USA Africa Dialogue Series - Ivory Coast: How to End the Crisis

COTE D'IVOIRE IMPASSE AND ECOWAS GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY

Jide Balogun, Former UN staffer and university professor of public administration. Author of The Route to Power in Nigeria (2009), and Headhunting for World Peace: an inside view of UN employment law and practices (2010). I

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 30, 2010, http://friendsinforeignplaces.blogspot.com/

Ever since its establishment in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (hereafter referred to as ECOWAS or "the Community") has never embarked on an adventure as ill-conceived (and perilous) as the one I am about to describe. If the world press is to be believed, the Authority of the Community sent the sit-tight Ivorian Head of State, Laurent Gbagbo, an ultimatum to vacate his office or face the threat of an externally orchestrated "regime change".  The ECOWAS supremos could not understand why Gbagbo would hang on to power after the electoral commission had pronounced his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, the indisputable winner of the 28 November 2010 presidential election. The ultimatum conveniently omitted the fact that Cote d'ivoire's Constitutional Council had dissented with the electoral body on the outcome of the election. According to the Council, the victor was Gbagbo and not Ouattara.  Also forgotten is the chain reaction triggered by the issuance of two conflicting electoral verdicts-notably, the swearing in of two presidents for the same sovereign state, the appointment of two prime ministers with parallel but incompatible authority, the deepening of hostility between the north and the south, and the escalation of tension.

Case against Gbagbo

That Gbagbo has outlived his usefulness is beyond doubt. The 2000 election that first brought him to power could hardly be equated with popular mandate, more so as Alassane Ouattara had yet to scale the citizenship obstacle to be cleared for participation. The election came and went but it neither mollified the disenfranchised Ivorians nor persuaded the northern rebels to lay down their arms. It will be recalled that Côte d'Ivoire was split into two entities after a failed coup in 2002, with the south remaining with the government, and the north firmly under the control of the rebels. It took an externally cobbled agreement, the 2007 peace accord, to get Gbagbo to share power with a prime minister, Guillaume Soro, leader of the New Forces (FN).

Rather than avail himself the opportunity presented by the cessation of hostilities to energize the economy and improve the people's living standards, Gbagbo engaged in petty political squabbles. Even when the rebels appeared willing to give the power sharing arrangement (and peace) a chance, he never ceased to play hide-and-seek with his opponents and the international community.  He designated policy areas that were off-limits to his prime minister. With his constant refrain on Ivorian sovereignty, he antagonized foreign powers whose support he needed to turn the economy around, strengthen governance institutions, and consolidate post-conflict gains. Having frustrated attempts at the conduct of elections in 2004 and 2005, he took advantage of the UN Security Council resolution 1721 of 2006 to extend his tenure and to evade the risk of imminent defeat. Meanwhile, the neglect of the economy and the growing welfare deficits had combined to increase the incidence of crime and fuel socio-political tension.

Cote d'Ivoire's civic culture

So, going by simple logic, it is plausible to make a case for Gbagbo's removal. The question is what constitutes logic in Cote d'Ivoire's complex, sometimes illogical, situation. Equally salient is the issue of how and by whom he is to be "removed". Let us first address the question of logic, along with how it has been shaped by the Ivorian civic culture. It might be difficult to accept, but rather than emerge spontaneously, Cote d'Ivoire's crisis evolved over time. The crisis might not be noticeable all along, but it started right from the days of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the country's first President.

In the days when life-Presidents were rare, Houphouet-Boigny was one of a kind. He ruled his country with a firm-some would say, iron, others paternal-hand. Since Cote d'Ivoire's economy by and large did well while he was at the helm, neither he nor any of his associates broached the idea of the president's eventual demise, and none came up with any leadership succession plan. Dictator or not, the West loved him. This was not surprising. If there was any African that eagerly championed Western, and particularly, French, interests on the continent, Felix it was.  He played a crucial role containing Communism, destabilizing left-leaning neighbours, supporting Western-oriented "liberation movements", and spreading the gospel of free enterprise. At a time when the likes of Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah opted for "freedom in poverty" (rather than "enslavement with affluence"), the Ivorian President harped on Franco-African "inter-dependence" and solidarity.

Interesting enough, Laurent Gbagbo was a thorn in the life President's flesh.  As an arrowhead of opposition to Houphouet-Boigny's regime, Gbagbo led the demonstrations which culminated in the closure of universities and institutions of higher learning in February 1982. Shortly thereafter, he fled to France where he formed the Ivorian Popular Front (PFI) and made fruitless attempts to turn the French against Houphouet-Boigny.

If Gbagbo's transformation from student agitator to sit-tight president is today ironic, so is Alassane Ouattara's decision to confer post-humus honour on Houphouet-Boigny. How else does one interpret his choice of "Houphouets' Rally for Peace and Development" as the name by which his party would be known?[1] Back in 1993 when the President was critically ill, it was widely expected that on his demise, he would be succeeded by none but Ouattara. The latter's influence grew when he served as Prime Minister and after 1990 when Houphouet-Boigny's deteriorating health devolved on Ouattara the power and authority to make critical decisions.  Yet, before he breathed his last, the ailing President left the instructions that the mantle of leadership be passed not to Ouattara, but to Henri Konan Bedie, then President of the National Assembly. That singular decision was latter to hand Ouattara's opponents the ammunition they needed to outflank him politically. The intense leadership struggle which followed Houphouet-Boigny's death ended with Ouattara being declared an alien-an alien who, though not from outer space, did not belong in Cote d'Ivoire and, for that reason, could not even dream of becoming the country's Number One Citizen.

Bedie's ascension to power did not end the struggle for power. For one thing, Ouattara never gave up the idea of unseating him. For another, the northern part of the country felt increasingly alienated by the decision to declare a fellow northerner ineligible for the number one post-based on the flimsy excuse of non-citizenship. While the leadership struggle lasted, Bedie unsuccessfully enlisted the support of the military. Robert Guei's refusal to toe the (ruling) party line led to the General's summary dismissal as army chief of staff in 1995.  His subsequent appointment as a minister was did not last long either as he was fired within a year. By 1999, elements within the army had decided to move against Bedie. He was overthrown and Robert Guei was recalled from retirement to head the military junta. 



Internal Ivorian capacity for "regime change"

Hoping to burnish his image as a democrat, and expecting at the same time to cash in on his popularity, Guei organized a presidential election in 2000. This is the election which he contested but which would eventually bring Gbagbo to power. General Guei might have wished to dump his army fatigues for civilian leadership toga, but he was defeated at the 2000 poll by Laurent Gbagbo. Then began another drama-one with a significant lesson for ECOWAS and other well-wishers of Cote d'Ivoire.  Probably thinking that what separates a sitting head of state from power is either death (as in the case of Houphouet-Boigny) or military coup (as that of Konan Bedie), Guei behaved as if he had been comprehensively insured against both threats. He refused to recognize the results of the 2000 election and to hand over power to Gbagbo. It never occurred to Guei that there were other methods-besides death and coup d'etat-for removing unwanted leaders. Gbagbo, a former student leader, successfully mobilized the populace against the quasi-military regime. In the end, it was internal popular agitation-not an externally planned military coup-that brought about the "regime change".

Case against externally orchestrated change

Of course, nothing would please Ouattara's supporters more than to be rid of Gbagbo once and for all. To achieve their goal, they would enthusiastically welcome assistance from any quarter-including the support of friends in high and powerful places. However, when the friends happen to come from places that are also foreign to Cote d'Ivoire, the short-term gains will in all probability turn into long-term head-aches. It does not matter the origin of an externally fomented regime change-be it the under-the-radar moves of foreign powers, the ECOWAS's do-gooder instinct, or the inscrutable mind of the "international community"-such a change cannot but produce ominous consequences. Iraq, Afghanistan, and, to come nearer home, Somalia, are living examples of foreign intervention gone awry. DRC's agonies might not have lasted this long had external meddlers not inserted themselves into the country's socio-economic, political and military equations. The fires in Liberia and Sierra Leone were not extinguished until the two countries squarely faced the challenges posed by foreign economic interests-timber merchants in the case of the former, and the purveyors of "blood diamonds" in the case of the latter.

Needless to add that among states waiting to join Cote d'Ivoire adventure are those facing monumental governance, socio-cultural, and development challenges at home--that is, within their own territories. One would have expected such states to literally mind their own business. They would certainly do well to promote dialogue at home on how to tackle their own problems instead of planning to rush troops to foreign lands.

When a nation is in conflict, the best that outsiders could do to help is either to stay out, or act as credible and impartial arbitrators. An arbitrator compromises his/her role (and renders him/herself redundant) when s/he abashedly takes sides. With specific reference to ECOWAS's ultimatum to Gbagbo, such an act not only questions the moral autonomy of individual Ivorians but it also ridicules the sovereignty of the Ivorian state. It sends a wrong signals to Ouattara's supporters-the signals that decisive help is on the way, and that their man was only a second away from power.  And by giving hope to one side, threats of external intervention fosters a siege mentality on the opposite side--the side of the "victimized".

ECOWAS and limits to 'rapid deployment' capacity

Even on the assumption that foreign intervention is inevitable, ECOWAS must start by asking if it has the mandate (and the wherewithal) to proceed. Neither the 1975 nor the Revised Treaty included war-mongering as one of the Community's strategic objectives. Under the Revised Treaty, the High Contracting Parties simply "decide that it (ECOWAS) shall ultimately be the sole economic community in the region for the purpose of economic integration and the realization of the objectives of the African Economic Community." What are these objectives?  As provided for in Chapter II, Article 3 of the Treaty, the aims of the Community


"are to promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent" (emphasis added)
And in order to achieve the aims set out in the paragraph above, and in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Community shall, by stages, ensure;
(a) the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources, industry, transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism, legal matters;
(b) the harmonization and coordination of policies for the protection of the environment;

(c) the promotion of the establishment of joint production enterprises; 
(d) the establishment of a common market through:

(i) the liberalization of trade by the abolition, among Member States, of customs duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition among Member States, of non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade area at the Community level;
(ii) the adoption of a common external tariff and, a common trade policy vis-à-vis third countries;
(iii) the removal, between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, service and capital, and to the right of residence and establishment. 
(e) the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common policies in the economic, financial social and cultural sectors, and the creation of a monetary union;
(f) the promotion of joint ventures by private sectors enterprises and other economic operators, in particular through the adoption of a regional agreement on cross-border investments;
(g) the adoption of measures for the integration of the private sectors, particularly the creation of an enabling environment to promote small and medium scale enterprises;
(h) the establishment of an enabling legal environment;
(i) the harmonization of national investment codes leading to the adoption of a single Community investment code;
(j) the harmonization of standards and measures;
(k) the promotion of balanced development of the region, paying attention to the special problems of each Member State particularly those of land-locked and small island Member States;
(l) the encouragement and strengthening of relations and the promotion of the flow of information particularly among rural populations, women and youth organizations and socio professional organizations such as associations of the media, business men and women, workers, and trade unions;
(m) the adoption of a Community population policy which takes into account the need for a balance between demographic factors and socio economic development;
(n) the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development; and
(o) any other activity that Member States may decide to undertake jointly with a view to attaining Community objectives.
It is true that the High Contracting Parties agreed to be bound by certain fundamental principles, among which are equality and inter-dependence, solidarity and collective self-reliance, inter-State cooperation, and maintenance of regional peace, recognition and protection of human and peoples' rights, and promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State as envisaged by the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991. However, the principles could not have included war-mongering for the simple reason that the High Contracting Parties at the same time committed themselves to the following principles:

*          non-aggression between (and presumably, among) Member States;
*          maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness (rather than aggression); and
*          peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States, active cooperation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development.
Ending the Ivorian stand-off: Options  
If, for theoretical, practical, legal, and other reasons, ECOWAS ought to rule out the "regime change" option, does it then mean that the Ivorian crisis should be left to fester? The answer to this is No. ECOWAS can still serve as a force for the good in Cote d'Ivoire.  However, if it is to build lasting peace in this remarkably beautiful country, ECOWAS should reinvent itself as a genuine peace maker.  It should come up with proposals that lean neither to Ouattara nor to Gbagbo.  At any rate, the time is now when rival candidates for the presidency of Cote d'Ivoire ought to display their leadership and bridge-building competencies.

Fortunately, as I was getting ready to post this blog, I learnt that ECOWAS had decided to send a negotiation team to Abidjan. This is a welcome development.  The first order of business is to undo the damage that the hasty commitment to intervention might have caused.  As much as possible, the team ought to let the contending parties know that the issues at stake are such as could only be resolved by Ivorians themselves rather than by outsiders. Emphasis should be given to the role of Ivorian political, civic, religious and business leaders and the intelligenstia in steering the country away from disaster towards peace and prosperity.  What ECOWAS can (and must be ready to) do is offer its good offices in bringing the warring parties together and nudging them towards mutual accommodation. Anything outside that is off-limits to the Community, in particular, and to foreign do-gooders, in general.

Back in 1998 when Dr Asmelash Beyene and I submitted a restructuring and reorganization proposal to the ECOWAS Secretariat, we had both cautioned against the plan to institutionalize war-mongering by authorizing the establishment of a full-fledged Department of Military Affairs. At that time, we felt that whatever setbacks there were to regional integration (in West Africa, and particularly, in Liberia and Sierra Leone) would soon become history.  To use the temporary setbacks to justify the establishment of a permanent Military Affairs Department was to ignore the philosophy underpinning the creation of the Community.  If the plan to invade Cote d'Ivoire and install a president goes ahead, the fear Ashmelash and I both entertained back in 1998 would have been borne out-ECOWAS would have indeed wandered off its regional integration track to plan and launch military expeditions in far-off places!  
I wish you all a Happy New Year!
M J Balogun

[1] In French, Houphouets' Rally for Democracy and Peace translates into Rassemblement Houphouetists versez Democracie et Pais/RHDP)

Posted by friendsinforeignplaces at 1:10 PM 0 comments
Email This
BlogThis!
Share to Twitter
Share to Facebook
Share to Google Buzz



SUNDAY, DECEMBER 26, 2010
Welcome to my first post!

The events of 9/11 changed the world. Neither international nor national politics will ever be the same. The idea behind this blog is to track the linkages between both--that is, between what happens at home and what is decided abroad. Once in a while, I hope to comment on global developments with local implications or domestic choices with profound external effects .  Other issues of contemporary interest will be discussed as the need arises.

 

--  

Toyin Falola
Department of History
The University of Texas at Austin
1 University Station
Austin, TX 78712-0220
USA
512 475 7224
512 475 7222  (fax)
http://www.toyinfalola.com/
www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa
http://groups.google.com/group/yorubaaffairs
http://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue