Moreover, just reflect on what happened in Jos under Governor Jang. Surely, the governor has done some good things but is that the kind of exemplary leadership that one would expect from the Middle Belt? I visited a part of Jos that was predominantly Muslim and realized that the roads were neglected. I know this has to do with the religious tension but this can easily become a vicious circle.
One critical way of showing a viable alternative to the current system where Middle Belt people feel marginalized is to demonstrate when they are in power that they will govern differently (justice, fairness, inclusiveness and accountability) and anyone who cares would have to acknowledge that. I have heard many people express their disappointment with governor Jang. His government became what some political scientists call "personal rule." His son became very powerful in the government. It became at some point like a family affair. And all this happened in spite of Governor Jang claiming that he is an ordained minister. How about that? I feel sad that many of the problems of lack of accountability and of the weak being oppressed by the powerful that are common in the broader Nigerian society are also common among Middle Belt people, who see themselves as victims.
But as Moses documented in his book "colonialism by proxy" to me, what happened during that period shows how even Black people can dehumanize each other. They do not need Eurocentrism to do that. IN one part of the book, Moses quoted a traditional chief working with the colonial officer, asserting during a visit to one of the administrative outpost, "Ga Shanun Mu Su na Zuwa" i.e., when he saw the local people coming to see the traditional ruler and the colonial officer and often based on films I watched of those days, the local people will bow down, the traditional ruler said "There are our cattle coming" when he saw them. The colonial officer documented that. It is terrible to hear that and when I read it, I felt that simply because I am Black, it is no guarantee that I am inherently incapable of dehumanizing another person who is Black and Nigerian.
I am a minority and I am saying this out of experience. The Chairman of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Bauchi State at one point was a minority person and will fit the Middle Belt categorization. But when he was given large sums of money by one of the past governors of Bauchi state, CAN lost any relevance it terms of holding the government accountable.
"The Fulani were a small landless group of austere mystics who bade their time to capture power in a well-orchestrated coup d'état. It soon came to be called a "Jihad" and a "revolution". Some of them took the flag to Ilorin. The story of the betrayal of the Ore Ana Kakanfo by Alimi is history.
I come from the Middle Belt and no doubt harbor my own biases. What I can tell you, however, that what is happening in Jos Plateau, Southern Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba, Benue, Kogi and other places has no precedent in history, The Fulani have become the armed mobile wing of the New Jihad, a Jihad of conquest, subjugation and humiliation." Obadiah Mailafia
There are two historical and sociological inaccuracies in the above excerpt that I simply can't ignore. The notion that the rise of the Alimi ruling dynasty in Ilorin is a direct outgrowth of the Usman Danfodio Jihad is one unregenerate historical fallacy that has invidiously outlasted its shelf life, thanks to repeated mentions and lack of sustained rebuttals.
Insights from the late Professor Abdullahi Smith's writings (which are distilled from translations of the travel notes of Arab travelers who witnessed events in nineteenth-century "Nigeria") tell us that the Ilorin jihad wasn't a direct offshoot of the Usman Dan Fodio jihad. Alimi, the progenitor of the current ruling family in Ilorin, was an itinerant Fulani preacher in Yoruba land whom Afonja volitionally invited to Ilorin. Afonja wanted Alimi to be his spiritual guardian (or "Alfa") to ward off what he thought were the machinations of the Alaafin of Oyo with whom he was locked in long-drawn-out supremacy battles. After settling in Ilorin, many of Alimi's Yoruba students from different parts of Yoruba land decided to follow him to his new home. In time, Alimi grew so popular that Afonja feared that he would eclipse him, so he asked Alimi to leave. It was Alimi's students, most of whom were Yoruba, that fought and defeated Afonja.
This upheaval was coeval with, perhaps even inspired by, but was by no means the direct consequence of, the Usman Dan Fodio jihad. There is no greater evidence for this than the fact that Alimi and his disciples were not given the "flag" of the Sokoto Jihad until after at least three visits to Sokoto. They weren't given the flag because they weren't directly connected to the Sokoto jihad. They had to convince the people in Sokoto that although they were not affiliated with the original jihad, they had established a Muslim state in Ilorin, which deserved the recognition and blessing of the emergent epicenter of what would become the Caliphate.
Second, the notion that "The Fulani have become the armed mobile wing of the New Jihad, a Jihad of conquest, subjugation and humiliation" is an unhelpful conflation of ethnicity and religion that is not grounded in the wispiest shred of sociological evidence. Such a conflation assumes that a Fulani is invariably a Muslim and that his actions and inactions are, ipso facto, animated by Muslim expansionist impulses. That's an intensely problematic assumption.
Many, perhaps most, Fulani herders who have sanguinary confrontations with farmers in the Middle Belt and elsewhere are neither Muslims nor Christians, and those that are Muslims aren't affiliated with nor are they inserted into the currents of global Islamic expansionist consciousness. They are simply cattle herders who clash with farmers irrespective of the ethnicity and religious identity of the farmers. They have perennial clashes with Hausa Muslim farmers in the extreme north. They also clash with (Muslim) Yoruba farmers, and so on. (Recall Buhari's wrongheaded intervention in the bloody clashes between Fulani herders and Yoruba farmers in the Oke-Ogun area of Oyo state, who are mostly Muslims, sometime in October 2000?).
In my part of Borgu, which is over 90 percent Muslim, clashes between farmers and pastoral Fulani habitually escalate into the kind of sanguinary fury that drenches the land with blood. Interestingly, Christian missionary evangelization has been more successful with Christianizing Fulani cattle herders in Borgu than it has been with sedentary ethnic groups in the area (See, for instance, Paul A. Burkwall's 1987 MA thesis titled "Application of the Homogeneous Unit Principle as an Initial Strategy for Christian Ministry to the Fulbe with Particular Reference to Church Growth among the Korakube Fulbe of Nigeria and Benin.")
The pastoral Fulani's primary loyalty isn't to any religion; it is to his cattle. I know the average northern Nigerian is experientially programmed to appropriate social realities from religious lenses, but you're doing a disservice to public intellection to conflate the aggressions of the pastoral Fulani with the nineteenth-century Fulani jihad—or with global Jihad. That's a wild interpretive stretch. As several scholars who have studied the pastoral Fulani have pointed out, the pastoral Fulanis' allegiance is first to the welfare and fertility of their cattle before anything else. Attributing Jihadi motivations to what is essentially an existential imperative is profoundly unsociological.
--Farooq A. Kperogi, Ph.D.Assistant Professor of Journalism & Emerging Media
School of Communication & Media
Kennesaw State University
402 Bartow Avenue, MD 2207Social Science Building 22 Room 5092Kennesaw, Georgia, USA 30144
Cell: (+1) 404-573-9697
Personal website: www.farooqkperogi.comTwitter: @farooqkperogAuthor of Glocal English: The Changing Face and Forms of Nigerian English in a Global World
"The nice thing about pessimism is that you are constantly being either proven right or pleasantly surprised." G. F. WillOn Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 9:00 AM, John Mbaku <jmbaku@weber.edu> wrote:Moses:I did, indeed, misquote you. I was in a hurry and should have read your post more carefully. Thanks for your understanding. It is true that many nomadic herdsmen around the world have been convinced to come to terms with changing environmental conditions in their communities and adopt other ways of making a living. Nevertheless, the methods used to achieve those results have been less coercive and top-down than what is currently taking place in many countries in West Africa, including Nigeria. Perhaps, Nigeria could lead from Kenya's and Tanzania's ongoing efforts to work with their nomadic peoples.--On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 6:10 PM, Moses Ebe Ochonu <meochonu@gmail.com> wrote:Professor MbakuYou misread me. Permit me to quote the entire sentence from which you excerpted your phrase: "I am from the Middle Belt myself and I can't see any of those people surrendering their lands willingly for the Fulani to occupy or graze their cattle on.""Any of those people[s]" obviously refers to Middle Belt peoples, the people of my area, not to the Fulani as you surmised.The context of my submission is the ongoing proposals for the creation of grazing reserves and/or grazing routes in the Middle Belt for the nomadic Fulani, a proposal that Middle Belt peoples vehemently reject. You don't try to solve one problem by creating another. The Middle Belt is already too volatile as it is.The challenge, in my opinion, is how to persuade the nomadic Fulani to give up their anachronistic nomadic grazing culture and adopt what Murtala Nyako, himself a Fulani and a former governor, advocates, and what has now been adopted worldwide by herding peoples: ranching.The insistence on continuing a nomadic livestyle in a climate-changed 21st century world that is clearly unsuited to it is the root of the problem.--On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 4:25 PM, Jibrin Ibrahim <jibo72@gmail.com> wrote:MosesPosted below is the old column you referred to. I definitely do not agree that this complex issue can be reduced to an Islamist plot.JiboThe Fulani Question in West Africa
Jibrin Ibrahim, Daily Trust, 5th December 2011
Last week, it was reported that at least 5,000 people have fled villages in Benue and Nassarawa states following clashes between nomadic Fulani cattle herders and sedentary farmers. At least five people were reported to have been killed in the fighting. The reports however indicated that there could be far more deaths in remote villages that are difficult to reach. The fighting began when Fulani cattle herders found some of their livestock dead, said Conrad Wergba, Benue state's information commissioner. The cattle herders retaliated by attacking villages of the Tiv ethnic group in both Benue and Nasarawa states. It is a recurring problem throughout West Africa when cattle belonging to the Fulani destroy crops belonging to farmers who in turn kill cattle and attack the Fulanis.
A combination of factors based on climate change and poor governance are at the base of the problem. As the northern part of West Africa dries up due to climate change, the land can no longer support the animal stocks in the Sahel where grazing demands creates further fragility of the ecosystem and pushing the desert southwards. Since the only useful land to herders is south of the desert, they move their herds toward the agricultural areas of the sedentary farmers. Naturally, crops destroyed by animals are a source of tension for farmers who struggle to grow enough food to feed themselves in an unforgiving environment.
The Fulani, also called Peul or Fulbe, are an idiom for a much wider problem because they are found all over West Africa, from Lake Chad to the Atlantic coast, with concentrations in Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Cameroon, Senegal, and Niger. Given this dispersion of Fulani groups, the Fulani interact with each other as herders and farmers. The typical Fulani are nomads, but after many years of integration with other cultures, and the depletion of their herds to environmental conditions, they sometimes rely on farming for livelihood. The nomads make temporary camps of portable huts, exchanging dairy produce for cereal foods; cattle are rarely killed for meat.
They are victims of the pulse model. The pulse model is used by archeologists to describe the tendency of the Sahara desert to "move" South over thousands of years, having socio-economic impacts on the peoples living in its path. The receding amounts of open water mean smaller "microenvironments" and greater contact between people seeking the same resource. The competition means that the increased contact results in increased conflict.
The conflicts are most serious in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso where many sedentary groups have also been forced to relocate due to the process of desertification. In these countries, the corporate identity established by such groups through years of sedentary is being disturbed by the process of desertification. Movement of the desert southwards is forcing communities to relocate, and this is indirectly causing conflict.
During the colonial era, cattle routes were protected and nomadic groups had secure routes through which they passed. The breakdown of governance in the region has meant that these routes have now for the most part been cultivated and it is becoming impossible to move animals without trespassing cultivated land.
In Ghana, there has been rising tensions between farming communities and nomadic Fulani pastoralists since 2009. These tensions over the years has degenerated into worse forms of homicides, evictions, increased stereotypes among others in most communities of the Ashanti (Agogo and Konongo) Brong-Ahafo, Northern, Upper East and West, Volta and Eastern regions. These regions have conducive vegetations for cattle rearing but have recently been abused by the pastoralists. Peasant communities have risen against Fulani pastoralist threatening to forcefully evict them from their communities. The trigger for increased violence and attempted evictions is the widespread belief that former Fulani herdsmen who have lost their cattle are now engaged in armed robbery. The sudden rise of armed robbery has traumatised Ghanaians and the result is a backlash against the Fulani.
Currently, some district assemblies in East and Central Gonja and Agogo districts have proposed two either the forced eviction of the Fulanis of "pastoralist ID Cards that would allow security agencies distinguish local pastoralists from their rogue brethren who might come in and attack from other districts. Of course the Fulani have refused both discriminatory acts of expulsion or of tagging and dividing them in a context in which no other group is being subjected to this form of identification. Meanwhile, tension continues to grow between the Fulani and their neighbours as insecurity grows.
The issue is becoming a genuinely West African problem because some communities have expelled Fulanis and there have been retaliatory attacks not just in Ghana but also attacks against Ghanaians by Fulani in other West African countries. The tactic of forceful eviction of Fulani pastoralists by sedentary communities is currently spreading in some parts of Plateau State and in Southern Kaduna. It is a dangerous development because it can lead to generalised civil war in many countries in West Africa.
Things are not looking too good for the Fulanis in their historic heartland in Guinea. Guinea is a country with a history of brutal dictatorship which has created deep scars related to ethnic victimization and discrimination. From the 16th and 17th century, the Fulani conquest of the Dialokas has created memories of ethnic oppression. From 1958, the 26 year reign of terror by President Sekou Toure led to the massacre of Fulani leaders and their marginalisation from power. The Fulanis turned from victims to collaborators of power wielders from 1984 to 2009 during the Lanssana Conte dictatorship and there were repetitive massacres and economic spoliation against the Malinke.
Once again, the tables have turned since the election of Alpha Conde to power. Given his radical background in the opposition movement and the fact that he had not been part of any previous regime, there was a lot of hope that Alpha Conde would came down ethnic tensions. Unfortunately, his actions have revealed his beep involvement in ethnic politics. The composition of his government is marked by his Malinke ethnic base and he appeared to have jettisoned the broad ethnic alliance that brought him to power following the first round of the elections when he emerged second to Celou Dallen, the Fulani leader. Currently, he is suspected of pursuing an agenda of establishing a one party state following his insistence that the parties that allied with him to defeat the Fulani candidate should dissolve themselves into his party. In a meeting with political leaders from Fouta Djallon, he publicly declared that there was no need for political reconciliation in the country.
It seems to me that the core problem that is exacerbating the Fulani question in West Africa is the inability of our governments to address the governance of pastoral routes and manage the ecosystem in a way in which farmers and pastoralists benefit from each other rather than fight. ECOWAS has a role in mapping a way forward.
On Sep 24, 2015, at 7:05 PM, Moses Ebe Ochonu <meochonu@gmail.com> wrote:Obadiah,I would not dismiss the academic perspectives completely, but I commend you for bringing a refreshingly non-formulaic approach to bear on the issue at hand. Jibrin Ibrahim wrote a column on this issue a while ago and his perspectives complement yours. One of the things he stressed, if my recollection is right, is the push impact of desertification and the expansion of the Saharan shore. I think that problem is pushing nomadic herding communities southwards, increasing pressure on land in the Nigerian/West African Savannah, and exacerbating clashes between farmers and pastoral Fulani.I don't think you solve that problem by displacing or forcing sedentary/farming communities to give up land to accommodate the pastoralists. That's why all the talk about creating grazing reserves and grazing routes skirts the main issue and raises the question of who is going to willingly give up their land to build the reserves or to serve as route for the Fulani's cattle? I am from the Middle Belt myself and I can't see any of those people surrendering their lands willingly for the Fulani to occupy or graze their cattle on.There is also something that Jibo brought up that is pertinent: the fact that increasingly, the livelihood of the Fulani is being threatened by aridity, shortage of grazing land, and increase in agricultural acreage due to increase in population. The result is that many young Fulani have actually left the pastoral economy and have now become mercenaries--fighters and terrorists for hire. Some have even become cattle rustlers, as military operations in the Northwest and cattle recoveries have revealed. This, for me, is the most dangerous dimension of the problem.The sight of Fulani cattle herders in the bush with AK-47s is a tragic game changer. Clearly, these are not our grandparents' Fulani herders. These new groups have other agendas. I heard from many credible sources that the governor of Nasarawa State hired and armed some nomadic Fulani groups to attack and weaken the Eggon, the single biggest ethnic group in the state whose prominent politicians were/are his rivals. Once armed, these Fulani mercenaries moonlighted by raiding many communities outside the Eggon area and as far as Tivland and the Agata areas of Benue State.Some of these Fulani gangs are outright bandits, raiding villages for treasure and killing sedentary peoples to make way for herders. There is a method to what is going on--it is not random.These Fulani groups, whether they are herders or not, are now all armed with sophisticated weapons and no one is talking about disarming them. That is a huge problem. They've become a menacing sight across the country. Initially, they claimed that they carried these weapons to protect their herds from rustlers, but clearly there is now a coordinated agenda on their part of emptying lands that herding and non-herding Fulani can move into. They want to forcefully rebuild their threatened lifestyle on the backs and corpses of communities they regard as infidels and existential threats.I read somewhere recently that many Fulani mineral prospectors have swarmed the Berom areas that have been deserted or depopulated by the raids of herdsmen. The Fulani, it is said, are now mining the many minerals in these areas and selling their finds directly to the Chinese, a growing, lucrative, underground mineral sector that is now said to be fueling the attacks on berom communities by bands of Fulani gunmen.I agree about the need for some sort of Enclosure Law, but not the type passed in Europe. The Fulani need to to be told clearly that given the competition for farmlands, changing animal husbandry practices, the expansion of the Sahara, etc, their nomadic herding lifestyle is no longer sustainable and has become unsuitable to the imperative of peace and national cohesion.They also need to be educated that sedentary herding and a fixed cattle economy is actually much more lucrative than a nomadic one that brings herders into constant conflict and is actually a decaying enterprise. Already, many of the children of these herders are choosing other vocations either because they no longer have cattle to herd or because they find the life too harsh and the lure of non-herding vocations too strong to resist. Nomadic herding is a vanishing lifestyle all over the world, and it is high time the Fulani in Nigeria are persuaded to adopt ranching as a more viable, more lucrative cattle culture.On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 4:55 AM, Oluwatoyin Adepoju <toyinkaidara@gmail.com> wrote:John Mbaku,You might want to take your message to the Nigerian and international comnmnunities who insist, that in relation to the problems Nigeria and other countries faces with Fulani herdsmen, group dynamics is not defined in terms of individuals forming a group and using the group to engage in criminal activities.The group- the Fulani- and their lifestyle- nomadic animal husbandry- are what shape the culture of the individuals within those groups.The crisis being faced in West Africa with the Fulani herdsmen makes them notorious as far as South Eastern Nigeria and Ghana.No other pastoralist group has such a reputation in relation to pastoralism in Nigeria.When does your claim to your right to graze your cattle across broad territory interfere with my property rights?- is a framing of the situation that reflects the reality.If you want to make a strong case, you could engage the references I linked in my last post along with the horde of references describing the problem which greet the person whop Googles 'Fulani herdsmen'.Resorting to logic to try to wish away a stark and well known social reality wont do the job.toyinOn 23 September 2015 at 18:42, John Mbaku <jmbaku@weber.edu> wrote:Sorry, but this changes nothing. Hold individuals responsible for their criminal activities--if the individuals form a group and use the group to engage in criminal activities for the benefit of the group so formed, then prosecute the members of that particular group. All over the world where they are pastoralists and farmers, you are bound to have a conflict--we see it in Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Senegal, northern Ghana, northern Cameroon and parts of the North West Region of Cameroon, northern Uganda, and parts of Côte d'Ivoire and in several countries in Asia and Latin America. The problem is of one of property rights--if you want to educate yourself on the problem, read books on the history of property rights in colonial Nigeria. Stop demonizing ethnic groups in Nigeria. This solves nothing.On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 7:32 AM, Oluwatoyin Adepoju <toyinkaidara@gmail.com> wrote:toyinIt involves clear historical facts which can be verified by a simple Google search, for example, for "Fulani herdsmen", a search that will reveal the age and scope of the problem in Nigeria and the fact that it extends beyond Nigeria and is so recognised beyond her borders, by both affected African communities and research groups beyond Africa.This issue is too well know in Nigeria to require much flogging.The issue is about population numbers in relation to occupation.All Fulani dont need to be enaged in nomadic husbandry for nomadic husbandry to be recognised as a central occupation among the Fulani.Thanks Mbaku.I believe you are getting it wrong, although I needed to qualify my statements.One can also address claims of some powerful Fulani working agst the resultion of the problems without claimg that all Fulani are involved.Such a Google search brings up this paper, for example-linked and attached-which helps to make clear the specificity and scope of information on this subject in the public domain-
"Between Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen : Organised Crime and Insecurity in Nigeria" by Bolaji Omitola.Such a search also brings up this summation from the Wikipedia page on the Fulani-
"The Fulani are traditionally a nomadic, pastoralist trading people. They herd cattle, goats and sheep across the vast dry hinterlands of their domain, keeping somewhat separate from the local agricultural populations. They are the largest nomadic ethnic group in the world, and inhabit several territories over an area larger in size than the continental United States.In virtually every area of West Africa, where the nomadic Fulɓe reside, there has been an increasing trend of conflicts between farmers (sedentary) and grazier (pastoral nomadic). There have been numerous such cases on the Jos Plateau, Bamenda Highlands, Central/Middle Belt regions of Nigeria, Northern Burkina Faso, and Southern Chad. The rearing of cattle is a principal activity in four of Cameroon's ten administrative regions as well as three other provinces with herding on a lesser scale, throughout the North and Central regions of Nigeria, as well as the entire Sahel and Sudan region.[25
For decades there have been intermittent skirmishes between the Bororo (graziers) and sedentary farmers, such as the Jukun, Tiv, Chamba, Bamileke, and sometimes even the Hausa. Such conflicts usually begin when cattle have strayed into farmlands and destroyed crops. Thousands of Fulani have been forced to migrate from their traditional homelands in the Sahel, to areas further south, because of increasing encroachment of Saharan desertification. Nigeria alone loses 2,168 square kilometers of cattle rangeland and cropland every year to desertification, posing serious threats to the livelihoods of about 20 million people.[25]
Recurrent droughts have meant that a lot of traditional herding families have been forced to give up their nomadic way of life, losing a sense of their identity in the process. Increasing urbanization has also meant that a lot of traditional Fulani grazing lands have been taken for developmental purposes, or forcefully converted into farmlands.[26] These actions often result in violent attacks and reprisal counterattacks being exchanged between the Fulani, who feel their way of life and survival are being threatened, and other populations who often feel aggrieved from loss of farm produce even if the lands they farm on were initially barren and uncultivated.
Fulani in Nigeria have often requested for the development of exclusive grazing reserves, to curb conflicts.[27] All the leading presidential aspirants of previous elections seeking Fulɓe votes have made several of such failed promises in their campaigns. Discussions among government officials, traditional rulers, and Fulani leaders on the welfare of the pastoralists have always centered on requests and pledges for protecting grazing spaces and cattle passages. The growing pressure from Ardo'en (the Fulani community leaders) for the salvation of what is left of the customary grazing land has caused some state governments with large populations of herders (such as Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau, and Kaduna) to include in their development plans the reactivation and preservation of grazing reserves. Quick to grasp the desperation of cattle-keepers for land, the administrators have instituted a Grazing Reserve Committee to find a lasting solution to the rapid depletion of grazing land resources in Nigeria.[28]
The Fulani believe that the expansion of the grazing reserves will boost livestock population, lessen the difficulty of herding, reduce seasonal migration, and enhance the interaction among farmers, pastoralists, and rural dwellers. Despite these expectations, grazing reserves are not within the reach of about three-quarters of the nomadic Fulani in Nigeria, who number in the millions, and about sixty percent of migrant pastoralists who use the existing grazing reserves keep to the same reserves every year. The number and the distribution of the grazing reserves in Nigeria range from insufficient to severely insufficient for Fulani livestock. In countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso where meat supplies are entirely dependent on the Fulani, such conflicts lead to scarcity and hikes in animal protein prices. In recent times, the Nigerian senate and other lawmakers have been bitterly divided in attempts to pass bills on grazing lands and migration "corridors" for Fulani herdsmen. This was mainly due to Southern and Central Nigerian lawmakers opposing the proposal, and Northern Lawmakers being in support.[28] Fulani are involved in Communal conflicts in Nigeria."
The claims of these passages are supported by references linked by the nos visible in the passages.
As for the accounts from Plateau and Benue State, regardless of the various sides to the issue, based on the information I have got from following this story for some years and observing the increasing militarisation of Fulani herdsmen and recent reports, with pictures, of their renewed onslaught, I give credence to the claim that they are on an ethnic cleansing mission and land grab mission in one or both of those states.
The abduction of Olu Falae, a central Yoruba politician and and technocrat, ascribed to Fulani herdsmen, is still unfolding.
I would have taken the trouble to marshall evidence from the past 5-10 years and the various efforts to respond to it from various sections of Nigerian society, evidence that demonstrates the problem stems from the insistence on an anachronistic form of animal husbandry by members of a particular ethnic group, but it might not be necessary now for me to devote time to that.I would be open to examining evidence to the contrary in relation to the claims I am making.thanks
On 23 September 2015 at 10:49, Ugo Nwokeji <ugo@berkeley.edu> wrote:Well-said, Professor Mbaku.
This sort of stereotyping is simply unacceptable, apart from being misleading and dangerous. Period.UgoG. Ugo NwokejiDirector, Center for African StudiesAssociate Professor of African American Studies
University of California, Berkeley
686 Barrows Hall #2572
Berkeley, CA 94720
Tel. (510) 542-8140
Fax (510) 642-0318Twitter: @UgoNwokejiFacebook: facebook.com/ugo.nwokejiOn Tue, Sep 22, 2015 at 12:23 PM, John Mbaku <jmbaku@weber.edu> wrote:Dear Toyin: You wrote:Here is my reply:The systemic character of the problem is suggested by the debate over the right of the Fulani herdsmen to maintain this lifestyle or adopt fixed husbandry and the claim that the land allocated for this purpose in the North has been distributed by politicians.Its a systemic problem, not simply the actions of a few.This situation is described as being made more problematic by the strength of Fulani in Nigerian politics, centrally placed Fulani being described ass working agst the resolution of these problems.Secondly, the Platue situation is a case of one ethnic group working in a systematic process agst others.In the first instance, nomadic husbandry is a group lifestyle, lived by a group, not by few members of that group.In both cases, group social identity and lifestyle are at play, not the actions of few individuals.The second question has to do with charges of ethnic cleansing by Fulani in Platue state..With reference to more specfioc issues involving the Fulani in Nigeria, a central problem between Fulani herdsmen and other Nigerians has to do with their insistence on nomadic husbandry in world of sedentary communities, leading to frequent clashes with landowners, and resulting deaths and other forms of devastation.I am sorry, but I disagree with what you write above. I am quite familiar with the Fulani, not only in Nigeria, but also in Cameroon and other countries in West Africa. It is true that a lot of Fulani are engaged in nomadic husbandry. Nevertheless, not all Fulani are so engaged. Even if they were, there is no evidence that the entire Fulani group in Nigeria is united behind the criminal activities undertaken by some of their members. To ascribe the activities of some individuals to an entire group is not only disingenuous but also a very dangerous way to approach inter-ethnic relations. Demonizing the Fulani is not an effective way to resolve the problems that currently plague Jos and surrounding areas. I am sorry, but what you write above does not fully explain what is happening in Jos and the Plateau State. The conflict in Jos is complex and requires a much more holistic analysis that what you present above.On Tue, Sep 22, 2015 at 10:18 AM, Oluwatoyin Adepoju <toyinkaidara@gmail.com> wrote:toyinthanksThe systemic character of the problem is suggested by the debate over the right of the Fulani herdsmen to maintain this lifestyle or adopt fixed husbandry and the claim that the land allocated for this purpose in the North has been distributed by politicians.Its a systemic problem, not simply the actions of a few.This situation is described as being made more problematic by the strength of Fulani in Nigerian politics, centrally placed Fulani being described ass working agst the resolution of these problems.Secondly, the Platue situation is a case of one ethnic group working in a systematic process agst others.In the first instance, nomadic husbandry is a group lifestyle, lived by a group, not by few members of that group.In both cases, group social identity and lifestyle are at play, not the actions of few individuals.The second question has to do with charges of ethnic cleansing by Fulani in Platue state..John,With reference to more specfioc issues involving the Fulani in Nigeria, a central problem between Fulani herdsmen and other Nigerians has to do with their insistence on nomadic husbandry in world of sedentary communities, leading to frequent clashes with landowners, and resulting deaths and other forms of devastation.On 22 September 2015 at 15:42, John Mbaku <jmbaku@weber.edu> wrote:I am afraid I do not understand this claim about the Fulani. Why are the Fulani being held responsible for the actions of a few people? Individuals, and not the "tribes" or "ethnic groups" that they belong to, should be held responsible for their actions. If a person commits a crime, that person should be brought to book for his or her crimes. No tribe, nationality or ethnic group is responsible for the "destruction" of Nigeria. Individuals, from all walks of life and from all backgrounds and classes have contributed to the situation Nigeria finds itself in.On Tue, Sep 22, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Oluwatoyin Adepoju <toyinkaidara@gmail.com> wrote:---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Ugo Harris Ukandu abujarock@gmail.com [Edo_Global] <Edo_Global@yahoogroups.com>
Date: 21 September 2015 at 17:40
Subject: Edo_Global. AFIS-- FULANI HAS SOME POWER ONLY IN NIGERIA AND HAVE ZERO POWER EVERYWHERE SCATTERED POOREST AND DESTITUTES IN 15 COUNTRIES EVERYWHERE ==FULANI ARE BORN TO RULE, IGBO ARE BORN TO CRY..........I am afraid of jail Tinibu...pics
To: Edo_Global@yahoogroups.com
It is interesting that only gullible Nigeria does Fulani have some political power. In the rest of the 15 or more countries they are scattered and live in Africa, they have zero power and are the most destitute and poorest African tribes in Africa. Maybe other African countries that have not given Fulani power know why, and maybe they have seen how Nigeria have been destroyed by a few minority including the Fulanis.
Fulani saw cunningly and used Nigeria as a gullible stupid nation of cowards and corrupt laden few that loots and steals from the people and nation. This is how few corrupt military people, few corrupt politicians, few families and few tribes looted and turn Nigeria into a basket case that is not working and will never work. Fulani is a small tribe in Nigeria of less than 10 million and because Nigeria is a corrupted entity that's why few can loot and corruptly corrupt the nation and they Fulani too are suffering because they constitutes among the poorest and most destitute of all tribes in Nigeria.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------The Fulani, the scattered people of West Africa By TAMBA JEAN-MATHEW | Monday, July 20 2015
http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/The-Fulani-the-scattered-people-of-West-Africa-/-/979182/2799876/-/h3osrr/-/index.html
Fulani girls in West Arica. PHOTO | BBC
Monday, September 21, 2015In spite of their numerical advantage in West Africa, only a few of the Pulaar-speaking politicians have risen to the very top in their countries. Current exceptions are President Macky Sall of Senegal (who is of a mixed-parentage) and President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria.
Ethnic groups that cut across Africa's post-colonial boundaries are a common feature. But perhaps the most widely dispersed community on the continent are the Fulani of West Africa.
They range from Mauritania through Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso to Cote d'Ivoire and across to Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon, though they go with different names in different countries.
Accounting for an estimated total population of some 40 million, they form majorities in many West African countries and are interestingly also the only group of people who are easily recognisable at first sight as they bear similar characteristics.
The Fulani are conspicuous because of their light-skinned complexion, slender composure, long and slender noses, unique accent, and curly hair. At birth, many of them are slashed with two traditional marks on either side of the face between the eye and the ear.
Across West and Central Africa, they are classified mainly as Pulaar-speaking people, but with specific names in various countries. In Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal, they are known as the Peulh.
In Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, they are known as Fula, whereas in Niger, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon, they are called Hausa-Fulani. In northern Cameroon, their term of reference is Fulfulbé.
The Hausa-Fulani nomenclature, especially in Nigeria, came through years of assimilation and intermarriage with the Hausa, who are a distinct group. Others say it is a deliberately political construct to beef up their numbers in Nigeria vis-a-vis the southerners.
In Sierra Leone, a mockery is made of the ethnic Fula-speaking people for their lack of an 'r' in their speaking vocabulary. Hence, they pronounce words like 'brother' as 'boloda' and 'bread' as 'blade.'
But virtually every ethnic Peulh or Fula understands the spoken language generally known as Pulaar, albeit of course with slight differences in phonetics or pronunciation.
This is where they are diametrically opposed to other majority tribes like the Serrer in Senegal whose speakers do not understand a word from the other ethnic Serrer speakers living barely 50km apart.
In discussions about the real origins of the Peulh, Fula or Hausa-Fulani, some claim kinship with the late Ethiopian Emperor Haile Salasie II, who they say was the last monarch in their illustrious pedigree.
The name of the incumbent Rwandan President Paul Kagame also emerges in other contemporary narrations of kinship.
Looking closely at these Pulaar-speaking people, one would easily notice that they bear considerable resemblance to Somalis and/or Ethiopians at the extreme eastern end of the continent.
In Guinea's Futa Djallon region where they are believed to have originated from, the provincial headquarters town of Labé is considered as their natural birthplace.
However, the majority of them are found in the Sahel with some accounts saying they may have originated in the Maghreb from early contacts between the blacks and the Arabic-speaking people.
In Senegal where their concentration is third only after Nigeria and Guinea, the ethnic group is alternately known as Toucouleur, which when literally translated in French means "every colour ".
They are predominantly Muslim and they also happen to be the most nomadic of African communities. To date, there are very few Fulani or Peulh who adhere to Christianity.
Historically, their main occupation was livestock rearing and petty trading in different wares including cowrie shells and kola nuts.
Their staple food comprises meat, milk, millet and sorghum with virtually no spices like pepper.
This sharply contrasts with many other ethnic groups in West Africa and particularly the Kru, a fishing community from Ghana, who are renowned as "pepper birds" and who baptise their children with pepper.
The minority of the Fulani who are dark-skinned will still be recognisable by their accent and curly hair, often bearing resemblance to the dark-skinned Indians.
And like Indians, the Fulani are known for their mainly endogamous system of marriages which they maintain in almost all of the countries of West Africa they occupy.
These are marriages between uncles and nieces and cousins and only in highly exceptional circumstances could one find the Fulani or Peulh marrying into another ethnic group.
Ousmane Baldé, a retired Senegalese school teacher, told the Africa Review that the reason for this was "to ensure that the hard-earned wealth was maintained within the family setting".
This characteristic of the Fula open them up to accusations of ethnocentricity and even racism.
They make very little effort to learn other languages, which many of them tend to have little mastery of.
While they refer to other non-Pulaar speaking Africans as "black people" they also look down on their own dark-skinned kin as machudor or "slave", a derivative from the days of old when slavery was practised among Sahelian and Maghreb communities.
But like any other ethnic group, the Fulani have unique family surnames, prominent among them being Ba and Diallo (spelt Bah and Jallow respectively in English-speaking countries).
Others are Barrie, Baldé, Juldé, and Sall.
One of the most illustrious Pulaar-speakers to emerge on the post-colonial African political landscape was the late Diallo Telli, a Guinean who became the first secretary-general of the Organisation of African Unity. He later died - reportedly through starvation - while imprisoned by the Sekou Touré regime.
In spite of their numerical advantage in West Africa, only a few of the Pulaar-speaking politicians have risen to the very top in their countries. Current exceptions are President Macky Sall of Senegal (who is of a mixed-parentage) and President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria.
On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at 8:31 PM, Afis 'Deinde <odidere2012@gmail.com> wrote:<image2.JPG><image3.JPG><image4.JPG>THE THIEVES CALLED INYANMINRINSThese thieves and cousins of thieves are running scared.It is Sunday. They say they are Jesus followers. Today is the day of worship.I guess what they read in church today is "HOW TO HATE THY NEIGHBOR".
ShikenaAfisSent from my iPad--
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