- ".... on further reflection, proposing a minute silence in Adekunle's memory at the National Assembly was in error. I think this syndrome of passive insensitivity has gone on for too long. I also see no basis for the comparison with Emeka Ojukwu. *The symbolism of Ojukwu for Nigeria is far greater than that of Adekunle. The former was the embodiment of Biafra while the latter was no more than a relatively successful war commander - there is no equivalence between the two*-- Akin Osuntokun."
Akin Osuntokun has something in common with Ojukwu which is that their fathers were among some Nigerians selected and groomed by the Colonialist to be intermediaries between the colonial masters and the Nigerian masses. For their sorry roles in history the colonialist made them rich relative to ordinary Nigerians. The children of the agents of the Colonialist in Nigeria constitute a separate class of their own and they associate and mingle politically across the ethnic and religious boundaries. It is in this Class context that one should understand Osuntokun's elevation of Ojukwu to war hero and his belittling of Adekunle as a lucky, ordinary war commander. Few months before the outbreak of War in 1967, Peter Enahoro who had gone into exile in protest of the killing of the Igbos in the North in September 1967, wrote in the Eastern Nigerian Outlook thus, "Eastern Nigeria must not surrender. Ojukwu must not capitulate. Let us for the first time in the history of Nigeria have a force powerful enough to challenge the feudal North." Had Ojukwu declared war against the feudalists, many Nigerians would have enlisted in his army. But since the feudalists were the same petty bourgeois class empowered by the colonialist as his father, Louis Philip Ojukwu , Emeka Ojukwu had no interest in fighting the feudalists. I do agree that there is no equivalence between Ojukwu and Adekunle because while Ojukwu was a psychopath that wasted million of lives of our Igbo brethren for nothing, Adekunle wanted to stop the sufferings and deaths in Biafra by a quick defeat of Ojukwu's army. Through the military prowess of Adekunle, the war in practice had almost ended in September 1968 but the power that be prevented Adekunle from finishing the war. The claim that Obasanjo finished the war is no more than attributing gallantry to a hunter who discovers a dead lion. Akin Osuntokun can parade pygmies as giants to his ilk but not to normal Nigerians.
2. "A more careful reading and less received wisdom on the civil war raises the issue of the proper place of a historical personality like General J T U Aguiyi in the history of Nigeria. I think it was fairly certain he was not part of the January 1966 coup and that he was a victim of circumstances - Akin Osuntokun."
Whatever is fairly certain, is not certain; a woman is either pregnant or not, for one cannot see a half-pregnant woman. Forty-eight years after the coup, it is hypocritical of Akin Osuntokun to still be thinking if Ironsi was part of the coup or not. Let us go into how the coup was organised and executed.
Major Patrick Chukwuma Nzeogwu was assigned to take charge of the affairs of the Northern zone and he was to be assisted by Major Timothy Onwuatuegwu. Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna was to co-ordinate all the activities planned for Southern zone. His key collaborators were Majors Adewale Ademoyega, Humphrey Chukwuka and Donatius Okafor. Major John Obienu was to support the coup execution in the Southern zone with armoured vehicles. The two zones were to be independent of each other, with Major Christian I Anuforo acting as liaison officer and co-ordinator general of operations. According to Captain Ben Gbulie, there arose a disagreement about if the coup was to be bloody or not. "One group of the officers deemed, for instance, it was necessary, indeed mandatory to gun everybody down so as not to jeopardize in any way their chances of success; they also firmly believed that no success is sure unless it is complete. The other group of officers... argued strongly in favour of a bloodless coup... Opinions were almost evenly divided. Finally, ... the coup plotters decided to let every officer exercise his discretion in handling the matter. Everyone could do what he thought expedient, particularly in the event of unforeseen circumstances (P. 57-58, NIGERIA'S FIVE MAJORS: BY Ben Gbulie)." As it later turned out those who were against bloody coup were those assigned to deal with Ironsi, Ojukwu, Okpara and Osadebay!!
Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka was the Commander of the 5th Battalion in Kano as at January 15, 1966. Since Nzeogwu and his co-plotters in Kaduna envisaged a sort of opposition to the coup, they issued a .38-calibre pistol and ample live ammunition to Captain Goddy Ude and dispatched him by road from Kaduna to Kano already on Thursday, 13 January 1966, for the purpose of neutralizing Ojukwu (p.66, Gbulie: Nigeria's Five Majors). In early morning of the coup in Kaduna the capital of the then Northern Region, Nzeogwu led his troops to the Premier's Lodge and killed the Premier, Ahmadu Bello, one of his wives and a night guard. On his part, Major Timothy Onwuatuegwu, led troops to surround the residence of Brigadier Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun while he went upstairs with his cocked Sten gun at ready, safety-catch release. Gbulie wrote, "Then having burst into the master bedroom, he (Onwuatuegwu) turned on the light and found a stunned Brigadier Ademulegun lying in bed with his wife. 'What the devil!' barked the Brigadier, flouncing out of the sheets in his pyjamas, a threatening edge to his deep voice. Meanwhile an equally shocked Mrs Ademulegun, draped in a silk lingerie, climbed out of their bed, and planting herself protectively in front of her husband, yelled, 'What are you doing in here.' Just at that instant, Major Onwuatuegwu squeezed the trigger. A bullet caught the Brigadier slap-bang on the chest. Mrs Ademulegun dived, screaming, trying to shield her husband from the lethal lead. A second bullet also meant for the Brigadier hit her, ripping open her abdomen. Then as the couple reeled and slumpd down on the floor, their attacker turned away and left them. In a matter of seconds his two victims lay perfectly still in a large pool of blood (Gbulie: p. 79-80)." May I add here that Ademulegun's wife was said to be eight months old pregnant.
Onwuatuegwu drove next to the residence of Colonel Robert A Shodeinde. According to Gbulie, "The Major tried to force open the living-room door, but it was firmly locked. Some moments later, however, the Colonel, thinking he heard someone knocking at the door, came out to open it - to his complete undoing. Almost immediately, his second wife emerged from behind him, wondering on earth what was going on. Then the Colonel without uttering a word, turned slowly, rather contemptuously, and started working away. Major Onwuatuegwu opened fire. He fired twice, one of the bullets cutting the Colonel down, while the other cut his young pregnant wife, wounding her considerably but not fatally (p. 80, Nigeria's Five Major by Ben Gbulie)."
On Captain Goddy Ude's mission in Kano, Gbulie wrote, "We had fully realized, however, that our signal instruction to Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu's unit was no more than a leap in the dark, for we have also received no word from our man, Captain Goddy Ude, whom we had sent there on a special mission." It is worthwhile to know that, Captain Ude was of Igbo tribe just like Ojukwu!!
The operation in Ibadan was led by Emanuel Nwora Nwobosi who quickly arrested the Deputy Premier, Chief Remilekun Fani-Kayode, that led the soldiers to the Premier's hide out. On arrival there Gbulie noted,"...Captain Nwobosi burst into the building, followed by second Lieutenant Egbikor. They set about searching for their target, blasting one door open after another,their weapons at the ready and with forefinger on the trigger. They searched for a long time without success. Then, as they darted up the stairs towards the Chief's bedroom, the whole house suddenly quaked with the report of small arms fire. Quickly Captain Nwobosi ordered his men to withdraw.. A bullet had gazed his head, spattering his uniform with blood. Another bullet had hit Egbikor, but the effect was far from fatal. Once outside the house, Nwobosi allowed his troops to open fire, with a view to getting the Premier to return it. Not unexpectedly, the Premier took the bait. He continued to fire until he exhausted his ammunition. When he stopped firing, Nwobosi asked his men to cease too. ...the Premier with his hands raised in surrender, strode defencelessly out of the building. Minutes later, he was executed by a three-man firing-squad (p. 133-134 of Nigeria's Five Majors by Captain Gbulie)."
In Lagos the situation was very confusing and it was there the tribal infiltrators wreaked havoc on the revolutionary Majors led by Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna. The coup in Lagos did not commence until 03:00 in the morning of 15 January 1966 because the plotters were at the Ikoyi residence of Brigadier Maimalari for a party in respect of his newly wed wife. At about midnight the coup planners, except Major John Obienu, withdrew quietly from the party. Major Ifeajuna led the troops to arrest Prime Minister Balewa and Finance Minister Okotie- Eboh. Major Donatius Okafor and his troops struck at Brigadier Maimalari residence and even though some guards were killed, Maimalari escaped from his assassins. Gbulie recounted, "But, unfortunately for him, luck was not quite on his side. He was captured shortly afterwards by Lieutenant Geoffrey Ezedigbo who had spotted him scurrying away, along a side-road. Then, almost immediately, Major Ifeajuna arrived. At once the Brigadier recognized his BM (Brigade Major) and, heaving a deep sigh of relief, hollered,*It's me, Emma! It's me the Brigade Commander!* All to no avail, however. For he was instantly gunned down by the very person he had thought would gladly rush to his rescue (p. 128- 129)." Also killed by the coup makers were, Lieutenant Colonel Abogo Largema in a hotel at Ikoyi where he was temporarily accommodated on official errand from his 4th Infantry Battalion in Ibadan; Lieutenant Colonel James Yakubu Pam, the Adjutant General; Colonel Kuru Mohammed, Chief of Staff; and Lieutenant Arthur Chinyelu Unegbe, the Quartermaster General. The killers were identified as Major Ifeajuna, Major Anuforo, Major Chukwuka and Major Donatius Okafor.
Ironsi had been at a party on elder dempster ship at the harbour that night but when he left, he did not go home. Where was General Ironsi? Captain Gbulie explained, "But by far the thickest wedge cast between the coup executors and success was the ugly element of treachery that manifested itself in the course of nocturnal operation. To begin with Major Donatius Okafor and Captain Ogbo Oji had taken a stand against any step that might embody the killing of Ironsi. ...It was, to say the least, too much of a coincidence that while the would-be assassins were pointedly making for his (Ironsi) residence he was at the same time heading towards Ikeja to enlist the support of the personnel of the said 2nd Infantry Battalion (to crush the Majors' Revolution)." Gbulie Continued, "Moreover, it turned out that at that very crucial stage of the operation, ... Major John Obienu had for some insane reason, turned traitor; and that he was, in fact, a downright insincere coward. His failure to honour his pledge and turn up that night with his armoured cars was the one deciding act that led ultimately to the collapse of the Lagos operation - a calamitous act of sabotage that, by depriving our colleagues of the much-needed fire-power with which to crush Ironsi counter-revolution, finally drove a nail into the coffin of our objective (Gbulie: p 125-126)." Captain Gbulie remarked on p. 125 that Captain Ogbo Oji was a native of Umuahia in the Eastern Region, and a kinsman of Ironsi. It should also be noted that Major Obienu did not leave Brigadier Maimalari's party with his fellow coup planners. In fact when he left there, he went to Ikeja to wait for Ironsi who linked up with him. Gbulie recounted Major Okafor's excuse for the failure of the coup in Lagos thus, "To begin with, the news had leaked out several days in advance of the military operation. Far too many people in the Lagos units, officers and men alike, had got wind of an imminent coup d'état and were actually peddling this vital intelligence long before the D-day ( Gbulie p. 124)." Okafor and Ogbo Oji self had taken a stand against any step that might embody the killing of Ironsi and if the leakage of the impending coup had occurred several days before the D-Day, then, Ironsi must have heard about it. In his book titled, *NZEOGWU - An Intimate Portrait,* Obasanjo had this to say, "It was alleged that some of the participants tipped off Major-General Ironsi and that Lieutenant Orji (actually Captain Ogbo Oji) who was detailed to take care of him, saw him at Carter Bridge and after they exchanged words in their local dialect, Orji (Oji) had a change of heart. It may also be said that kinsmanship and old school ties alone are not enough to carry out and sustain a coup in Nigeria. The pattern of casualties was seen on reflection by well-meaning Nigerians as not only uneven, but also a sudden change in the political equation (p 100)." To some Nigerians, like Akin Osuntokun, everyday is first of April in which they are either being fooled or they are fooling others.
S. Kadiri
Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2014 07:06:21 -0700
From: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com
Subject: USA Africa Dialogue Series - Akin Osuntokun: From Biafra to Scotland
To: usaafricadialogue@googlegroups.com
Apparently the ghost of Biafra has not been laid to rest. I should know. I got so carried away about the late Benjamin Adekunle and Alabi Isama’s book on the Nigeria civil war; that I completely forgot myself and failed to dutifully reflect the most pertinent question of the war in my column last week titled Adekunle; Obasanjo and the Civil War - the justification and the meaning. I was given a rude awakening to this lapse by letters pointedly calling to question the propriety of celebrating distinguished combatants of the war as national heroes.
In all honesty, I cannot find fault with this sentiment and would even go further to suggest that on further reflection, proposing a minute silence in Adekunle’s memory at the National Assembly was in error. I think this syndrome of passive insensitivity has gone on for too long. I also see no basis for the comparison with Emeka Ojukwu. The symbolism of Ojukwu for Nigeria is far greater than that of Adekunle. The former was the embodiment of Biafra while the latter was no more than a relatively successful war commander -- there is no equivalence between the two.
The logic of the proclamation of no victor no vanquished by General Yakubu Gowon transcends the act of magnanimity and represents the central truism of the war -- it was not a war between good and evil, not a contest between right and wrong. The war, for instance, has no correlation to the America civil war fought to overcome a secessionist bid that was predicated on the categorical moral evil of slavery. This (the American precedent) was a just war and it is correct to celebrate its outcome as the victory of good over evil.
I do not subscribe to a similar characterisation and criminalisation of Biafra -- to do so will amount to consecrating the motto of the victorious federal government as ‘might is right’-emptied of moral content. Nigeria has been living a lie and the sooner we begin calling a lie by its name the better for us all. A more careful reading and less received wisdom on the civil war raises the issue of the proper place of a historical personality like General JTU Aguiyi in the history of Nigeria. I think it was fairly certain he was not part of the January 1966 coup and that he was a victim of circumstances.
The irony here is that from all the accounts of the coup and counter coup of 1966, he died on account of a stubborn commitment to the unity and integration of Nigeria -- the antithesis of secession. This was what Decree 34 was all about -- the abolition of the regions and their rearrangement into group of provinces; and the posting of military governors to administer provinces other than their own.
Bereft of guilt conscience and in supreme demonstration of good faith, he practically entrusted his life to a Hausa-Fulani officer, Sani Bello, whom he appointed ADC. For that matter if Ironsi could be linked, no matter how tenuous the linkage, on account of ethnic consanguinity to the January 15th coup, why was it equally necessary to kill his host in Ibadan, Governor Adekunle Fajuyi?
The nationalist predilection of Ironsi is seldom highlighted and completely glossed over because it does not suit the narrative of fostering defensive mentality of aggrandising secessionist aggressors on the Igbo.
Far it be from me to seek to exonerate any guilty party (as the coup plotters of January 1966) of any culpability in the series of mishaps that exploded into the civil war but the idea of constructing a nationalist ideology on the criminalisation of Biafra is at the root of a hypocritical national behavioural pattern that robs Nigeria of authenticity and obstructs development-oriented identification and solidarity by citizens.
Presented with an unambiguous colour projection, Nigerians are apt to choose that moment to be colour-blind. Personally I am beginning to think that maybe it is not too late in the day to convene a truth and reconciliation commission (even if it is at the symbolic level) on the most significant aspect of post independent Nigeria’s history.
I find it most curious and disheartening that the late Chief Ojukwu failed to give us what would have been the most comprehensive account of Biafra. And the more worrisome in all this is that the omission was deliberate; there could be no any other explanation than that, for whatever reason, Ojukwu just did not want to do it. He was adequately equipped to write, write and write.
He had in abundance, what, in another context, Thurston Veblen called the leisure of the theory class. He had no financial constraints; he studied history at Oxford University and had all the time in the world to mentally exert himself in whatever direction and on whatever cause he chose. He served as military officer in both the Nigeria and Biafra armies; he was intellectually rigorous.
The sad conclusion here is that there is no inference we can make from this abstention that can be interpreted positively for Nigeria. At best, the attitude bespeaks of stoic indifference to the destiny of Nigeria and at worst an anticipation that the country is ultimately fated to doom and disintegration.
I don’t know whether there is in existence a ‘Reader’ on the Nigeria civil war, in the manner that we have a ‘Reader’ on Nigeria federalism (a publication comprising papers contributed by scholars and experts) neither am I aware that a colloquium convened on the specific subject of the Nigeria civil war has been called.
The reason the book (There Was A Country) by the intellectual giant and greatest Africa story teller, Chinua Achebe, provoked so much controversy, was that it seemed more like an afterthought; an incomplete and unnecessarily sensational work, rushed, perhaps in anticipation of death knocking at the door, to fill a vacuum left by the prima donna, Ojukwu. It is striking that the most celebrated effort yet at telling the Biafra story, with the empathy that nobody outside the Biafra mental space can muster, was undertaken by a lady born after the civil war.
My combustible friend (I won’t mention his name) called, in bated breath, the night before the referendum in Scotland, to sound me out on the likely reverberation on Nigeria -- were the ayes to carry the day. My thinking was that it would have resonated a lot more were the National Conference delegates to be in session.
Asked a similar question afterwards -- what the lessons were. I surmised there are two interrelated take-away (again I say this with the due apologies to Lagos State Governor Babatunde Fashola). One is that it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war and it is ultimately profitable to subscribe to the principle of voluntary citizenship, because in reality, though it can be delayed but nobody can stop an idea whose time has come.
Why don’t we, for instance, call the bluff of those who say they want to leave Nigeria and call a referendum on the proposal? The presumption that the call for secession if subjected to popular vote will carry the day is mostly not true. If it is put to vote and it is defeated, as it is often the case, you would have achieved a better settled and more resilient society.
Such positive outcome however is contingent upon the willingness to grant more local (regional) autonomy -- understood as the moderate version and reconcilable response to agitations for separation. The pledge by Prime Minister David Cameron to support more devolution to the comprising four nationalities of United Kingdom, UK, was the deal that finally sealed the Yes vote.
- Ikhide
Stalk my blog at www.xokigbo.com
Follow me on Twitter: @ikhide
Join me on Facebook: www.facebook.com/ikhide
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