Dear Reader:
Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds is the fifth installment in the National Intelligence
Council's series aimed at providing a framework for thinking about the future. As with previous
editions, we hope that this report will stimulate strategic thinking by identifying critical trends and
potential discontinuities. We distinguish between megatrends, those factors that will likely occur
under any scenario, and game-changers, critical variables whose trajectories are far less certain.
Finally, as our appreciation of the diversity and complexity of various factors has grown, we have
increased our attention to scenarios or alternative worlds we might face.
We are at a critical juncture in human history, which could lead to widely contrasting futures.
It is our contention that the future is not set in stone, but is malleable, the result of an interplay
among megatrends, game-changers and, above all, human agency. Our effort is to encourage
decisionmakers—whether in government or outside—to think and plan for the long term so that
negative futures do not occur and positive ones have a better chance of unfolding.
I would like to point out several innovations in Global Trends 2030. This volume starts with a look
back at the four previous Global Trends reports. We were buoyed by the overall positive review in the
study we commissioned, but cognizant too of the scope for needed changes, which we have tried to
incorporate in this volume.
Our aim has been to make this effort as collaborative as possible, believing that a diversity of
perspectives enriches the work. We have reached out to experts far beyond Washington, D.C. We
have held numerous meetings, many in universities, in Indiana, Texas, California, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Colorado, Tennessee, New York, and New Jersey.
We also sponsored a public blog which featured blog posts and comments by experts on key themes
discussed in Global Trends 2030. The blog had over 140 posts and over 200 comments. As of
mid-October, it had 71,000 hits and had been viewed by readers in 167 different countries. To ensure
that the blog posts can continue to be consulted, we are linking them to the web and e-book versions
of the final published report.
We expanded our engagement overseas by holding meetings on the initial draft in close to 20
countries. Many times this was at the invitation of governments, businesses, universities, or think
tanks. One beneficial outcome of the NIC's quadrennial efforts has been the growing interest
elsewhere in global trends, including elaboration by others on their own works, which we
encourage. Because of the widespread interest in how Global Trends 2030 is seen elsewhere, we
have detailed the reactions of our international experts to the initial draft in a special box following
the introduction.
In this volume, we expanded our coverage of disruptive technologies, devoting a separate section
to it in the work. To accomplish that, we engaged with research scientists at DoE laboratories at
Sandia, Oak Ridge, and NASA in addition to entrepreneurs and consultants in Silicon Valley and Santa
Fe. We have also devoted strong attention to economic factors and the nexus of technology and
economic growth.
Finally, this volume contains a chapter on the potential trajectories for the US role in the international
system. Previous editions were criticized—particularly by overseas readers—for not discussing at
greater length the US impact on future international relations. We believe that the United States also
stands at a critical juncture; we have devoted a chapter to delineating possible future directions and
their impact on the broader evolution of the international system.
Scores of people contributed to the preparation of Global Trends 2030, and we have sought to
acknowledge the key contributors from outside the NIC in a separate entry. Within the NIC, Counselor
Mathew Burrows was our principal author in addition to orchestrating the entire process from
beginning to end. He was assisted by Elizabeth Arens as senior editor; Luke Baldwin, who established
the first-ever NIC blog; Erin Cromer, who oversaw logistical support; and Jacob Eastham and Anne
Carlyle Lindsay, who created the design. Dr. Burrows worked closely with regional and functional
National Intelligence Officers, who reviewed and contributed to the draft. Among NIC offices, the
NIC's Strategic Futures Group under Director Cas Yost rates special mention for its participation across
the board in Global Trends-related work. I would especially like to acknowledge the work of the late
senior analyst Christopher Decker who provided critical help with the forecasts on global health and
pandemics before his untimely death.
I encourage readers to review the complete set of Global Trends 2030 documents, which can be
possible scenario simulations using the interactive material. We also have published the work in an
e-book format so readers can download it for their use on a tablet. These formats are available for
downloading from our website.
As with our previous Global Trends studies, we hope this report stimulates dialogue on the challenges
that will confront the global community during the next 15-20 years—and positive and peaceful ways
to meet them.
Sincerely,
Christopher Kojm,
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
In Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria have the
potential to approach or surpass South Africa in
overall national power, but the key will be better
governance to further economic growth and social
and human development. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam's
regional power will grow, approaching by 2030,
Thailand. Vietnam benefits from a steady growth
in GDP per capita while Thailand has been subject
to erratic, drop-and-surge GDP per-capita-growth
patterns. In Latin America, the next 15 years probably
will confirm Brazil's position as the "colossus of the
South," increasing its position relative to Mexico and
Colombia—despite these countries' overall good
growth prospects. In Europe, Germany is likely
to remain the leader of the other 26 EU countries
because of its economic growth prospects, but will
be challenged by an aging population. By 2030 Russia
faces a steep population drop—about 10 million
people—a greater decline than any other country
during that time frame. However, depending on its
economic growth rates and immigration, Russia could
retain its current global power share.
Footnote: b Goldman Sachs' Next Eleven consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, The Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, and
Vietnam.
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Page 18
countries at high risk of state failure
| Rank | 2008 | 2030 |
| 1 | Burundi | Somalia |
| 2 | Yemen | Burundi |
| 3 | Somalia | Yemen |
| 4 | Afghanistan | Uganda |
| 5 | Uganda | Afghanistan |
| 6 | Malawi | Malawi |
| 7 | Dem. Rep. of Congo | Dem. Rep. of Congo |
| 8 | Kenya | Kenya |
| 9 | Haiti | Nigeria |
| 10 | Ethiopia | Niger |
| 11 | Bangladesh | Pakistan |
| 12 | Pakistan | Chad |
| 13 | Nigeria | Haiti |
| 14 | Niger | Ethiopia |
| 15 | Chad | Bangladesh |
Source: Sandia National Laboratories
Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories are
developing a Human Resilience Index (HRI ) to
provide tools that help explore the links among
human ecological conditions, human resilience, and
conflict. Seven indicators are used to calculate the
HRI : population growth rate, population density,
caloric intake per capita, renewable fresh water
per capita, arable land per capita, median age,
and population health (including infant and child
mortality and life expectancy). The table above
lists countries that are projected to have a high risk
of instability, conflict, or some other type of state
failure in 2030 because of their poor human ecology
and resilience.
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page 25
Nigeria is a good example of potential upside and
downside risks from migration for many aspiring states.
Nigeria's increasingly favorable demographic conditions
offer it the opportunity to escape from the economic
stagnation it has seen in the post-Independence period.
If it collects its demographic dividend in full, it could
see per capita incomes treble by 2030, lifting 80
million people out of poverty. Part of that economic
success would involve experiencing continued high
levels of migration as young Nigerians immigrate to
acquire or hone their skills abroad before returning
to join the growing middle class and contribute to the
economic miracle at home. Policy failure, in contrast,
could lead to a demographic disaster, with economic
underperformance and enhanced risks of strife and
conflict, creating substantially increased incentives
to migrate.
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page 26
THE WORLD AS URBAN
In a tectonic shift, today's roughly 50-percent urban
population (3.5 billion urban of the world's 7.1 billion
people) will almost certainly climb to near 60 percent
(4.9 billion of the world's projected 8.3 billion), a
sharp contrast to the largely rural world of 1950,
when roughly 30 percent (750 million) of the world's
2.5 billion were estimated to be urban residents.
Between now and 2030, demographers expect urban
population to grow most rapidly where rates of
population growth are highest and where the urban
proportion of the population remains relatively low, in
Sub-Saharan Africa (now 37-percent urban) and Asia
(near 50 percent)—two regions currently on disparate
economic paths. According to the UN, between 2011
and 2030, there will be an additional urban population
of 276 million in China and 218 million in India,
which will together account for 37 percent of the total
increase for urban population in 2030. Nine additional
countries are projected to contribute 26 percent of
the urban growth, with increases ranging from 22
million to 76 million. The countries are: Bangladesh,
Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the US.
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Page 41
A CRISIS PRONE GLOBAL ECONOMY
| Type | Status | Trendline | Impacts on Global Economy |
| Advanced Economies | The 2008 crisis and its long "tail" raise the prospect of an extended crisis undermining the social and political fabric in many Western countries, leading to potentially destabilizing effects. | To compensate for slowing labor force growth, Western countries will need to rely on growth in productivity. Even the slowly growing labor force may not be fully employed because of external competition, particularly among low-skill workers. One billion workers from developing countries are likely to be added to the global labor pool. In Europe, economic and fiscal issues are entwined with decisions on the EU's future, making potential solutions more complex because of the multiplicity of actors and political concerns. | The declining weight of US and other Western countries and growing multipolarity enhances fragility of the global economy. Absent a hegemonic power or strong global governance mechanisms, risks increase in this multipolar environment for major economic powers to focus on domestic imperatives without regarding the impact on others. |
| Emerging Powers | In the coming decades, not only will the big emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil make relative economic gains, but Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and potentially Nigeria also will make their marks. | To avoid the middle-income trap, China will need to transition to a more consumer-driven and knowledge-intensive economy, involving difficult political and social reforms. India faces similar problems and traps accompanying rapid growth, but New Delhi benefits from having democracy as a safety valve and a more youthful demographic profile. China and India are vulnerable to the volatility of key resources. | The health of the global economy will increasingly be linked to how well the developing world does— more so than the traditional West. The assumption of more global responsibilities in both political and economic spheres by emerging powers will be critical to ensure a stable global economic outlook. |
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Page 43
CRUNCH TIME TOO FOR THE
EMERGING POWERS
Most of the emerging economies weathered the 2008
financial crisis well. In the coming decade, we will
probably witness not only relative economic gains
by China, India, and Brazil, but also the increasing
importance of emerging regional players such as
Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, South
Korea, Mexico, and Turkey. However, developing
countries will face their own challenges, especially in
continuing the momentum behind their rapid growth.
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Page 48
Countries in the Awkward Mid-Range
If we use Polity's 20-point scalea and define the
awkward mid-range between autocracy and democracy
as scores between five and 15 (with autocracy below
five and democracy above 15), currently about 50
countries qualify as falling into this major risk group.
Most countries remain below a more consolidated
democratic level of 18 or above, suggesting that even
in 2030, many countries will still be zig-zagging their
way through the complicated democratization process.
The greatest number of countries in the mid-range
in 2030 is likely to be in Sub-Saharan Africa (23 of 45
countries), followed by Asia (17 of 59 total, including
five of the 11 Southeast Asian countries and four of
the nine Central Asian ones), then the Middle East
and North Africa (11 out of 16).a Recent events in the
Middle East/Levant confirm the region's vulnerability
to the governance transition risk, which is likely to be
playing out to 2030.
Footnote page 50: a The full list of mid-range, vulnerable countries is Algeria, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Laos,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Micronesia, Morocco, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria,
Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao
Tome, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga,
Tunisia, Uganda, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
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Page 81
Technological advances in the developed world
might reduce demand for African hydrocarbons and
other minerals. The high petroleum prices of recent
years enjoyed by oil-dependent economies such as
Angola and Nigeria might not continue. On the other
hand, Africa was largely insulated from the shock of
recent international financial crises because African
borrowing from private lenders is limited.
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Page 121 ff
Marx Updated for the 21st Century
The breakup of the EU a couple years ago was a classic case of Marxist inevitability. In a sense, what we saw was a transposition of the class struggle onto a larger regional landscape with northern Europeans in the role of exploitative bourgeoisie and the Mediterranean South the defenseless proletariat......
Page 124
Nigeria is virtually split with the Christian communities under siege in the North. The
transposition of the class conflict along sectarian, tribal, and ethnic lines in Africa means the
old "colonialist" map has been virtually torn up. By my count, there are ten new countries on
the African continent alone. In the Middle East, we now have a Kurdistan, carved out from
several countries. Winston Churchill and Gertrude Bell—architects of a united Iraq after
World War I—would be spinning in their graves. Of course, the West and China have yet
to recognize many of these partitions. They are like ostriches with their heads in the sand.
There's too much veneration for those so-called "venerable statesmen" who drew up the old
imperialist maps in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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Page 136
We visited several African countries to gain reactions to
the draft. In South Africa, in addition to meetings with
government officials, we held meetings with the South
Africa Institute of International Affairs and Institute of
Security Studies. In Nigeria, we met with government
officials and were hosted by the Ken Nnamani Centre,
the Centre for Democracy and Development, the
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and the
Centre for the Study of Economies of African (CSE A).
In Kenya, we briefed the President's National Security
Advisory Committee and met with the Kenya Institute
for Public Policy Research and Analysis and UN Habitat
offices. In Ethiopia, Dr. Martin Kimai, Director of Conflict
Early Warning and Response Mechanism, organized
a discussion on the draft. The Global Futures Forum
hosted a meeting in Botswana, which we attended,
that gathered together technology practitioners from
around the continent. In Brazil, we met with the Institute
Fernando Cardoso, Instituto de Pesquisa de Relacoes
Internacionaios, IBM Research Brazil, and Fapsep
Foundation.
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