would be insulting Nnamidi Azikiwe by inferring that he knew of that much community of spirit between the AG and the NPC only suddenly in London in 1957. Given that there wasn't much else over which the AG and the NPC agreed, you should kindly spell out the basis of the "sudden alliance" to which you alluded. By the way, at the same London Constitutional Conference, Awolowo and the AG also felt hemmed-in on matters in which the NPC and the NCNC had an agreement to which the AG could not subscribe. This was particularly the case on the setting of the date for Nigeria's independence.Adeniran AdeboyeOn Dec 6, 2012, at 8:44 PM, Rex Marinus wrote:Dr. Adeboye,
I went to Ukpor and spent a long day interviewing Mbazulike Amechi and that interview was published. I also have a letter written to Amechi by Mandela from that visit. I know exactly what Amechi said about the NCNC Training school, and the work it did. But I'll not detain you here sir; my aim is not to convince you, but to register these testimonies publicly. I'd also like to correct your assertion here: I never told you that Nkrumah was "a ward of Zik at Lincoln" - that is your strategic misreading. I said Zik mentored Nkrumah from 1935 when he arrived Accra to be Editor-in-Chief of the Accra Morning Post. Nkrumah was a Seminarian in a catholic seminary, and was uncertain about his direction Zik secured his admission to Lincoln and gave him the letters of introduction, pointed him on his way. I quoted directly from Ikejiani, who was a contemporary of Nkrumah in Lincoln who who noted Azikiwe's role in directing the West Africans, including Nkrumah to Lincoln, all of whom who met up at Lincoln between 1938 and 1939. Of this group I noted that the Ghanaian K.A.B. Quartey-Jones wrote Azikiwe's first biography published by the Cambridge University Press in 1961. Zik had returned to the contient by 1935 and so Nkrumah could not have been his ward at Lincoln. Again, not to deviate from the original thrust of this debate, Lennox-Boyd whom you now celebrate because he wrote scathingly of Zik would have done Zik great dishonour if he wrote glowingly of him. His comments on Zik is a badge of honor given the issues and the circumstances of the day. It is undeniable that in 1957, the NCNC made what they thought were immediate, short term compromises at the Constitutional Conference in London presided by Lennox-Boyd; but those compromises were made, as Jenkins and Post suggest in the Price of Liberty, because Zik and the NCNC delegation had been hemmed-in by an immediate alliance between the AG and the NPC, which gave Lennox-Boyd great power to set the tone of the negotiations. These facts are the stubborn ones. We must keep our eyes on the ball.
Obi Nwakanma
CC: omoodua@yahoogroups.com; naijapolitics@yahoogroups.com; naijaintellects@googlegroups.com; igboevents@yahoogroups.com; igboworldforum@yahoogroups.com; nigerianworldforum@yahoogroups.com
To: rexmarinus@hotmail.com
From: aadeboye@mac.com
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2012 15:57:26 -0500
Subject: [NIgerianWorldForum] Re: NigerianID | FROM THE ARCHIVES: Memo (31st July, 1958) by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for Colonies
Dr. Nwakanma,I often enjoy your ability to argue, it is the falsity of the material of your argumentation that destroys the value thereof. You have not given any data on this NCNC Training School. There was no such school. Here is what Amechi said:Nelson Mandela was being hotly chased about by the intelligence organizations of Britain and the apartheid government of South Africa; he ran to Nigeria and the NCNC requested me to give him refuge. He stayed with me as my guest for some six months before going back to South Africa where he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment.Only in your characteristic falsification of data does Mandela's stay constitute "training". Meanwhile you go ahead and characterize any disagreement with your agenda as "profound ignorance or mischief". You are amazing! Only recently, you practically characterized Nkrumah as a ward of Azikiwe at Lincoln University before I called it to your attention that Zik had left before Nkrumah got there.
Talking about Nkrumah, Ghana was also one of the places where Mandele and Mugabe spent time hiding from victimization, were they taking lessons from Nkrumah? Gbedema of Ghana spent a lot of time in Lagos, was he attending the NPC training school?I have my own basis for appreciation of many of Azikiwe's activities and contributions, but with your determination to create in him what he never was, you end up diminishing him. If you really need to dress him up in oversize clothing to make him relevant, there must be something else you seek to cover.I have no reason to doubt that the Brits had their own peculiar interests in Nigeria beyond independence and that Ahmadu Bello fitted their design to a T. If Azikiwe was not a veritable British stooge, how did he end up in their camp? And if Awolowo was their darling, how did that work for him?Adeniran AdeboyeOn Dec 6, 2012, at 2:33 PM, Rex Marinus wrote:Mandela for six months was attached at the NCNC training school at Yaba, Lagos in 1962, and lived with Mbazulike Amaechi. On his release from jail, he made the specific request to meet with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, before his trip to Washington. That must be significant, no? But speaking generally, Dr. Adeboye, I'm not sure you know what Mandela negotiated as the basic condition for majority rule in South Africa. The same profound ignorance or mischief shapes your misreading of the negotiations in Nigeria leading to independence. In 1951, Azikiwe and his party, were bound in an agreement with the other parties after the Ibadan conference, to follow more parliamentary means towards indepedence. He was a constitutionalist. This was at the core of his disagrements with the Zikist movement which prefered to initiate an armed struggle. Zik's metaphor of the "platter of gold" basically refered to the fact that Nigeria did not shed the kind of massive blood that could have been unavoidable had the nationalist movement resoorted to the maoist alaternative. Had the Zikist movements "armed struggle" not been strategically stepped down, Nigeria would have been compelled the Mau-Mau example in East Africa with all its sufferings and repercussion. This did not happen in Nigeria even though the British goaded and kept setting traps for the nationalists to take that option, for which many would have been eliminated. It was under Lennox-Boyd that the British colonial office suppressed the evidence of massive killings by the British against the Mau-Mau. Azikiwe basically refered to this, when he said, all told, Nigeria freed itself with relative low loss of life, and thus got its freedom on "a platter of gold." But you do not get it, do you? Yes, Nigerians were freed without firing a shot. That much was true, speaking relatively. So, note my point: there can be no doubt from the tone of Lennox-Boyd's memo about who had the backing of the British and who was opposed by the British. When the conservative Lennox-Boyd known for his right-wing politics even within the Tories speaks in praise of Awo and Balewa, I say, good for them! But we know exactly what it means when an army of occupation praises those who best reflect their mission in the land they occupy and who collaborate with them. Its as simple as that.
CC: naijapolitics@yahoogroups.com; naijaintellects@googlegroups.com; nigerianid@yahoogroups.com; raayiriga@yahoogroups.com; yorubaworld@yahoogroups.com
To: OmoOdua@yahoogroups.com
From: aadeboye@mac.com
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2012 11:27:33 -0500
Subject: NigerianID | FROM THE ARCHIVES: Memo (31st July, 1958) by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for ColoniesDear Prof Leye Ige,Nnamidi Azikiwe gratefully celebrated the "fact" that the British "gave Nigeria independence on a platter of gold". So much the notion that he "led" a fight for independence. I have no idea why Dr. Nwakanma would choose to insult Nelson Mandela who cannot possibly argue that South Africans got their freedom on a platter of gold.Adeniran AdeboyeOn Dec 6, 2012, at 10:44 AM, Leye Ige wrote:
I should tell you, perhaps you do not know, that Alan Lennox-Boyd was colonial secretary. He was minister in charge of the British colonial hodings.
This was CLEARLY stated in the memo that was posted--so this is just stating the obvious.
What did that mean in 1958? His description of Nnamdi Azikiwe in the period in which that assesment was made was a profoundly political statement.
Of course, for crying out loud, he WAS the Secretary of State for colonies!!! Which again was why his views are important!!!
It was the equivalent of the apartheid regime calling Mandela a terrorist in 1987/88 and Buthlezi a "competent and sagacious leader."
NO. Mandela DID NOT accept to work with apartheid's constructs for the "sake of one South Africa"; Mandela DID NOT sabotage "True Federalism" in South Africa; Mandela DID NOT "rework" the ANC as a "Xhosa-based" movement and Mandela CERTAINLY DID NOT base his political ascendancy on "the gods of Africa...."
Lennox-Boyd's memo on Zik and Awo clearly throws light on who had the English bacon.
YES, as we shall soon see below.
Azikiwe was to be dismantled and subverted, and they had tried every trick in the trade, including setting up and funding internal opposition led by Mbadiwe to remove Zik from the leadership of the NCNC. This failed.
An attempt has to be made to "dismantle and subvert" ANY and ALL SERIOUS anti-colonial movement lest colonialism would NOT be what it is/was. BUT, was Zik "dismantled and subverted"? By your own information, Francis Nwokedi was a "double' agent" giving Zik the heads up; the "phalanx of junior Igbo civil servants" were also doing the same thing. YET, Zik ENDED UP DOING EXACTLY WHAT THE BRITISH WANTED--to wit, PREVENTED AG from having National Power, KNOWING FULL well that AG's access to such power will NEGATE the Unitary system being designed thus checkmating the colonial agenda based on PERPETUAL conflict between the various Nationalities in the colony, resulting from internal resistances. Is that your definition of "dismatled and subverted"? There is peace in other colonies,like India, that took care of this Unitarism even after Pakistan left. Zik's idea of the Post-Colonial State fitted PERFECTLY with that of the British. So, why would Britain had to go the extra mile to have Zik by the balls? No political power would give its "operatives" a completely FREE hand. Agents and double agents and triple agents ALWAYS have "handlers". In Zik's case, BECAUSE of the anti-colonial sentiment from DIFFERENT quarters, he had to be held by the balls and his handler had to be the State itself--hence his non-persecution even with ALL available evidence..
Their next move was to create a diversionary minorities crisis in the East, and Azikiwe understood it.
NO. He did NOT because he CLEARLY DENIED the existence of minorities. And here you are CONFIRMING it. So, ALL of the MINORITY AGITATIONS in the East were "DIVERSIONARY"?
He specifically made certain to step aside from the governance of the East
YES, by acceding to the NPC-NCNC Alliance and becoming the Governor-general, ACCORDING to the British Plans.
and made certain that Mbadiwe did not become Premier of the East, and rather chose Okpara, a junior minister, to beat back the British ploy.
Of course, he had "chronic unwillingness to tolerate around him men of independence of mind" AND which was WHY Okpara DILLY-DALLIED on UPGA, which would NOT have materialized had Akintola NOT decimated the Yoruba NCNC.
The Brits had Awo's back. He was one of their stooges. So what else do you expect Alan Lennox-Boyd to say?
The Brits wanted a UNITARY STATE, so did Zik and NPC. Awo wanted a FEDERAL STATE, with REGIONS for all, including MINORITIES, which you are still insisting are "diversionary". And Lennox-Boyd COMPLAINED about this AG/Awo's position.
To cite Alan Lennox-Boyd is an insult on the memory of the nationalists, but I guess a generation has come with neither a knowledge of the truth and reality of the anti-colonial struggle, nor the implication of some of the issues invoved in the crucial years of the struggle, to be point that inheritors of Nigerian freedom now swear by Alan Lennox-Boyd. Indeed, how ironic.
Ironic, indeed. When the citation EXPOSES your limitations and REAL conduct in the struggle, then it must be "non-knowledge". ONLY your own account is acceptable and permissible.
So, then, let us go back to Boyd's assesment, and see by the light of subsequent events, and let us tell the truth about who could not in the end "tolerate around him men of independence of mind." Recently, in an essay in the Vanguard, Dec. 4, 2012, Philip Asiodu, describing the high calibre of the Civil service of his era wrote: "One must also give due credit to the competence and resourcefulness of the Regions' Civil Services, particularly the Eastern Region Civil Service."
(1)BUT the Civil Service of the Western Region, under Simeon Adebo was adjudged the BEST in Africa.
(2) If INDEED Phillip Asiodu was indeed given such a high regard, WHY did Biafra and Biafranistas DENOUNCE the rejection of the Aburi Accord, of which Asiodu was a MAJOR player?
This statement destroys Alan-Boyd's assesment of the Eastern Region under Azikiwe as "run-down."
NO. It reinforces it.
Azikiwe's bold economic programs became copied by all the regions.
Na wah. So where were the "FIRSTS" in Africa. But it is NOT necessary to go into all of these, lest it becomes "diversionary". It is what is called "aarun oju".
In fact in a letter to Ikejiani on November 17, 1966, Azikiwe wrote the following: "coming back to Eastern Nigeria, I am perfectly justified in asking certain pertinent questions: ... where were these wandering scholars when it was regarded as a political crime to make Eastern Nigeria a bastion of political stability and bulwark of economic self-sufficiency? Did not some of these authorities criticize my Finance Law of 1956, which is now the bedrock of Nigerian fiscal practice?" What was Zik talking about, and how does it challenge the colonial fiction retailed by Lennox-Boyd in support of his Nigerian minions?
Zik was talking about the government of the Alliance. And Lennox-Boyds' opinion of the NPC was well stated. Hence, Zik found himself as a "one-eyed man in a community of the blind". It would be nice to compare his "1956 Finance Law, which is now the bedrock of Nigerian fiscal practice" with what the opposition had to say about it as well as the opposition's alternatives. BUT NOT HERE; for it would be another diversion from the interrogation of the anti-colonial narrative and Zik's EXACT ROLE.
Just this, that Eastern Nigeria from 1954 - 1964, grew faster and more prosperous than any region in Nigeria.
Oh yea? Even if we take this statement at face value, WHY WAS THERE VIGOROUS MIGRATION from the "more prosperous" to the "less prosperous"? Methinks simple economics will attract more to the "more prosperous"?
That is where the facts are really stubborn. No self-respecting Nigerian reading the Secretary of the Colonies under colonialism calling Balewa sagacious and Awolowo's western Nigeria as "competent" and Azikiwe's East "run-down" can fail to see whom the British did not want to come to power, and whom they backed.
The British themselves stated OPENLY whom and which Party they DID NOT want in power. So, there is NO NEED to start chasing shadows. The answer is ALREADY there--- by ALL of their accounts, they DID NOT want the AG, and Zik WORKED for them.
Coming out to Nigeria in 1956, the young Harold Smith was clearly oriented and aligned with the colonial offices's policy and rhetoric. That is the stuborn fact.
This is stating the obvious, for Harold Smith DID NOT hide his being a civil servant in the colonial administration. Therefore it is NOT the year of participation that matters, BUT the DEPTH. After-all, NO ONE in this debate was an ACTUAL participant--but we have all determined to what DEPTHS we will be engaged in the entire process, in all ramifications.
Leye Ige
--- On Thu, 12/6/12, Rex Marinus <rexmarinus@hotmail.com> wrote:
From: Rex Marinus <rexmarinus@hotmail.com>
Subject: RE: [NaijaPolitics] FROM THE ARCHIVES: Memo (31st July, 1958) by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for Colonies
To: naijapolitics@yahoogroups.com, naijaintellects@googlegroups.com, omoodua@yahoogroups.com, nigerianid@yahoogroups.com, raayiriga@yahoogroups.com
Date: Thursday, December 6, 2012, 6:00 AM
Dr. Aluko, facts? so Alan Lennox-Boyd is now your arbiter of truth on matters of Nigeria? How classic and how ironic. I should tell you, perhaps you do not know, that Alan Lennox-Boyd was colonial secretary. He was minister in charge of the British colonial hodings. What did that mean in 1958? His description of Nnamdi Azikiwe in the period in which that assesment was made was a profoundly political statement. It was the equivalent of the apartheid regime calling Mandela a terrorist in 1987/88 and Buthlezi a "competent and sagacious leader." Lennox-Boyd's memo on Zik and Awo clearly throws light on who had the English bacon. Azikiwe was to be dismantled and subverted, and they had tried every trick in the trade, including setting up and funding internal opposition led by Mbadiwe to remove Zik from the leadership of the NCNC. This failed. Their next move was to create a diversionary minorities crisis in the East, and Azikiwe understood it. He specifically made certain to step aside from the governance of the East and made certain that Mbadiwe did not become Premier of the East, and rather chose Okpara, a junior minister, to beat back the British ploy. The Brits had Awo's back. He was one of their stooges. So what else do you expect Alan Lennox-Boyd to say? To cite Alan Lennox-Boyd is an insult on the memory of the nationalists, but I guess a generation has come with neither a knowledge of the truth and reality of the anti-colonial struggle, nor the implication of some of the issues invoved in the crucial years of the struggle, to be point that inheritors of Nigerian freedom now swear by Alan Lennox-Boyd. Indeed, how ironic.
So, then, let us go back to Boyd's assesment, and see by the light of subsequent events, and let us tell the truth about who could not in the end "tolerate around him men of independence of mind." Recently, in an essay in the Vanguard, Dec. 4, 2012, Philip Asiodu, describing the high calibre of the Civil service of his era wrote: "One must also give due credit to the competence and resourcefulness of the Regions' Civil Services, particularly the Eastern Region Civil Service." This statement destroys Alan-Boyd's assesment of the Eastern Region under Azikiwe as "run-down." Azikiwe's bold economic programs became copied by all the regions. In fact in a letter to Ikejiani on November 17, 1966, Azikiwe wrote the following: "coming back to Eastern Nigeria, I am perfectly justified in asking certain pertinent questions: ... where were these wandering scholars when it was regarded as a political crime to make Eastern Nigeria a bastion of political stability and bulwark of economic self-sufficiency? Did not some of these authorities criticize my Finance Law of 1956, which is now the bedrock of Nigerian fiscal practice?" What was Zik talking about, and how does it challenge the colonial fiction retailed by Lennox-Boyd in support of his Nigerian minions? Just this, that Eastern Nigeria from 1954 - 1964, grew faster and more prosperous than any region in Nigeria. That is where the facts are really stubborn. No self-respecting Nigerian reading the Secretary of the Colonies under colonialism calling Balewa sagacious and Awolowo's western Nigeria as "competent" and Azikiwe's East "run-down" can fail to see whom the British did not want to come to power, and whom they backed. Coming out to Nigeria in 1956, the young Harold Smith was clearly oriented and aligned with the colonial offices's policy and rhetoric. That is the stuborn fact.
Obi Nwakanma
To: NaijaPolitics@yahoogroups.com; naijaintellects@googlegroups.com; OmoOdua@yahoogroups.com; nigerianID@yahoogroups.com; Raayiriga@yahoogroups.com
From: alukome@gmail.com
Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2012 02:20:27 +0100
Subject: [NaijaPolitics] FROM THE ARCHIVES: Memo (31st July, 1958) by Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for Colonies
My People:
Facts are stubborn.....Bolaji Aluko
SOME BACKGROUND: NIGERIA 1950-1959http://www.ngex.com/personalities/voices/baluko1950.htm
1950
Aminu Kano forms first Northern political party: Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU)
Census of Lagos
1951
The Macpherson Federal Constitution is introduced 1952
National census taken: count - 29 million Nigerians
1953
Enahoro moves (in March 1953) resolution in the House of Representatives for attainment of self-governance of Nigeria "in 1956". North is unwilling, preferring "as soon as practicable."
May: riots break out in Kano during campaign for self-government
Macpherson Constitution revised in London in July and August
Council of Rivers Chiefs replaces Ijo Rivers People's League (formed between 1941-52) and continues agitation for creation of distinct Rivers province.
December: Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State movement formed in Uyo1954
More revisions of the Macpherson Constitution in London and Lagos; becomes effective October 1, 1954; Sir John Macpherson becomes first Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria Federal House of Representatives elections October - December
1956
Oil discovered by Shell-BP in Nigeria in January 1956 at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta; later in the year at Afam, Bomu & Ebubu (in Ogoniland)
1957
March 6: Ghana becomes independent May/June: Nigeria London Constitutional Conference.
Independence unanimously proposed for a date unspecified in 1959, but "not later than April 2, 1960"
August 30: Alhaji Tafawa Balewa forms first all-Nigeria Federal Executive Council; he is Prime Minister
September 25: Willink Minorities Commission set up
This year:
Nigeria establishes (in Western Nigeria) first television station in Africa
1958
August 18: Willink Commission publishes report
September/October: Resumed Constitutional Conference in London announces October 1, 1960 as Independence date
First oil field came on stream producing 5,100 bpd1959
Promulgation of Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance
Northern Region becomes self-governing March 15 (East and West were already self-governing since 1957)
March: State visit of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson
July 1: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) established
August 29: Balewa appointed first Prime Minister of the Federation
December 12: Federal Elections
December 15: Akintola appointed Premier of Western Nigeria to succeed Awolowo who is to become Leader of the Opposition in the new Federal Legislature
December 20: NPC/NCNC forms coalition Federal Government, with Balewa as first elected Prime Minister of the Federation
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________A Memorandum on Nigeria's Constitutional Conference (1957-1958)and Background to the Willink CommissionBy Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies (1954-1959), United Kingdom
SECRET
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
Printed for the Cabinet. July 1958
C. (58) 171 Copy No.
31st July, 1958.
CABINET
NIGERIA
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
The Nigeria Constitutional Conference, which adjourned in June 1957 to
await the reports of certain Commissions to whose establishment it had agreed,
will resume in London on 29th September. Its composition will be much as before:
there will be 70 to 80 Nigerian delegates and advisers broadly representative of
Nigerian opinion as a whole. The Conference is likely to last most of October.
The 1957 Conference
2. At the 1957 Conference I agreed to the creation of an office of Federal
Prime Minister and to an all-Nigerian Federal Council of Ministers presided over
by the Governor-General, whose members would be appointed by the Governor-
General on the Prime Minister^ recommendation. The United Kingdom interest
was secured by the agreement of the Conference that the Governor-General should
retain until independence his general reserved powers to act without consulting his
Ministers or against their advice, and his responsibility, in his discretion, for external
affairs and defence, for the use of and operational control of the Police and for the
Federal Public Service.
3. It was also agreed, in fulfilment of the undertaking given by my
predecessor in 1953, that the Eastern and Western Regions should be granted
Regional self-government. This mainly involved the withdrawal of the general
reserved and discretionary powers of the Governors of these Regions. Largely
because of the obvious possibilities of abuse of power by inexperienced
Governments I obtained agreement to the distribution of some of the powers
previously held by the Governor among independent bodies such as the Public
and Judicial Service Commissions, and to the inclusion in the Regional
constitutions of safeguards for the integrity of certain other organs of government.
It was also agreed that the Governor-General should be empowered to intervene
if a self-governing Region threatened the functioning of the Federal Government
or the continuance of federation. In addition constitutional changes were agreed
for the Southern Cameroons and the Northern Region. The Northern
representatives said they did not want Regional self-government until 1959.
The Present Position
4. Most of the changes agreed were brought into effect last August. The
leader in the Federal Legislature of the Northern People's Congress, Alhaji
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, became the first Federal Prime Minister and sought to
create a " national" Government to work for early independence by including in
his team Ministers from the Action Group, who are the dominant Party in the
West but weak in the Federal Legislature, in addition to members of the National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), the major Party in the East,
and of his own Party, the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.). The Prime Minister
is sagacious and able and relations between him and the Governor-General are
frank and cordial. He is openly anti-Communist, he is under no illusions about the
difficulties of the task facing both himself and the country, and his policy is likely
to be as pro-Western as the narrow Muslim outlook of his principal Northern
supporters will allow. (In his Party hierarchy he is only deputy to the leader, the
vain and pompous Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the Northern Region.) His
Government, however, has been only a moderate success. Because the fortunes
of the Federal Ministers are closely bound up with those of the main Regional
Parties from which they come they have not always found it possible to develop
a true Federal outlook, and where these Regional interests have clashed the
Ministers have sometimes been content to record disagreement.
5. In the West the grant of Regional self-government has on balance been
justified. The Action Group Government, led by the Premier, Chief Awolowo,
have proved reasonable and competent administrators and, although with the
steady run-down of the cadre of overseas officers there is bound to be some decline
in standards of administration, the advanced educational programme of the Region
should in time provide sufficient replacements. The Premier aspires to national
leadership and has to this end formed a close alliance with the principal Opposition
elements in the North and East.
6. In the East government has seriously run down. Dr. Azikiwe (" Zik "),
leader of the N.C.N.C. remains in power as the personification of Ibo tribalism,
but his chronic unwillingness to tolerate around him men of independence of mind
has brought into being a Regional Executive Council, almost all of whom are
nonentities. Some of the Federal Ministers drawn from his Party, notably
Dr. Mbadiwe, have recently lost their posts through constant but so far ineffective
warfare against his personal dictatorship of party affairs. His star may be on the
wane. At present he has no serious rival as leader of the Ibos, who are much the
largest race in the Region, and although it would be much healthier for Nigeria
if his hand were removed from the helm, the time has passed when Her Majesty's
Government could take any effective action to hasten this process. He must be
left to the disillusionment of his own people.
7. The vast Northern Region is still well behind the others in " progress."
Two-thirds of its 18 million people are strict Muslims, accepting the authority of
their Emirs. Educational progress is still slow and there is no prospect for a
generation of the Region being able to replace from its own resources the overseas
officers who have served them so well. The North fears and dislikes the more
educated Southerners and if they were not economically bound to the Federation
would be glad to be quit of it. The Emirs have for the most part recognised that
they must come to terms with democracy and support the party at present in power,
the N.P.C. The Premier, the Sardauna of Sokoto, is himself of a princely family.
The Public Services
8. Since the East and West became self-governing the overseas officers there
have been entitled to retire with lump-sum compensation. This will be the position
in the North when it attains Regional self-government next year and in the Federal
Public Service on the attainment of independence. The premature retirement of
experienced overseas officers is the gravest single threat Nigeria faces to the
continuance of good government. A Colonial Office representative visited Nigeria
earlier this year to enquire into means of meeting this threat. A White Paper is
being published this week setting out the proposals put to the Nigerian Governments
as a result of his mission and of their response. The Federal and Northern
Governments have broadly endorsed the proposals and this should go some way
to encouraging officers in their services to remain. The East and West contemplate
applying the proposals to selected officers only and from these Regions the exodus
will no doubt continue. At best and whatever efforts are made, overseas officers
in Nigeria are now a wasting asset.
Prospects for the Conference
(a) The Problem of Minorities
9. At last year's Conference the minority Parties forcibly represented their
fears of exploitation after self-government by the majority Parties, with their mainly
tribal and religious bases, and pressed for the setting up of separate States of their
own. After bitter discussion I was invited to appoint a Commission to enquire
into the question. The Commission, under the Chairmanship of Sir Henry Willink,
is about to submit its Report, which will be the main item of the resumed
Conference agenda. It will recommend no new States; some of its proposals are
likely to provoke fierce controversy. The Action Group, which seeks national
power as the champion of minorities everywhere, will probably express
dissatisfaction and continue to fight for new States as a main plank in its platform
for next year's Federal elections.
(b) The Police
10. Either "in connection with the question of minorities or as a separate item
there will probably be renewed pressure, which I shall resist, for the bulk of the
Federal Police to be divided up into separate Regional forces.
(c) Fiscal Questions
11. Dissatisfaction over the existing division of revenue between the
Federation and the Regions and over the powers to raise revenue led last year to
the appointment of a Fiscal Commission. The report of this Commission, of which
Sir Jeremy Raisman was Chairman, is about to be published and will be considered
by the Conference. It is unlikely to prove a major bone of contention.
(d) Self-government for the Northern Region
12. The Northern Regional Government have informed me that they wish
to be granted Regional self-government from the 15th March, 1959. In accordance
with my predecessors undertaking, I am bound to accede to this request. The
pattern of self-government in the East and West will largely be followed but because
of the backwardness of the Northern Region I shall try—I cannot put it higher—
to retain some greater powers for the Governor than those retained by the
Governors of the East and West, and to obtain assurances about the incidence of
Muslim law and the retention of much of the present structure of the Provincial
Administration.
(e) The Question of Independence
13. At last year's Conference I was pressed by all Parties to agree to
independence first in 1959 and then, when this was seen to be impracticable, on the
specific date of 2nd April, 1960. After a series of discussions I gave an undertaking
in the following form: —
" I understand that it is proposed that some time about January 1960 the
new Nigerian Parliament will debate a resolution asking Her Majesty's
Government to agree to full self-government within the Commonwealth by a
date in 1960 which will have been mentioned in the resolution . . . . on
receipt of your resolution Her Majesty's Government will consider it with
sympathy and will then be prepared to fix a date when they would accede to
the request. We could not at this stage give any undertaking that the date
would be the same date as asked for in the resolution, though we would do
our utmost to meet the resolution in a reasonable and practicable manner
. . . . Her Majesty's Government would of course be very much guided in
their choice of a date by the way everything was going, by how the two Regions
now about to enjoy Regional self-government had taken the strain of this great
step forward, and by how the country as a whole had faced up to the problems
of minorities, on which a Commission would already have reported."
The Nigerian delegations expressed their disappointment but did not reject
this undertaking and informed me that they would revert to the demand for
independence on 2nd April, 1960. The Prime Ministers " national " Government
was formed to work for independence on this date and at the coming Conference
I shall be under renewed pressure to accede to the date with or without conditions,
or at least to go some way beyond the undertaking given last year.
14. I propose to reaffirm last year's undertaking but not to go beyond it.
The weaknesses in the North and East that I have described are likely over
the next year or two to become more pronounced as overseas officers begin to
leave the North after Regional Government next March and as the exodus from
the East continues. The " national" Government at the Centre has developed
no national outlook or community of interest. I understand that at the Federal
elections late next year the Northern People's Congress and the N.C.N.C. (who
are normally kept apart by mutual suspicion and by Northern dislike of
Dr. Azikiwe), alarmed by the determination and organising ability of the Action
Group, are likely to combine to keep the Action Group out of power. Such a
combination would offer no great reassurance for competent or courageous Federal
Government. The tribal divisions that remain in Nigeria are so deep that the
unity and stability of the country cannot yet be taken for granted. All these are
reasons for going slowly. But in view of the decline in the number of overseas
officers in post and of the mounting pressure for early independence, the freedom
of action left to Her Majesty's Government is small if Nigerian goodwill is to be
maintained. I cannot go back on the undertaking I gave last year but it is in my
view essential that, before making the final decision to give independence, Her
Majesty's Government should be able to assure itself that the new Federal
Government elected late in 1959 can properly claim to represent majority opinion
in the country and has a reasonable prospect of maintaining the unity and stability
of the country.
15. If this undertaking is strictly adhered to it is unlikely, even if all goes well,
that independence could come as early as April 1960. Provided that a competent
Federal Government is formed late in 1959 there will need to be final discussions
between this Government and Her Majesty's Government early in 1960 and then
the drafting and passage of legislation here, so that the second half of 1960 seems
the earliest practicable time for independence to come. I expect to have informal
talks with the Federal Prime Minister before the coming Conference and I shall
discuss this question with him.
The Trust Territory of the British Cameroons
16. The Northern British Cameroons is administered as part of the Northern
Region and has always declared itself content so to remain. The Southern
Cameroons has its own Government which to date has been financially dependent
on the Federal Government and has ultimately been responsible to the Governor-
General. The recommendations of the Fiscal Commission are likely to give the
Southern Cameroons a fair measure of financial independence and their
representatives are committed to asking at the coming Conference for full Regional
self-government. With Nigerian independence approaching, this small Government
must quickly learn to stand on its own feet and I propose to agree to a substantial
increase in its responsibilities but probably not at present to full internal
self-government on the model of the major Regions.
17. Before Nigeria becomes independent the people of the British Cameroons
will have to make known their wishes for their future. The United Nations
Mission, which is making a regular visit to the British and French Cameroons
later this year, is being asked to consider the procedure for consulting the people
of the British Cameroons. I hope that as a result of their recommendations there
will be separate popular consultations (probably by plebiscite) in the North and
South early in 1960, and that we shall be able to ensure that the choice put to the
people is one between joining an independent Nigeria and continuing under
Trusteeship pending a final decision about their future. There is little doubt that
the Northern British Cameroons will choose to stay as part of the Northern Region.
The choice of the Southern Cameroons is less certain. The Parties supporting
the present Government are in favour of becoming a separate Region in an
independent Nigeria: the main Opposition party is in favour of continuation of
Trusteeship with an eye to joining up with the French Cameroons in time.
18. I invite my colleagues to note the present position and seek their
concurrence in the course outlined above. The Conference may well be a difficult
and possibly a stormy one.
A. L.-B.
Colonial Office, S.W. 1.
29th July, 1958.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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